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Abortion is an inimitable experience that poses a host of unique ethical and
philosophical questions not generated by other medical procedures. In spite of a massive
amount of literature discussing abortion, there is little theoretical work examining the
relationship between abortion and informed consent. This is a problematic oversight
because informed consent plays a prominent role in contemporary abortion practices. In
an effort to address this lacuna, my dissertation explores the concept of informed consent
as it functions within abortion discourse.
Informed consent and abortion are both interdisciplinary terms and thus a robust
critique of their intersection requires an interdisciplinary analysis. Therefore, I critically
track the concept of informed consent across four unique discourses: traditional informed
consent literature, Supreme Court rulings on abortion regulations, state-sponsored
informed consent materials distributed to women seeking an abortion, and women’s firstperson narratives. As a contribution to feminist and bioethics scholarship, I argue that
informed consent is a deeply inadequate concept in the context of abortion. Importantly,
however, the reasons for this inadequacy change relative to the discourse in question.
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Thus, Chapters One, Two, Three, and Four each take as their focus a distinct discursive
engagement of informed consent. In Chapter Five, I confront a series of questions
generated by my interdisciplinary survey.
In bridging the gaps between informed consent theory and abortion discourse, I
demonstrate two important points. First, I illustrate how popular articulations of
informed consent are ill-equipped to address the moral and medical issues particular to
abortion. Secondly, I illuminate cases where the rhetoric of informed consent is, in fact,
being used to undermine and jeopardize women’s reproductive autonomy. This
dissertation concludes with a plea for a revised conception of informed consent within the
abortion context, one that deploys the subjective standard of disclosure and recognizes
the value of flexible dialogue between the woman and her abortion provider.
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

“Might it not be necessary to do two things at once: to emphasize both the permanent
value of the philosophy of rights, and, simultaneously, the inadequacy, the limits of the
breakthrough it represented?” Helene Cixous (1993, p.202)

Although abortion is shrouded in stigma and controversy, it is a common
procedure. According to the Guttmacher Institute, one half of all pregnancies in the
United States are unintended (Finer & Zolna, 2014). Of these, forty percent will end in
abortion (Finer & Zolna, 2014). In 2011, over a million women had abortions in the
United States alone (Jones & Jerman, 2014). Given abortion rates in 2008, three in ten
women will have had an abortion by the age of forty-five (Jones & Kavanaugh, 2011).1
Abortion has been legal in the United States since the Supreme Court’s landmark
1973 ruling in Roe v. Wade. Over the last forty years, however, access to abortion has
diminished as states have found creative ways to regulate and restrict the abortion
procedure. In the first half of 2011, state legislators introduced a record number of
antiabortion bills. In nineteen states alone, eighty antiabortion laws ranging from
mandatory counseling and waiting periods to gestational laws and bans on insurance
coverage were passed, a legislative testimony to the incremental successes of the
antiabortion campaign (Guttmacher Institute, July 13, 2011). According to the
Guttmacher Institute (July, 2014), at least half of the states have now passed some form
of legislative restriction on abortion.
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Of the many restrictive regulations imposed by antiabortionists in recent years,
one of the most troubling comes in the form of “informed consent” laws. In traditional
form, informed consent is at once a legal requirement that governs medical decisionmaking and an ethical ideal that aims to enhance and protect patient autonomy in the
clinical and medical-research settings. An emancipatory concept designed to service
individual rights, informed consent is a child of liberal humanist thought and its
concomitant ideals of freedom and equality.
Despite its liberatory origins, however, informed consent practices are
increasingly being used to subvert and undermine women’s reproductive autonomy.2
More specifically, antiabortion politicians are infiltrating the informed consent process to
further an antiabortion agenda and, consequently, a number of states have passed laws
that require healthcare providers to share misleading and fraudulent information to
women seeking an abortion.3 According to the Guttmacher Institute (February, 2015a),
seventeen states currently advise women of at least one of the following scientifically
unsubstantiated claims in their “informed consent” materials: a link between abortion
and breast cancer; the ability of the fetus to feel pain; the possibility that abortion will
cause long-term mental health consequences for the woman (p.1). Concurrently, five
states require providers to tell women that personhood begins at conception, twentyseven states include information on fetal development throughout the entire course of
pregnancy despite the fact that third-trimester abortions have never been legal on
demand, and five states inaccurately claim abortion causes infertility (Guttmacher
Institute, February, 2015b). In each case, the information provided to women is
scientifically unsupported, ideologically biased, or medically unnecessary (Richardson &
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Nash, Fall 2006). Although some states’ informed consent requirements continue to
accord with the standard format of the informed consent process—a basic description of
the abortion procedure and its purpose, a description of the risks or benefits associated
with the procedure, a list of alternative procedures, and an opportunity for the patient to
ask questions (Berg et al., 2001, p.12)—the information provided in other states’
“informed consent” materials is medically deceptive and designed to reinforce
antiabortion ideology.
Inspired and troubled by the antiabortion appropriation of bioethics rhetoric, this
dissertation unpacks the concept of informed consent as it functions within the
contemporary abortion context. Separately, the topics of informed consent and abortion
have received extensive theoretical attention. However, there is little theoretical work
that considers the troubling interplay between informed consent and abortion practices,
and the ideological co-option of a concept originally intended to enhance patient
autonomy has received minimal attention in bioethics literature. Operating with a
feminist perspective, I aim to rectify such oversights by critically theorizing the
problematic intersection of informed consent and abortion. This work is necessary
because contemporary “informed consent” law jeopardizes women’s reproductive
autonomy and these laws institutionalize sexist ideologies that aim to efface women’s
moral agency.
Although I am certainly not the first person to notice that antiabortion forces are
perverting the liberal rhetoric of informed consent, I am the first to offer a comprehensive
analysis of informed consent as it functions within contemporary abortion rhetoric. To
complete this task, I critically track the concept of informed consent across four
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discourses: traditional informed consent literature; Supreme Court rulings on abortion
regulations; state sponsored “informed consent” materials given to women seeking an
abortion; and women’s first-person narratives relating their encounters with “informed
consent” laws. I contend that this interdisciplinary survey of informed consent will better
equip scholars and activists to recognize and confront the background normative
assumptions and social beliefs that contribute to the institutionalization of antiabortion
ideology under the pretext of bioethical ideals. That is, in order to successfully challenge
and overthrow “informed consent” laws, it is necessary to understand how the concept of
informed consent functions across different strands of abortion and bioethics rhetoric.
One of the major tasks of this work is to provide a map of this functioning.4
In the course of tracking informed consent across multiple discourses, this work
will demonstrate that informed consent is a deeply inadequate concept in the context of
abortion. Importantly, however, the reason for this inadequacy changes relative to the
discourse in question, whether be it bioethics, Supreme Court rulings, clinical materials,
or anecdotal reports. Thus, Chapters One, Two, Three, and Four each take as their focus
a specific discursive enactment of informed consent. In Chapter Five, I confront a series
of concluding questions generated by the previous four chapters. The scope of my
argument proceeds as follows.
Synopsis of Chapter One
I begin this work with a critical overview of traditional theories of informed
consent. More specifically, my goal in Chapter One is to illuminate a series of theoretical
deficiencies that haunt early articulations of informed consent. Even as I recognize the
many ways that informed consent practices have improved medical decision-making
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during the preceding decades, I argue that mainstream conceptions of informed consent
suffer from a series of theoretical blind spots that carry consequences for minority or
subjugated patient-groups, such as women seeking an abortion.
A secondary goal of this chapter is to problematize the claim that abortion-specific
“informed consent” laws are tantamount to a misappropriation or deformation of standard
informed consent practices, an argument commonly made by Guttmacher Institute policy
analysts and women’s reproductive rights advocates. Although not untrue, the problem
with this argument is that it falsely presumes that informed consent is an ethically ideal
practice that invariably protects all subjects equally, and it overlooks how dominant
articulations of informed consent fail to protect and enable women’s reproductive
autonomy. Counter to other critics of abortion-specific “informed consent” practices, I
propose that the traditional doctrine of informed consent is a limited concept articulated
from a position of social privilege, one that is insensitive to the moral issues generated by
unwanted pregnancy. My critique, in turn, suggests that to adequately support women’s
reproductive autonomy, not only must we overturn “informed consent” laws that deliver
false information to women, but we must revisit and revise dominant informed consent
paradigms, as well.
In order to develop my argument, I construct a mode of critique unique to informed
consent scholarship. More specifically, I use feminist insights to analyze three traditional
formulations of informed consent. At its heart, informed consent is an interdisciplinary
concept, one that emerges across a series of unique disciplines. In order to sufficiently
illuminate the shortcomings of mainstream informed consent theory, I critique informed
consent as it is articulated within early judicial rulings, founding texts of biomedical
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ethics, and government reports. By grouping these three articulations together, my
analysis respects the interdisciplinary character of informed consent even as it casts this
character into critical light.
Importantly, my point is not that informed consent practices should be discarded, as
the concept of informed consent has indubitably benefited medical decision-making in
many ways. I agree with Berg et al (2001) who argue that despite theoretical and
practical flaws, “the process of informed consent is still the most promising path to
patients’ receiving care that is for their own good, as they themselves define it” (p.35).
Rather, my argument is that informed consent theory requires feminist revision if it is to
operationalize women’s autonomy in the abortion-care context.
Synopsis of Chapter Two
In Chapter Two, I commence my critique of informed consent as it functions within
abortion discourse specifically, beginning with a look at judicial rhetoric. More
specifically, the purpose of Chapter Two is to critically track the evolution of informed
consent across United States Supreme Court rulings on abortion, and to demonstrate how
the Supreme Court opened the door to the tsunami of punitive abortion regulations that
define the current era in the pivotal decision Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992).
To clarify the Court’s deployment of informed consent, I offer an historical
overview of Supreme Court rulings that concern medical decision-making in the abortion
context. I focus my attention on the following pre-Casey Court decisions: Roe v. Wade
(1973), Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth (1976), Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health (1983), and Thornburgh v. American College of
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Obstetricians (1986). Pointedly, my historical narrative will show that abortion
jurisprudence routinely proffers an impoverished vision of women’s moral and epistemic
capacities, despite the legal advances precipitated by Roe. Consequently, the Supreme
Court fails to advance an articulation of informed consent that promotes women’s
reproductive autonomy.
My primary argument is that the Court’s failure to recognize women’s moral
authority vis-à-vis the abortion decision positions the Court to interpret informed consent
as a means to monitor women’s reproductive decisions, rather than as a mechanism that
enhances and safeguards women’s autonomy. Although the Casey decision marks a
turning point in the Court’s view of abortion-specific “informed consent” laws, the
Court’s logic from Roe onwards ignores or depreciates women’s epistemic and moral
capacities. When it comes to the abortion decision, the Court is either a) concerned with
protecting the physician’s autonomy, or b) concerned with defending a state’s right to
inject information into the informed consent process. In both instances, the Court
configures women as secondary decision-makers whose abortion decision requires public
surveillance.
Chapter Two develops my argument in Chapter One that the Court operates with an
ethically frail conception of informed consent. Given the Court’s failure to produce a
patient-centered paradigm of informed consent practices in general, it is unsurprising that
the Court would also fail to advance a vision of informed consent practices that
underscore women’s moral autonomy within the abortion context. This chapter provides
a unique perspective on informed consent literature as it shows how the Court’s failure to
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articulate a robust jurisprudence of informed consent carries added consequence for
women seeking to terminate an unwanted pregnancy.
Synopsis of Chapter Three
In Chapter Three I focus on state-sanctioned “informed consent” materials to
demonstrate the troubling deployment of “informed consent” within the clinical context.
Informational content varies state by state, and states rely upon different mediums to
transfer misleading and manipulative information regarding abortion, ranging from
printed materials to verbal recitations to websites. Although a wide-range of information
is discussed across the states, I focus specifically on information trends that I find
particularly disturbing for their scientific falseness and ideological agendas.
Researchers at the Guttmacher Institute have compiled data on the existence of
abortion-specific “informed consent” materials across the states, but there is a dearth of
theoretical work analyzing the rhetoric of these materials. In this chapter I expand upon
preliminary research carried out by the Guttmacher Institute to delineate three rhetorical
strategies that operate within “informed consent” materials: a) the adoption of
methodologically flawed and discredited research studies that falsely suggest a causal
relationship between abortion and breast cancer; b) an embellished and empirically
reductive discussion of post-abortion emotional response; c) the careful construction of a
fetal subject that sanctions antiabortion ideology. By outlining these strategies I
demonstrate with detail how antiabortion forces deform and reform bioethics lexicon to
suit their political program. To discuss the first two rhetorical strategies, I draw upon
policy papers and current scientific research to explain why warnings detailing the
psychological and health “risks” of abortion are medically misleading, empirically
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reductive, and scientifically unsound. To discuss the construction of fetal subjectivity, I
turn to medical embryology and feminist scholarship and I show how antiabortion
ideology permeates and drives mandatory discussions of fetal subjectivity.
Chapter Three departs from the approach taken in the previous two chapters
where I criticized the theory and practice of informed consent within bioethics and
judicial rhetoric. Although I remain mindful of the theoretical problems that jeopardize
dominant articulations of informed consent, my primary purpose in Chapter Three is to
illuminate the dramatic perversion of informed consent practices by antiabortion
politicians. In general, Chapter Three will explain why the antiabortion appropriation of
informed consent bears little resemblance to informed consent doctrine as originally
espoused by the Courts, bioethicists, and clinicians.
“Informed consent” materials assault and jeopardize women’s reproductive
autonomy, they displace the autonomy of healthcare providers, and they bypass
professional standards of information provision. In this sense, “informed consent” laws
are deforming standards of medical practice to align with antiabortion dogma. This
deformation should be viewed as alarming, no matter one’s personal views regarding the
ethics of abortion. The explicit politicization of a healthcare practice originally designed
to benefit patients and improve patient-provider dialogue demands immediate redress.
Synopsis of Chapter Four
The focus of Chapter Four is the impact of “informed consent” laws upon
women’s lives. Currently, there is limited research on “informed consent” laws, and little
is known about women’s idiosyncratic experiences with these regulations. Despite this
paucity of research data, I argue that it is possible to illuminate some of the disturbing
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ramifications of “informed consent” laws and to show how these laws harm women’s
reproductive autonomy.
In section one, I summarize limited research on women’s perceptions of
“informed consent” laws in order to delineate the current research scene. Although
empirical research indicates that “informed consent” laws are not impacting abortion
demand, I argue this research nevertheless contains clues that suggest “informed consent”
laws hurt women’s autonomy. More specifically, I draw on structured interviews to
propose that optional-ultrasound laws engender negative emotional responses in some
women. In addition, I explore a common opinion surfaced by Cockrill and Weitz’s
(2010) research on women’s perceptions of “informed consent” laws: “I do not require
heightened regulation, but other women, do.” I suggest that this opinion is both a cause
and an effect of antiabortion ideology.
In section two, I turn to the story of Carolyn Jones whose first-person account of
“informed consent” laws in Texas has received wide-ranging press. To help theorize an
under-theorized field of human experience, I recount Carolyn Jones’ distressing
experience with abortion laws. Jones’ narrative is useful as it provides rich insight into
both the psychological and administrative dimensions of abortion regulation in Texas.
In section three, I couple Jones’ story with feminist theories of intersectionality
and relational autonomy to hypothesize the obstacles women from other social locations
may encounter during the “informed consent” process. In addition to providing
important insights into the “counseling” experience, Jones’ story also affords the
opportunity to imagine the impact of “informed consent” laws on women who are further
disadvantaged along economic, sexual, or racial lines. Drawing on these insights, I argue
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that “informed consent” laws undermine, assault, and diminish women’s reproductive
autonomy, although not in any uniform way.
By considering the empirical impact of “informed consent for abortion” laws
upon women, this chapter brings together two arguments developed in earlier chapters.
First, Jones’ story demonstrates how deeply “informed consent” laws pervert the doctrine
of informed consent. Secondly, Jones’ encounter with the Texas sonogram law
problematizes bioethics’ facile equation of information with autonomy, and it
demonstrates the need to supplement mainstream bioethics with feminist insights.
Overall, this chapter weaves together women’s first-person narratives with theoretical
perspectives to offer a fresh perspective on the antiabortion appropriation of bioethics
lexicon.
Synopsis of Chapter Five
I can neither anticipate nor answer all of the issues and questions raised by my
research on “informed consent” laws. Nevertheless, this concluding chapter explores
three questions that especially warrant further address. These questions include: 1) Who
is resisting “informed consent” laws, and what form does this resistance take? 2) How
have professional medical associations, like the American Medical Association or the
American Woman’s Medical Association, responded to the politicization of the informed
consent process? 3) Given that current informed consent practices are unacceptable and
inadequate, how should informed consent practices proceed for women seeking an
abortion?
To begin, I theorize resistance to antiabortion hegemony. Though “informed
consent ” laws are an abusive instance of power, it is important to remember that women
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and abortion care givers are not simply victims; they are also agents capable of critical
response and counter-action. This section suggests some of the ways resistance to
“informed consent” laws may be occurring or could occur. More specifically, I consider
four modes of resistance: legal challenges, provider strategizing, first-person narratives,
and academic and research publications.
Secondly, I raise questions regarding the relationship between professional medical
organizations and “informed consent” laws. In earlier chapters, I argued that traditional
formulations of informed consent disproportionately defend and promote physician
authority. Given that “informed consent ” laws invasively override medical authority and
assault physician autonomy, it is not surprising that professional medical associations
have issued formal responses to “informed consent” laws. I suggest that the policy
statements of the American College of Gynecologists (ACOG), the American Woman’s
Medical Association (AWMA), and the American College of Physicians (ACP) are
important initial volleys against “informed consent” laws. However, I critique the
American Medical Association’s (AMA) official policy on abortion for its tepidity and
rhetorical imprecision. Given that the AMA wields the most social power of any medical
organization, the AMA’s silence on “informed consent” laws is particularly troubling.
Finally, I return to the issue of informed consent in the abortion context. Although
this work is clearly critical of the doctrine and practice of informed consent, I do not
mean to suggest that informed consent practices should be discarded in the abortion
context. Rather, informed consent practices must be redesigned in light of the inimitable
phenomenology of unwanted pregnancy and the moral particularity of abortion. In this
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concluding section, I draw upon feminist clinical practice to espouse a positive vision of
what informed consent practices should offer to women seeking an abortion.
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CHAPTER ONE
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF INFORMED CONSENT
I begin this work with a critical overview of mainstream conceptions of informed
consent in order to demonstrate two important points. First, I aim to illuminate a number
of theoretical flaws that compromise traditional conceptions of informed consent.
Although I recognize the many ways that informed consent practices have improved
medical decision-making, I argue that dominant paradigms of informed consent are
compromised by a series of theoretical weaknesses that carry consequences for minority
or subjugated patient-groups, such as women seeking an abortion.
A secondary aim of Chapter One is to complicate a common claim made by
feminists who challenge abortion-specific “informed consent” laws. More specifically,
some feminists argue that “informed consent” laws violate the traditional doctrine and
practice of informed consent. For example, Richardson and Nash (Fall, 2006) write in
the Guttmacher Policy Review that abortion-specific “informed consent” laws “ . . . do
not always measure up to the gold standard of informed consent” (p.6). According to
Richardson and Nash (Fall, 2006), “policymakers and public health officials frequently
disregard the basic principles of informed consent in favor of furthering a highly
politicized antiabortion goal” (p.11). Likewise, Jessica Mason Pieklo (July 25, 2012)
observes in a RH Reality Check article that abortion-specific “informed consent” laws
compel doctors to “go from being an advocate of the patient and a representative of the
best possible medical consensus to an advocate for the anti-choice cause. It’s nothing
short of a perversion of the doctrine of informed consent” (para 10). In both cases, the
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authors view “informed consent” laws as a political deformation of standard informed
consent practices.5
Although the observations made by Richardson and Nash (Fall, 2006) and Pieklo
(July 25, 2012) are not untrue, I break away from their approach to highlight the
theoretical weaknesses that compromise founding articulations of informed consent.
Whereas thinkers like Richardson and Nash (Fall, 2006) and Pieklo (July 25, 2012)
assume that informed consent is an invulnerable ethical ideal that invariably protects all
subjects equally, an ideal that abortion-specific “informed consent” laws derange and
deform, I contend that mainstream conceptions of informed consent are insensitive to
issues of social oppression as they manifest within the medical setting and that this
insensitivity carries added consequences for women seeking an abortion. Thus, I argue, a
successful renovation of abortion-specific “informed consent” laws will also require a
deep rethinking of the practices and policies of informed consent in general.
Of course, I am not the first to argue that traditional theories of informed consent
are limited or that informed consent requires theoretical redress. According to Manson
and O’Neil (2007) informed consent “is now the most discussed theme in Western
medical ethics and research ethics” (p.1). By way of example, a MedLine database
search reveals the publication of over 1,800 English articles addressing the subject of
informed consent in the years 2002 and 2003 alone (Manson & O’Neil, 2007, p.1).
Critical discussions of informed consent are legion, and bioethicists and medical
practitioners perpetually breathe analytic life into one of American bioethics’ most
entrenched subjects.6
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Nevertheless, I argue that a particular mode of critical review is still missing from
informed consent scholarship, despite the existence of a colossal library of informed
consent literature. More specifically, a critique of informed consent that exposes
informed consent’s theoretical deficiencies through a feminist lens while simultaneously
minding its interdisciplinary, rhetorical character has yet to be thoroughly developed.
Insofar as founding articulations of informed consent proliferate across a series of unique
discourses, it is imperative for any analysis of informed consent to demonstrate a similar
interdisciplinary mobility. Likewise, a feminist reading of informed consent will
highlight the impact and import of gender oppression within bioethics’ discourse and
practice, modes of oppression that carry particular consequences in the abortion context.
In order to develop such a critique, this chapter uses feminist insights to track the
rhetorical inception of informed consent across three discourses. In demarcating three
different discourses for survey, I take my cue from Berg et al. (2001) who argue there
“are at least three distinct senses of informed consent” (p.15): legal conceptions of
informed consent; bioethical conceptions of informed consent; and thirdly, informed
consent as “shared decision making.” By grouping these articulations together I offer a
unique analysis that recognizes and engages the interdisciplinary discursive character of
informed consent while simultaneously foregrounding theoretical pitfalls and blind spots.
Perhaps more importantly, however, my interdisciplinary critique will allow me to
demonstrate the inadequacy of the argument that “informed consent” laws are simply a
violation of standard informed consent practice and doctrine.
To be clear, this chapter is not intended as a comprehensive critique of informed
consent, nor do I mean to suggest that the concept and practice of informed consent vis-à-
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vis abortion care should be discarded. As an ethical ideal, informed consent provokes us
to reconsider the ethical dilemmas endemic to medical decision-making, and the
institutionalization of informed consent policies have benefited patients on a number of
fronts. The three iterations of informed consent that I consider in this chapter stress the
importance of patient autonomy, and each iteration improves upon its predecessors in
terms of advancing a theoretical framework to help operationalize patient autonomy—
characteristics that mark important ethical advances within biomedical practices.
Nevertheless, I argue founding constructions of informed consent advance an
impoverished model of informed consent. Thus, my aim in Chapter One is to trouble the
assumption that informed consent is a finely tuned and beneficial concept, specifically in
the context of abortion. Later on, in Chapter Five, I suggest an alternative model for
informed consent practices, one that is sensitive to the complex interactions of social
power and medical decision-making that shape reproductive healthcare. A general
premise of this work is that informed consent practices continue to hold liberatory
promise, but they require feminist supplement in order to effectively operationalize
patient autonomy.
A Brief History of Informed Consent
In short form, informed consent is both an ethical and legal doctrine that governs
decision-making in the medical context. More specifically, informed consent obligates
healthcare providers to disclose and discuss information relevant to a patient’s medical
condition prior to an act of medical intervention. In contemporary models, healthcare
providers are required to alert patients to the following information during the
communication process:
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(1) those facts or descriptions that patients or subjects usually consider material in
deciding whether to refuse or consent to the proposed intervention or research, (2)
information the professional believes to be material, (3) the professional’s
recommendation, (4) the purpose of seeking consent, and (5) the nature and limits
of consent as an act of authorization. (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p.121)
In this model, if the healthcare provider delivers the relevant and necessary information,
if the patient is competent to make adequate decisions and understands the provided
information,7 and if the patient’s decision is voluntary and free from coercion,8 then an
informed consent has occurred. Or arithmetically put: information + competency +
voluntary choice = informed consent.
In American bioethics, informed consent is viewed as key to respecting,
protecting, and enacting patient autonomy during the medical decision-making process.
First articulated in court rulings during the 1950s, and then embellished in subsequent
decades, informed consent was initially devised as a corrective measure to medical
paradigms that promoted medical paternalism and as a remedy for lurid cases of medical
malfeasance, such as the notorious Tuskegee Syphilis Study. As an alternative to the
“doctor-knows best” mentality, informed consent policies were originally intended to
protect and empower the individual patient.
In theory, informed consent policies help to institutionalize sensitivity to the
ethical ambiguities that often accompany medical decision-making in the modern world.
Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, the advent of new medical technologies
irrevocably changed medical practices by proliferating treatment options and extending
human life. In this brave new world, a model of unilateral medical decision-making that
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privileges the physician’s viewpoint, or assumes that patients automatically share the
same nonmedical values as their doctor, is inadequate for generating medical solutions
(Jonsen, 1998, p.3). Inarguably, informed consent revolutionized medical ethics, as prior
paradigms of medical decision-making were unambiguously paternalistic and assumed
that medical practitioners alone should make medical decisions.9 Risking platitude, one
might say informed consent was articulated with the best of intentions.
Yet, if we turn to key articulations of “informed consent,” if we look and see how
informed consent is formulated across a variety of discourses, we will witness theoretical
weaknesses that may interfere with some patients’ autonomy, most notably those from
oppressed or underrepresented social groups. In the following section, I begin with a
critical look at early judicial conceptions of informed consent as developed in the court
cases, Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees (1957) and Natanson v.
Kline (1960). Next, I turn to Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress’ (2009)
definitive text, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, in order to critically engage a widely
accepted model of informed consent within bioethics literature. Finally, I spotlight
theoretical inadequacies concealed within a 1982 government report published by The
President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical
and Behavioral Research, which advances a potentially promising conception of
informed consent as shared decision-making. I focus on these texts partly because they
are widely recognized as inaugural articulations of informed consent and partly because
each text exemplifies a unique approach to informed consent theory and practice.
Although the theories of informed consent that I consider in this section are decades old,
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they continue to exert an indelible influence upon contemporary medical practice and
theory.
The theoretical weaknesses I discuss below carry implications for all patients, in
all medical contexts. However, my critique in this section is driven primarily by
concerns regarding abortion care. Consequently, I draw on examples from abortion
decision-making to help elucidate my argument.
Informed Consent in Judicial Discourse
In the United States, it is well recognized that the term “informed consent” first
appeared within legal discourse. Faden and Beauchamp (1986) write,
Informed consent was never the concern of the great writings and teachings in
medicine, theology, or any discipline traditionally addressing the search for moral
truths in medicine. Informed consent is a creature originally of law and later
snatched from the courts by interdisciplinary interests and spearheaded by an
ethics driven more philosophically than theologically. (p.92)
Although medical cases dealing with battery, disclosure, and consent have a long history
in judicial discourse,10 the term “informed consent” is first used in the 1957 decision
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees and is given greater specificity
in the 1960 decision Natanson v. Kline.11 In both cases, new medical technologies had
been used without the disclosure or discussion of possible risks, and patients had
experienced severe injuries.
The Salgo (1957) case concerned Martin Salgo, a patient who experienced
permanent paralysis in his lower extremities after a physician decided to perform
an aortography. At that time, aortography involved injecting a dye, sodium
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urokon, into a patient to locate a block in the abdominal aorta. Martin Salgo
claimed he had not been warned of the risks associated with the procedure and he
sued his physicians for negligence.
Alternatively, the Natanson (1960) case concerned Irma Natanson, a
patient who suffered severe and disabling injuries after receiving cobalt radiation
therapy, a relatively new procedure for breast-cancer treatment. After undergoing
a mastectomy, Natanson was administered cobalt therapy and, consequently, she
suffered severe radiation burns to her thorax. Although Natanson “consented” to
the new procedure, she argued that her physician had not informed her of the risks
and hazards of the treatment (Katz, 1984, pp.60-71).
In the Salgo ruling, Justice Bray of the California Court of Appeals argued that
physicians have a duty to disclose “any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an
intelligent consent by the patient to proposed treatment” (as cited in Faden &
Beauchamp, 1986, p.125). In the first documented judicial use of “informed consent,”
Justice Bray explained, “In discussing the element of risk a certain amount of discretion
must be employed consistent with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed
consent” (as cited in Katz, 1984, p.6).12 Although the courts had long recognized
“consent” as a necessary requirement in medical practice, and the courts had historically
argued that patients have a right to know a physician’s medical intentions and physicians
could be convicted of battery absent disclosure of their intentions, the Salgo ruling
expanded the idea of “consent” to include the enabling condition of information provision
(Faden & Beauchamp, 1986, p.126).
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Subsequently, the Natanson case endowed the notion of informed consent
with richer legal specificity. Here, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that
physicians have the obligation “to disclose and explain to the patient in language
as simple as necessary the nature of the ailment, the probability of success or of
alternatives, and perhaps the risks of unfortunate results and unforeseen
conditions within the body” (as cited in Katz, 1984, p.66). As we can see in the
previous citations from the Natanson and Salgo rulings, the court articulates
informed consent as a process of informational disclosure governed by medical
knowledge.
The Salgo and Natanson cases awarded “informed consent” formal status
in judicial discourse, and they established a new legal injunction in medical
practice: physicians have an affirmative duty to disclose relevant information to
their patients. Consequently, physician liability now exceeded harmful intent; if a
physician neglected or overlooked certain domains of information they could face
charges of malpractice.13 Although the doctrine of informed consent spawned a
litany of legal questions that the courts did not answer, it irrevocably changed the
legal practice of medical decision-making.14 A medical paradigm that promoted
patient ignorance and safeguarded physician paternalism was no longer
acceptable. Instead, in the words of Justice Schroeder, “each man was to be
master of his own body” and “the law does not permit [the doctor] to substitute
his own judgment for that of the patient by any form of artifice or deception” (as
cited in Katz, 1984, p.66). Although the court does not develop a detailed account
of the ethical relationship between information and self-determination (a
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development we will witness later in the landmark texts of bioethics), the court’s
rhetoric reflects a burgeoning belief that healthcare providers must recognize and
respect patient autonomy and that information provision is a necessary component
in implementing this respect.15 In many ways, it is not surprising that the court
defended patient autonomy; after all, individual autonomy had long been an
important component of the American ethos.16
Despite the courts’ defense of patient autonomy, the courts’ articulation of
informed consent overlooks key components necessary to the operationalization
of patient autonomy. More specifically, the courts’ articulation of informed
consent reduces informed consent to an institutionalized formality driven by the
fear of medical liability. In addition, the courts’ view of informed consent overidolizes physician authority and consequently reduces informed consent to a
unilateral process of information disclosure. In the following paragraphs I expand
upon each of these concerns, and I explain why the courts’ anemic articulation of
informed consent carries added consequences for minority groups, particularly
women seeking an abortion.
My first concern pertains to the courts’ view of informed consent as an
institutional requirement. Although institutional requirements are not necessarily
problematic, problems can arise if medical practice shapes itself primarily to
accord with institutional requirements, rather than patient needs. In the legal
articulation of informed consent, informed consent simply becomes a series of
procedures and protocols that medical practitioners must follow under threat of
liability. Although the courts recognized the need to institute legal provisions to
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protect patients, ultimately their articulation of informed consent is limited to the
clarification of physician liability and tort law, rather than the enhancement of
patient autonomy (Terry, 1993; Shultz, 1985). Of course, institutionalized laws
may incite important medical dialogue necessary to patient autonomy, but there is
nothing inherent to such protocols to guarantee that patient autonomy has been
protected and operationalized.
In their critique of legal articulations of informed consent, Beauchamp and
Childress (2009) argue that legal articulations refer “only to an institutionally or
legally effective authorization, as determined by prevailing social rules . . . .
‘Consent’ under these circumstances is not bona fide informed consent” (p.119).
As Beauchamp and Childress (2009) correctly note, legal articulations fail to
adequately explore the conditions and criteria necessary to an act of autonomous
consent. In a context of medical power, a patient may feel compelled to sign a
form indicating that the doctor has supplied him or her with medical information,
but a signature does not necessarily mean the patient understands the meaning and
consequences of a medical procedure nor that the patient has exercised an
autonomous decision.
Following the dictates of legal discourse, informed consent can easily
become a mechanical and empty exercise of obtaining a patient’s signature on a
consent form. In this model, once a provider has disclosed medical “facts,” to
borrow the language from Salgo, and the patient has signed the informed consent
form, the healthcare provider has secured a certain degree of legal impunity. But,
what vision of patient autonomy does this model proffer? In this sense, informed
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consent is simply a symbolic procedure evidencing a litigious culture, rather than
a practice that encourages autonomous decision-making.
A second problem with the courts’ early articulation of informed consent
pertains to the courts’ idolization of physician authority and its underlying distrust
of patient competency. Jay Katz (1977; 1984) famously calls attention to a
contradiction that lies deep at the heart of the Salgo ruling. In Salgo, Justice Bray
ruled that physicians must exercise “a certain amount of discretion” while
simultaneously practicing “full disclosure,” a difficult coupling that leads Katz
(1977) to remark, “[o]nly in dreams or fairy tales can ‘discretion to withhold
crucial information’ so easily and magically be reconciled with ‘full disclosure’”
(p.138). The concept of “full disclosure” poses a number of complex problems.
First, how can full disclosure occur if physicians can withhold crucial
information? Secondly, what counts as “full” disclosure in a situation where a
physician does not plan to withhold information? How does a physician decide
when a sufficient amount of information has been supplied, and how does a
physician avoid overwhelming a patient with superfluous information?
Moreover, how does a physician decide which information is most pertinent in
light of patient values?
The issue of abortion, for example, troubles the notion of “full disclosure.”
For example, some women seeking an abortion may not want to view an
ultrasound image or hear a detailed medical reading of the image, as we will see
with the case of Carolyn Jones in Chapter Four. In the highly politicized climate
of abortion, it is difficult to purvey medical information about pregnancy as
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neutral medical fact, and some women may experience excessive information
about pregnancy as patronizing or punitive rather than helpful and informative.
As I will discuss further in Chapter Four, too much information regarding fetal
ontology may agitate some women’s self-trust and consequently trouble their
capacity for reproductive autonomy (McLeod, 2002; Graham, Ankrett, & Killick,
2010). In general, the deeply personal nature of the abortion decision means that
the physician may not be best positioned to recognize the appropriate
informational scope of “full disclosure.”
In general, the court glosses over the practical ambiguities entailed by the
concept of “full disclosure,” an oversight that may be partially informed by the
court’s reluctance to override medical authority. Katz (1984) argues, for example,
that the contradictory injunction to practice “full disclosure” with “discretion”
testifies to a deep judicial ambivalence regarding the relationship between patient
autonomy and medical expertise. Katz (1984) writes,
Judges were hesitant to intrude on medical practices, and not only for
reasons of unfamiliarity with the ways in which physicians worked. Their
impulse to foster individual self-determination collided with an equally
strong desire to maintain the authority of the profession, both for the sake
of professionals and for the ‘best interests’ of patients. (p.59)
That is, even as the courts recognized the value of patient autonomy, they were
unable to relinquish the long-reigning paradigm of medical ethics that ‘the doctor
knows best.’ Thus, their vision of informed consent placed an onus on doctors to
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share some forms of medical information, but it failed to sufficiently recognize
patient values or delimit space for patient voices.
According to Katz (1984), the courts’ arguably anemic vision of informed consent
is informed by the “deeply buried” bias that patients lack “capacities to make reasonable
decisions” (p.71). If patients are viewed as poor decision-makers, then physicians must
retain control of the decision-making process, an assumption that carries a number of
problematic consequences for the practice of informed consent. For one, insofar as
competency is a requisite element of an informed consent (Beauchamp & Childress,
2009, p.120), then the informed consent process will be derailed, if not completely
abandoned, if competency is found lacking. Secondly, the courts’ general distrust of
patient competency positions the court to advance a model of informed consent that is
predicated on the primacy of physician knowledge rather than patient values. For the
courts, informed consent amounts to a monologue wherein one agent, the doctor, simply
recites information to another agent, the patient, in order to deflect medical liability.
Although information provision marks an advance over older models of medical
paternalism that kept the patient in the dark, so to speak, information disclosure is not
sufficient for autonomous decision-making, a point that will be developed in the
following section. Katz (1984) contends that the courts’ deference for physician
authority led the courts to “[toy] briefly with the idea of patients’ right to selfdetermination and largely cast it aside” (p.82).
Katz’s argument that legal articulations silence patient voices is insightful, but it
requires feminist supplement. If Katz is correct in his claim that the legal and medical
worlds are undergirded by a fundamental distrust of patient competency, then it is
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important to remember that different patients are distrusted to different degrees. Insofar
as individuals’ rational and moral capacities are not uniformly recognized across social
groups (Lloyd, 1984), then it follows that asymmetric distributions of distrust will occur
within the medical context, as well. Although Katz’s insights are instructive in
understanding the court’s conservative articulation of informed consent, Katz does not
explicitly recognize that physician distrust may be magnified in situations where the
patient is a member of a social group that is historically discredited or deemed
epistemically incompetent.
For example, male paradigms of ideal patient competency can
unconsciously alter healthcare providers’ assessment of patient competency.
Feminist philosophers have gone to great lengths to demonstrate the
normalization of hostile tropes of women’s inferior epistemic and moral capacity
across various discursive practices. Deeply entrenched stereotypes of women as
irrational, nervous, or hysterical, for example, can color the assessment of
women’s rational competency and epistemic credibility.17 Genevieve Lloyd
(1984) has famously argued that rationality in western discourse is articulated on
the basis of women’s exclusion. More specifically, women are excluded from
rational activity on both a practical and a symbolic level; to be rational is to be
other than woman. Drawing on Lloyd’s argument, “rationality” is not a material
capacity, but it is a construction driven by sexist standards. This insight is
developed by Susan Dodds (2000) when she writes, “The rational competence of
women and other oppressed groups is frequently questioned, insofar as they are
thought to lack sufficient emotional distance and objectivity to act rationally”
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(p.224). As we will see in Chapter Three, abortion-specific “informed consent”
materials rely heavily upon cultural tropes of female irrationality and epistemic
incompetency to advance their narrative that women who choose to terminate a
pregnancy may become hysterical and pathological. Arguably, antiabortion
arguments have found traction in state legislatures and in the courts partly because
our culture is already saturated with stereotypes of female incompetency.
Sociological research on medical discourse further confirms that gender,
race, and class differences frequently shape medical dialogue, and that healthcare
providers may experience problematic attitudes ranging from paternalism to
outright hostility when interacting with patients who are from an oppressed class.
For example, sociologist Alexandra Todd (1983) writes,
The darker a woman’s skin and/or the lower her place on the economic
scale, the poorer the care and efforts at explanation she received. Women
of color and/or an economically poor background were more apt to be
seen as ‘difficult’ patients when they asked questions.18 (p.77)
In a frequently cited study (Roberts, 1996, p.123; Smith, 1996, p.194), Roger
Shuy (1983) notes that “[c]onsciously or unconsciously, dialect speakers tend to
get worse treatment, wait longer for service, are considered ignorant, and are told
what to do rather than asked what they would like to do” (p.192). Such studies
suggest that implicit biases may predispose healthcare providers to unfairly assess
a patient’s competency.
If a physician believes a patient lacks competency, or if a physician has
internalized nefarious stereotypes about certain patient groups, then the informed
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consent process may be negatively impacted and the patient’s ability for
autonomous action may be derailed from the onset.19 As demonstrated by the
studies cited in the above paragraph, physicians who doubt patient competency
may feel less inclined to engage in a meaningful dialogue with their patients or to
entertain patient questions, or a physician may adopt an overtly paternalistic
attitude that discourages the patient from asking questions or critically
considering treatment options in light of the patient’s own values and beliefs.
In essence, the court’s defense of physician authority fails to reckon with
issues of medical paternalism, a problem that can carry added weight for
oppressed groups. McLeod and Sherwin (2000) speak to this point when they
write:
The exercise of paternalism is especially problematic when applied to
patients whose autonomy is reduced by virtue of their history of
oppression. Oppression involves unjust distributions of power, and
health-care settings are sites of very uneven power differentials. If healthcare professionals, especially physicians, further consolidate their already
disproportionate power in relation to patients, especially those from
oppressed groups, they exacerbate a problematic power differential and
further reduce the already limited autonomy of their patients. (p.267)
Insofar as informed consent is intended to diffuse physician paternalism and
enhance patient autonomy, it is important to recognize the import of social bias
when interacting with patients from oppressed social groups. Yet, this
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recognition is missing not only in legal formulations of informed consent, but in
Katz’s (1984) critique of legal discourse, as well.
In short summation, the courts’ delimitation of informed consent in terms of
disclosure and negligence produces an impoverished articulation of informed consent.
More specifically, judicial articulations of informed consent disproportionately deify
physician insight, they fail to recognize the value of patient perspectives, and they
ultimately defend a paternalistic model of medical decision-making. In general, the
courts’ consideration of informed consent is primarily driven by the need to clarify the
legal parameters of medical liability, and the court’s articulation does more to shore up
and protect the physician’s authority than it does to facilitate patient involvement in the
medical decision-making process.
Informed Consent in Biomedical Ethics
A second articulation of informed consent is found in biomedical ethics. Tom L.
Beauchamp and James F. Childress (2009) best demonstrate this articulation in their text,
Principles of Biomedical Ethics, where they define informed consent as “an individual’s
autonomous authorization of a medical intervention or of participation in research”
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p.119).20 The second use of informed consent, informed
consent “as autonomous authorization” (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986; Beauchamp &
Childress, 2009), exceeds legal articulations by introducing a more comprehensive list of
qualifying criteria that targets a specific set of actions within the clinical setting.
For Beauchamp and Childress (2009), the legal articulation of “informed consent”
is inadequate, and they argue in favor of a definition that stresses patient competency,
understanding, and voluntary action. More specifically, they argue that an informed
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consent occurs “if and only if a patient or subject, with substantial understanding and in
absence of substantial control by others, intentionally authorizes a professional to do
something quite specific” (p.119). For Beauchamp and Childress (2009), a physician
who allows a patient to sign a consent form without the patient adequately understanding
her medical condition, or without a sure sense that the patient’s decision is voluntary,
may meet the legal or institutional requirements for informed consent, but the act of
consent cannot be considered an “autonomous authorization.”
Whereas the legal formulation of informed consent focused almost exclusively on
the disclosure of risks and benefits, Beauchamp and Childress (2009) analyze informed
consent in terms of seven constitutive elements. They outline these elements as follows:
I. Threshold Elements (preconditions)
1. Competence (to understand and decide)
2. Voluntariness (in deciding)
II. Information Elements
3. Disclosure (of material information)
4. Recommendation (of a plan)
5. Understanding (of 3 and 4)
III. Consent Elements
6) Decision (in favor of a plan)
7) Authorization (of the chosen plan) (pp.120-121)
In general, Beauchamp and Childress’ list can be read as a double effort to expand
informed consent beyond their legal predecessor’s focus on disclosure, and to formulate
the conditions requisite to an “autonomous authorization.”
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Beauchamp and Childress (2009) address the ethical dimensions of the
doctor-patient relationship more deeply than legal formulations of informed
consent, and their framework reflects a richer understanding of the dynamics that
structure and complicate practices of medical decision-making. Yet, their
understanding of informed consent continues to pose a number of problems.
More specifically, their articulation is problematic for at least two reasons that I
will consider here: a) they reduce patient autonomy to a momentary and episodic
choice, and b) they focus primarily on the actions of the healthcare provider and
fail to adequately consider and engage the value and import of patient
perspectives. Consequently, the articulation of informed consent advanced by
Beauchamp and Childress overlooks the impact of socio-political power upon
episodic choices, and it privileges the perspective of the healthcare provider over
that of the patient.
To begin, Beauchamp and Childress (2009) delimit autonomy to a specific
choice. In terms of autonomy, they state that their focus is on “autonomous
choice rather than on general capacities for governance and self-management”
(p.100). To flesh out this distinction, they call attention to the possibility that it is
possible for a person who is “self-governing” to make a nonautonomous choice,
as in cases of coercion or “other conditions that restrict their options” (p.100).
Conversely, it is also possible for a person who lacks a general capacity for
autonomy to make a momentary autonomous choice. A prisoner, for example,
can still make decisions that reflect a certain degree of autonomy—like “making a
phone call” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p.100)—even if the general structure
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of their life lacks autonomy. According to Beauchamp and Childress, it makes
sense to delimit their focus to specific choices because a general capacity for
autonomy does not necessarily guarantee an autonomous choice, and their point
of concern is the one-time choice that occurs in the clinical arena when a patient
authorizes a medical procedure. Thus, they evaluate informed consent in terms of
“autonomous choice” rather than “general capacities.”
Importantly, my argument is not that Beauchamp and Childress’ distinction
between autonomous choice and a general capacity for autonomy is faulty. They are
correct that it is possible for someone who generally lacks autonomy to make an
autonomous choice, or vice-versa.21 Rather, my problem with their articulation of
informed consent as a specific episodic choice is that they fail to consider the impact of
wider social structures upon that choice. As Anne Donchin (2000) observes, “in
Beauchamp and Childress’ account, respect for autonomy is constructed around microlevel considerations and isolated . . . from macro-level, societal issues” (p.238). That is,
restricting their analysis of autonomy to a single choice prevents Beauchamp and
Childress from adequately recognizing the relationship between an individual’s medical
choice and the wider political structures within which such choices occur.
Here, feminist theories of relational autonomy are useful in illuminating
the theoretical weaknesses associated with Beauchamp and Childress’ constricted
focus.22 In a nutshell, to argue that autonomy is relational is to argue that the
capacities and skills that facilitate autonomous actions are engendered, nurtured,
and exercised in a social environment (Sherwin, 1998, p.36).23 Put more simply,
relational autonomy means autonomy is socially constituted (McLeod, 2002,
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p.37). Although there are important differences that distinguish distinct relational
approaches to autonomy, feminist models of relational autonomy agree that
understanding an individual’s capacity for autonomous choice requires some
understanding of that individual’s social location.24 Natalie Stoljar (2011)
astutely captures this point: “Relational conceptions emphasize that agents are
situated in historical, social, class, race and gender contexts. The agent’s social
situation has an impact not only on her identity and self-conception but also on
the nature of important capacities like autonomy” (p.376). If autonomy is
dependent on social relationships, then recognizing and analyzing autonomy
requires sensitivity to the practices and dynamics that structure social
relationships, and to the ways race, gender, class, and other aspects of identity
intersect with social prejudices to create barriers to autonomy.
In general, a feminist model of relational autonomy broadens the range of
what is necessary for an autonomous medical decision, and it suggests that
respecting and operationalizing a patient’s autonomy requires a more panoramic
view than what is allotted in Beauchamp and Childress’ (2009) account.
Although cognitive capacities such as rationality, deliberation, reflection, and
understanding are necessary skills for autonomy, feminist thinkers have
demonstrated that the functionality of these skills depends upon other socially
learned capacities. For example, Natalie Stoljar (2011, p.378) and Carolyn
McLeod (2002) argue that “self-referring attitudes” such as self-trust or selfesteem, are also foundational to autonomous choices.
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In Self-Trust and Reproductive Autonomy Carolyn McLeod (2002) defines
self-trust as “an attitude of optimism about our own competence and moral
integrity” (p.5). According to McLeod, to reflect on what ones “truly believes,”
one must have some degree of self-trust.25 If an agent distrusts herself, she may
be unable to recognize the value of her beliefs and goals, and she may lack the
confidence to articulate and act upon her own desires. Moreover, without the
capacity for self-trust, patients may be unable to direct other capacities like
understanding and voluntariness in the direction of an autonomous choice.
According to McLeod (2002), self-trust is constituted and cultivated
through social interaction. Insofar as individuals are positioned asymmetrically in
society, it follows that capacities like self-trust, and consequentially autonomy,
develop asymmetrically as well. Living in a social environment that discourages
practices of self-contemplation for some agents may interfere with that agent’s
autonomy skills. Likewise, such erosive factors as sexism, racism, classism,
ableism, and homophobia can dissolve one’s self-trust and diminish one’s
confidence in their own moral competency.
It is, therefore, important to recognize a patient’s social position over and
beyond the momentary clinical encounter, particularly when dealing with patients
who have been negatively impacted by gender socialization. Even in cases where
adequate and accurate information has been provided, and the agent has met
standards of competency, an agent’s autonomy skills may be frustrated or shortcircuited if they lack self-trust. Given that women’s decisions have faced
historical hostility and disdain from a variety of sources, their capacities for self-
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trust may be particularly vulnerable. For poor women, queer women, or women
of color these vulnerabilities may be compounded by other axes of oppression.
As way of specific example, a woman may desire an abortion because she
is disinterested in parenthood. However, if she has been socialized to doubt her
own moral capacities then she may have difficulty explaining or defending her
choice to her physician. If she inhabits a social context riddled with pronatalist
stereotypes, then she may worry that her doctor will meet her abortion decision
with derision or scorn. She may feel uncomfortable discussing abortion with an
unknown professional in a clinical setting, and her discomfort may translate into
disquietude or brusqueness. Consequently, she may come across as confused and
uncertain, despite a deep desire to avoid parenthood. In order to recognize that
the patient’s uneasiness stems from a lack of self-trust, however, the provider will
need a richer understanding of the patient’s interpersonal relationships and social
context. Otherwise, the provider may misinterpret the patient’s lack of self-trust
for deep moral conflict over the abortion decision, a misreading that could further
frustrate the patient’s ability to exercise her autonomous medical decision.26
Yet, provider insight regarding self-trust is unlikely to occur when the
domain of concern is a mico-level choice, as in Beauchamp and Childress’(2009)
account. Of course, time and resources perennially limit practices of informed
consent, and it is unreasonable to expect every healthcare provider to work up a
comprehensive evaluation of a patient’s social and psychological profile. But at
the very least, more attention to macro social-structures is necessary than what is
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allotted in Beauchamp and Childress’s model of informed consent as a microlevel authorization.
A second shortcoming of Beauchamp and Childress’ (2009) model of
informed consent stems from their narrow focus on provider conduct. Of course,
their book was written for healthcare providers, so it is understandable that their
discussion would focus primarily on provider conduct. The problem, however, is
that they fail to adequately discuss the unique issues that structure patient conduct
during the medical decision-making process. In general, they articulate informed
consent almost exclusively in terms of the healthcare provider’s actions and
responsibilities, and they are mostly silent on matters specific to the patient’s
decision-making process. As way of example: “Respect for autonomy,” they
argue, “obligates professionals in health care and research involving human
subjects to disclose information, probe for and ensure understanding and
voluntariness, and to foster adequate decision-making” (p.104). By delimiting the
principle of autonomy to professional obligations in the clinical context,
Beauchamp and Childress restrict their understanding of autonomy to the
comportment of the physician: Has the provider disclosed the proper information?
Has the provider refrained from coercive influence? Has the provider assessed
patient competency? Susan Dodds (2000) notes that “bioethics is primarily
concerned with the proper moral conduct of health-care providers” (p.216) and
tends to overlook “the decision-making process of the patient” (p.214). Although
provider conduct is surely a necessary ingredient to patient autonomy, it is only
one part of the equation.
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One of the issues with Beauchamp and Childress’ (2009) limiting focus is
that it forecloses the ability to recognize how various social forces may interfere
with or limit a patient’s ability to make autonomous medical decisions. The
decision-making processes of the patient can be complicated and problematized
by a number of elements, as discussed above with the example of self-trust. A
provider may supply adequate information, adopt a stance of noninterference, and
be confident that the patient is competent to make a medical decision, but if the
patient lacks self-trust, for example, then her autonomy may be thwarted
(McLeod, 2002). In order to recognize this obstacle, however, the provider will
need to focus on the patient’s actions and comportment in addition to their own, a
focus that is not adequately recognized in Beauchamp and Childress’ model.
Another problematic consequence of Beauchamp and Childress’ (2009)
focus is that it obscures the valuable insights that patients themselves bring to the
informed consent process. Although focusing on the actions of healthcare
professions is certainly necessary, this focus becomes precarious when the patient
is conceptualized as an object that is acted upon, rather than a subject who brings
a privileged perspective to the decision-making process. Insofar as the informed
consent process aims to bring the patients’ values to voice during the medical
decision-making process, the informed consent process is predicated on the
principle that the patient holds an epistemic advantage in terms of recognizing
what those values are. By focusing primarily on provider conduct, however,
Beauchamp and Childress replicate one of the problems with legal articulations of
informed consent: their focus eclipses the epistemic specificity of the patient, a
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major oversight for a model whose founding purpose was to bolster patient
autonomy and amplify patient involvement.
To be fair, Beauchamp and Childress (2009) do recognize the “moral”
(p.124) benefits of tailoring information disclosure to the individual needs of the
patient, a method that requires providers to attend to patient perspectives. In
bioethics, this standard of disclosure is known as the “subjective standard,” and it
“judges adequacy of information by reference to the specific informational needs
of the individual person” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p.123). One of the
values of the subjective standard is that it requires providers to acquaint
themselves with patients’ unique values and circumstances. However,
Beauchamp and Childress (2009) also argue that the subjective standard “does not
suffice for either law or ethics,” (p.124). In dismissing the subjective standard as
impractical, they miss an opportunity to advance a theoretical framework that
encourages providers to recognize, respect, and engage patients’ specific
informational needs and personal values, an oversight that carries added
consequences in the reproductive context.
Here, abortion is an excellent example of how patients can have insights or
informational needs that exceed the providers’ expertise. The deep personal nature of
abortion means that many women choose to terminate a pregnancy for reasons that
physicians can neither immediately know nor anticipate. For example, a woman may be
struggling economically, or a woman may be working to end an abusive relationship. In
such situations, childbirth could carry insufferable consequences, yet this relevant
information falls outside of the physician’s epistemic purview. Although physicians’
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professional expertise certainly awards them a unique insight on many matters,
specialized knowledge does not amount to medical omniscience, and there is a
particularly clear limit to provider insights in the case of abortion where patient values
are often the determining factor in choosing an abortion. The necessity of engaging
patient values in the abortion context, as well as the value and benefit of deploying the
subjective standard in determining informational disclosure, are topics that will be further
discussed in Chapter Five. For the time being, however, my primary point is that the
framework advanced by Beauchamp and Childress (2009) in Principles of Biomedical
Ethics does not adequately attend to the experiences and perspectives specific to the
patient within the clinical context, an oversight that could potentially frustrate the
autonomy of some patients.
In conclusion, Beauchamp and Childress (2009) set a higher bar for
autonomy than what is offered in legal discourse. Yet, their account of informed
consent, and consequently their account of autonomy, is still too lean. Like their
legal forefathers (sic), Beauchamp and Childress perpetuate the valorization of
physician authority and they fail to situate informed consent within the context of
kyriarchy, to use a term that is gaining popularity with third-wave feminists.27
Although they inarguably highlight many of the moral pitfalls that threaten
practices of informed consent, and they certainly broaden the moral meaning of
informed consent beyond its initial legal interpretation, their analysis ultimately
limits informed consent to a one-time action that focuses primarily on the actions
of the provider. Consequently, their focus overlooks the import of social
oppression upon patient perspectives and devalues the specificity of patient
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insight. When theories of informed consent fail to contextualize medical
decisions in the context of greater social structures, then minority groups suffer
added consequences. We should expect more from liberatory concepts designed
to enhance the autonomy of all patient groups.
Informed Consent and Shared Decision Making
A third articulation of informed consent is informed consent as “shared decision
making” (Berg et al., 2001, p.15). More than the previous two articulations, this sense of
informed consent is concerned with neutralizing, or at least diminishing, the power
imbalance inherent to medical dialogue and ensuring that the medical decision is a
collaborative process that balances “the rights and responsibilities of patients and health
care professionals” (The President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, October 1982, p.35). Informed
consent as shared decision making conceptualizes informed consent as a specific form of
dialogical exchange, one that differs from previous articulations with its emphasis on the
normative dimensions of patient-physician collaboration. In the words of Jay Katz
(1984), this model views informed consent as “a joint undertaking that depends more on
the nature and quality of the entire give-and-take process than on whether a particular
disclosure has or has not been made” (p.84). Of the three articulations of informed
consent that I consider in this section, I find this model the most promising in terms of
abortion care because it recognizes and underscores the indispensible value of patient
participation.28
Although informed consent as shared decision making shares some features with
other articulations of informed consent, it also departs from those articulations in
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important ways (Whitney, McGuire, & McCullough, 2004, p.55). According to some
theorists, “informed consent cannot be reduced to shared decision making” (Beauchamp
& Childress, 2009, p.118; Faden & Beauchamp, 1986, p.279), primarily because shared
decision making demands a collaborative model of dialogical interchange that is not
appropriate for all medical decisions. Sometimes physicians will provide patients with
medical information and patients will autonomously authorize a medical intervention
without engaging in the collaborative partnership that is the hallmark of shared decision
making. According to Whitney et al. (2004), shared decision making is only appropriate
in situations of medical uncertainty where multiple options exists; informed consent, on
the other hand, is appropriate in situations of medical risk where only one viable option
exits. Other theorists worry that shared decision making may compel patients to sideline
their own desires in an effort to find common ground with their physician (Berg et al,
2001, p.17), or vice versa. In short, informed consent as shared decision making
envisions a particular mode of medical dialogue that the other articulations of informed
consent do not promote.
In this section, I focus on the idea of shared decision making as articulated by The
President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical
and Behavioral Research (1982). First authorized by Congress in 1978, the Commission
was tasked with unpacking the ethical dimensions of various issues endemic to the
clinical and treatment realms. The Commission published its work in nine reports (Faden
& Beauchamp, 1986, p.97), and its 1982 report Making Health Care Decisions: The
Ethical and Legal Implications of Informed Consent in the Patient-Practitioner
Relationship addressed the issue of informed consent explicitly. In their first chapter,
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“Informed Consent as Active, Shared Decisionmaking” (p.15) the Commission (1982)
draws on the work of Jay Katz to argue that shared decision making “is the appropriate
ideal for patient-professional relationships that a sound doctrine of informed consent
should support” (p.30).
Commonly recognized as the “earliest mention” (Elwyn et al., 2012, p.1361) of
shared decision making, the Commission’s influential report advanced a robust model of
dialogical interaction between providers and patients. Since the publication of the
Commission’s report, bioethicists have developed and expanded the idea of shared
decision making beyond its discursive inception, in many cases offering detailed
strategies and guidelines for implementation (Charles, Gafni, & Whelan, 1997; Charles,
Gafni, & Whelan, 1999; Elwyn et al., 2000; Elwyn et al., 2012; Towle et al., 1999).
Although the Commission’s report marks an older instance of informed consent as shared
decision making, their underlying values and goals are consistent with contemporary
discussions; in general, the Commission’s report is a touchstone for discussions of shared
decision making, and it provides one of the most comprehensive overviews of shared
decision making to date.
In their report, the Commission continues to develop the ethical
implications of informed consent beyond its legal origins. Throughout the course
of their report, the Commission deploys liberal humanist language of individual
rights and self-determination to justify the institutionalization of informed consent
policies. For example, the Commission (1982) explains:
Current requirements for informed consent owe much to the legal system,
but the values underlying these requirements are not merely legal artifacts.
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Rather, they are deeply embedded in American culture and the American
character; they transcend partisan ideologies and the politics of the
moment. Fundamentally, informed consent is based on respect for the
individual, and, in particular, for each individual’s capacity and right both
to define his or her own goals and to make choices designed to achieve
those goals. (p.17)
By locating the values that underwrite informed consent in “American culture,”
the Commission amplifies the ethical-political implications of informed consent.
The concept is not simply a tool to assess medical liability; it is now part of the
institutional machinery that reflects and facilitates cultural norms.
In many ways, the Commission demonstrates a heightened sensitivity to
patient individuality and informational needs. For example, the Commission
(1982) argues that the substantial content and scope of what constitutes
“appropriate information” will vary in relation to context (p.70), and the
Commission stresses the need for physicians to tailor the disclosure process to
“the special needs of particular patients” (p.70) and “to elicit and discuss the
values of their patients” (p.71). Likewise, the Commission (1982) recognizes that
both the patient and the healthcare professional bring “to the relationship special
knowledge and perspectives that can help to clarify for both parties what is
actually at issue in any decision to be reached” (p.39). Thus, informed consent as
shared decision making is sensitive to the fact that ethical problems change
relative to unique patient needs. For all of these reasons, I find informed consent
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as shared decision making to be the most promising and liberatory articulation of
informed consent.
Nevertheless, the Commission’s (1982) report poses a number of
theoretical concerns, specifically in the context of abortion. Like Beauchamp and
Childress (2009), the Commission employs general criteria to demarcate the
informed consent process. More specifically, the Commission (1982) believes
that the following three criteria are necessary for “effective patient participation”:
decision-making capacity, voluntariness, and information (p.55). Although the
Commission (1982) recognizes complicated cases, it continuously treats these
criteria as stalwart sentinels of patient autonomy. Although a formulaic approach
to informed consent is not necessarily problematic, it can become problematic
when it fails to consider how models premised on universalized criteria can
shadow specific issues relevant to vulnerable patient groups.
Once again, theorists of feminist relational autonomy are instructive in
considering the theoretical deficiencies that threaten the demarcation of informed
consent with generalized criteria. In this section I focus my critique on the
Commission’s (1982) use of “information” and “voluntariness,” as I have already
unpacked some of the problems with the criteria of “decision-making capacity”
during my discussion of legal articulations of informed consent. In the course of
doing so, I intend to demonstrate what is missing from the Commission’s
articulation of informed consent as shared decision making.
To begin, information is clearly a necessary ingredient to patient autonomy and to
practices of informed consent. Yet, an uncritical use of “information” can be problematic
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if healthcare providers forget that “information” itself is a constructed concept. The
processes through which information is identified and the manner in which information is
delivered are subject to number of social forces, and in the ethically complex world of
medical care there is no single equation to determine the correct content and purveyance
of informational exchange.
Although some of the informational content physicians need to share with their
patients may be straightforward, such as the statistical likelihood of success of a certain
medical procedure, other pieces of information desired by the patient may not be as
obvious. In such cases, problems can arise if the information only reflects, or is only
relevant to, the lives of the socially privileged. As Susan Dodds (2000) who draws on the
work of Susan Sherwin (1998) writes:
[I]nformation made available to patients is inevitably that information deemed
relevant by the health professionals who care for them; but the large gap between
the life experience of health professionals, who are relatively privileged, and their
sometimes seriously disadvantaged patients makes the likelihood that the former
will provide information that meets the specific needs of their patient rather slim.
(p.224)
As way of specific example, a woman of color who is trying to decide between an
abortion or an adoption may be influenced by the fact that children of color are
disproportionately represented in the foster are system (U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, September 2013, p.2, p.6; Summers, Wood, & Donovan, May 2013,
p.1). However, it may not occur to economically privileged white physicians to share
this information with their patient while they discuss her unplanned pregnancy; indeed,
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some physicians may not even be aware of the racial inequalities that shape foster care in
the United States. Yet, for some women this fact may be particularly relevant as they
decide how to manage an unwanted pregnancy.
It is important to note that the failure to provide relevant information should not
be attributed solely to a physician’s lack of perception. Indeed, the information the
physician encounters is also the product of various political forces. Susan Sherwin
(1998) speaks to this point when she writes, “research, publication, and education
policies largely determine what sorts of data are collected and, significantly, what
questions are neglected; systematic bias unquestionably influences these policies” (p.27).
If patient autonomy centers on the process of information purveyance, however, and if
the information itself is limited in scope and content, then the patient’s autonomy may be
jeopardized from the outset.
Recent work in feminist bioethics also raises concerns about the exchange of
information in the course of medical dialogue. Janet Farrell Smith (1996) has argued, for
example, that the “information-transfer” model of communication that dominates medical
discourse is problematic because it treats information as transparent fact and, thereby,
fails to account for the normative tones that are inevitably wrapped up with any
informational package (p.188).29 Smith (1996) argues that the meritorious goal of
communication may be compromised by the healthcare provider’s preoccupation with
transferring information, as well as the prescriptive elements that significantly and
sometimes subtly shape dialogical interaction. As Smith (1996) writes, “patients may
perceive ‘what the doctor says’ as factual and final. Because of the authority physicians
have in our society, a patient may hear as an imperative or command what the physician-
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speaker intends only as an factual assertion or one among many options” (p.189). In such
cases, the discussion of information may exert counterproductive pressures upon the
patient’s ability to assess information. For example, a physician’s statement that a fetus
has a “well-developed diaphragm” could code for the normative claim that the abortion
decision is immoral because a being with a “well-developed diaphragm” has a “right to
life.” Although the Commission (1982) shows a heightened sensitivity to the variability
of patient needs, it promotes an inadequate treatment of “information” by failing to
robustly discuss how socio-political power impacts what gets recognized and demarcated
as medical information.
A second problem that arises with the Commission’s (1982) articulation of
informed consent concerns their criterion of voluntary action. In general, the
Commission (1982) fails to adequately reckon with the ways social forces can
impose subtle limits and restrictions on voluntariness. Although the Commission
(1982) recognizes that medical power can inadvertently intrude upon patient will
(p.63, p.65) and that genuine choice may be foreclosed if the provider capitalizes
upon “disparities in knowledge, position and influence” (p.66), they fail to
robustly discuss how gender, race, and other social identities intersect with
medical power to complicate concepts like voluntary choice.
Recent feminist work on “adaptive preferences,” or cases where an
individual molds her preferences to fit her available options, is instructive in
illuminating shortcomings with the Commission’s (1982) approach to voluntary
action. Sometimes discussed under the rubric of psychological oppression
(Bartky, 1990, pp.22-32), internalized oppression (Cudd, 2006), or deformed
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desires (Supersen, Spring 2014), adaptive preferences have received ample
attention in feminist literature, perhaps most notably by Martha Nussbaum (2001)
and Armartya Sen (1995). In general, feminist discussions are sensitive to the
gendered dimensions of adaptive preferences.
As way of example, Nussbaum (2001) references conversations she had
with two women while visiting Ahmedabad, Gujarat, India and Trivandrum,
Kerala, India. One woman, Vasanti, tolerated domestic abuse at the hands of her
husband for years because she believed it was “part of a woman’s lot in life”
(Nussbaum, 2001, p.68). Similarly, Jayamma did not protest discriminatory
wages because “it was just the way things were . . . she did not waste time
yearning for another way” (Nussbaum, 2011, p.69). In both cases, the women
adapted their beliefs and choices to accord with the circumstances they found
themselves in. Although all thoughts, desires, and values are socially formed,
adaptive preferences develop in the context of social injustice and benefit a social
order at the expense of the subject. In a just society, it is unlikely that these
women would have voluntarily chosen domestic abuse or wage discrimination.
Indeed, Nussbaum uses the fact that each woman later revolted against her
specific circumstances as evidence that these “preferences” are adaptive, not
autonomously chosen.
The phenomenon of “adaptive preferences” complicates the Commission’s
(1982) concept of autonomy and voluntary action. In their model, people’s
desires, beliefs, or choices are valuable just because they are that person’s actual
beliefs or desires. So long as the (competent) patient has been provided with
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accurate and sufficient information, and so long as there is no threat of external
coercive forces, then the patient’s choices are respected because they
(purportedly) reflect the patient’s own beliefs and desires. In the case of adaptive
preferences, however, a patient may be unable to make distinctions between
desires that promote her well-being and those that replicate and reproduce
ideologies that undermine her well-being. She is not necessarily acting
irrationally, incompetently, or under coercion insofar as her choices may be
rationally perceptive (albeit subjugated) responses to an unjust situation. Yet, it
would be incorrect to call the patient’s decision “voluntary” insofar as it was
driven by norms that reflect an unjust social order rather than her own well-being,
even if she identifies these norms as “her own.” Part of what makes adaptive
preferences so problematic is that their deep integration into the agent’s belief
system makes it difficult for the agent, or others, to recognize them as socially
constructed.
In the case of reproductive healthcare, for example, a woman who comes
from a socially conservative family background that vilifies abortion and
typecasts women as “mothers” may internalize the belief that carrying a
pregnancy to term is necessary, even if the pregnancy jeopardizes her own health
or life. Although she does not choose motherhood under threat of execution and
she may claim she is freely willing to carry a life-threatening pregnancy to term,
there is something strange in qualifying her choice as voluntary insofar as it was
made to accommodate a system of gender oppression. In such cases, women may
benefit from enhanced dialogue with a provider who is cognizant of her greater
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social circumstances and is willing to help the woman critically reconsider her
medical choices in light of the influences exerted by social values that stigmatize
abortion. In order for such a dialogue to even occur, however, the provider must
be sensitive to the reality of gender subordination and to the fact that systems of
gender oppression can subtly constrain and deform women’s voluntary choices to
align with sexist standards, a sensitivity that is missing in the Commission’s
(1982) report.
Of course, theories of adaptive preferences complicate all models of medical
decision-making, including feminist ones. Insofar as all individuals are socially
constituted, the ideal of voluntary choice is problematized. However, my point here is
not that healthcare providers should incessantly worry about the sway of adaptive
preferences, nor do I mean to suggest that women are incapable of making voluntary
choices in the reproductive context. Rather my point is simply that in societies marked
by social and political injustice, agents will adopt a variety of techniques to survive, and
that a recognition of these techniques may require a familiarity with the realities of
sexism. Consequently, healthcare providers should practice a more heightened sensitivity
to the intersection of social oppression and patient choice than what is granted in the
Commission’s (1982) discussion of voluntary choice.
In general, the Commission (1982) relies upon and mobilizes a generic model of
patient subjectivity, and it displays an excessive confidence in the principles that guide
the demarcation of information. As feminists have long argued, purportedly genderneutral models of both subjectivity and knowledge reflect and consolidate the
perspectives and interests of white, heterosexual, middle-class, men. Although the
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Commission’s (1982) articulation of informed consent as shared decision making
advances a more ethically sensitive concept of informed consent than what is proffered in
legal discourse or Beauchamp and Childress’ (2009) account, their failure to adequately
wrestle with the import of social differences and social power ultimately attenuates their
theoretical apparatus.
Conclusion to Chapter One
The objective of this chapter has been to illuminate various weaknesses inherent
in the founding conceptions of informed consent. Rather than offering universal value
for all social groups at all times, informed consent suffers from a series of theoretical
deficiencies. When you mix abortion (an issue historically riddled with narratives of
women’s moral ignorance and inferior epistemic capacity) with the doctrine of informed
consent, (a doctrine that presupposes and reinstates relations of power and authority even
as it seeks to manage these), you have a perfect storm for practices that fail to recognize
and operationalize women’s reproductive decisions. Consequently, it is inadequate to
simply argue that abortion-specific “informed consent” practices violate informed
consent doctrine. If our goal is to restore full reproductive autonomy to women, then we
must also recognize how the concepts of informed consent and patient autonomy have
themselves been compromised by their founders’ failure to recognize the import of social
and political oppression.
Informed consent may originally have been devised to protect patient autonomy,
but such good intentions are often insufficient or inadequate when it comes to enacting
ethical goals. Margaret Urban Walker (2007) has insightfully argued that the very
practice of moral theorizing can help to authorize the position of a few politically elite

53

and facilitate an authoritarian politics that is rhetorically veiled by the very language of
morality itself. In this sense, widespread ethical practices are often a function of those
who have access to, or control over, the institutional structures that legitimate, broadcast,
and reinforce moral theories. This is not reason to discard ethical concepts, but it is
reason to reconsider ethical concepts from the perspective of marginalized or
disenfranchised groups. Hopefully, the rhetorical cartography conducted in this chapter
will have illuminated some of the shortcomings that have compromised dominant
articulations of informed consent, thus pointing the way to more emancipatory practices
of medical decision-making.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE SUPREME COURT, INFORMED CONSENT, AND ABORTION
Chapter One explored the doctrine of informed consent as it is most broadly
construed, but it did not address the intersection between informed consent and abortion
discourses specifically. In Chapter Two, I turn my attention to abortion discourse, and I
consider the United States Supreme Court’s assessment of abortion-specific “informed
consent” laws. This chapter’s focus on judicial rhetoric will show how the Court
problematically configures informed consent vis-à-vis abortion and it will help to explain
the Court’s creation of a legal environment that sanctions government intrusion upon
women’s abortion decisions.
In general, the judicial origins of abortion-specific “informed consent” regulations
are typically located in the Supreme Court case, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992) (Cockrill & Weitz, 2010, p.12; Joyce, Henshaw, Dennis,
Finer & Blanchard, April 2009, p.3; Manian, 2009, p.8; Richardson & Nash, Fall 2006,
p.6). In this historic decision, the Court rejected the standard of strict scrutiny previously
used to assess the constitutionality of abortion regulations and replaced it with the more
lenient “undue burden” standard. Consequently, states were permitted to institute a wider
range of abortion regulations, culminating in today’s harmful abortion-specific “informed
consent” laws.
Indubitably, the Casey decision ushered in a new era of abortion regulation.
However, in this chapter I complicate the common claim that “informed consent” laws
originate with the Casey decision. Although this is not untrue, and I do spend
considerable time discussing Casey in this chapter, I argue a single focus on Casey is
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myopic because the Court’s problematic treatment of informed consent within the
abortion context begins long before the Casey decision. Therefore, I argue that a robust
understanding of abortion-specific “informed consent” laws requires a more historical
critique of judicial rulings on abortion regulations than what is generally recognized in
the (limited) literature critiquing “informed consent” laws.
Chapter Two develops my argument begun in Chapter One that judicial discourse
offers a theoretically underdeveloped account of informed consent. By tracking the
Court’s articulation of informed consent from Roe through Casey, I will demonstrate that
the Court is either a) concerned with protecting the physician’s autonomy, or b)
concerned with defending a state’s right to intrude upon the informed consent process.
That is, the Court articulates the abortion decision as either a medical decision made by
the physician or as a moral decision that requires state intervention. As we will see,
women are never granted the status of primary decision-maker vis-à-vis abortion.
Instead, the Court routinely configures women as secondary decision-makers who require
some form of supervision, a configuration that problematically influences the Court to
interpret informed consent as a means to monitor women’s reproductive decisions. Thus,
although the Court’s interpretation of informed consent changes over time, their distrust
of women remains a constant throughout abortion jurisprudence.
This chapter’s focus on the Court’s treatment of informed consent vis-à-vis
abortion is important for several reasons. For one, spotlighting entrenched articulations
of women’s moral inferiority within judicial discourse will acquaint us with the
background prejudices that shape the Court’s assessment of “informed consent”
regulations, thereby positioning us to better challenge the legal frameworks that
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compromise women’s reproductive autonomy and justify punitive “informed consent”
laws. Secondly, this chapter provides a unique perspective on informed consent literature
as it shows how the Court’s failure to articulate a robust jurisprudence of informed
consent in general carries added consequence for women seeking to terminate an
unwanted pregnancy. That is, the theoretical weaknesses that haunt early articulations of
informed consent, weaknesses that were discussed in Chapter One, are amplified within
abortion jurisprudence.
Roe v. Wade and Abortion Decision Making
The Court’s weak configuration of women’s decision-making capacity within the
abortion context originates with Roe v. Wade (1973). In this landmark decision, the
Court delimited abortion as fundamentally a “medical decision” and it stressed the
physician’s authority in making this decision. Although a thorough analysis of Roe is
beyond the scope of this project, I provide a brief summary of the Court’s 1973 divisive
ruling in order to illuminate the origins of the Court’s problematic analysis of informed
consent and abortion decision-making.
At issue in Roe was a Texas law that prohibited abortion except in cases to save
the woman’s life. At the time, similar laws governed a majority of states.30 In its final
ruling, the Court opined that criminal abortion statutes violate a woman’s right to privacy
as it flows from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.31
In his majority opinion, Justice Blackmun argued that a categorical prohibition on
abortion at any point in the pregnancy was unconstitutional, and that a state’s right to
regulate abortion depended, instead, on the stage of pregnancy. The Court explained:
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(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion
decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant
woman’s attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the
State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses,
regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal
health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in
potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe,
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the life or health of the mother.32 (as cited in Shapiro 2007, p.43)
The three “stages” of pregnancy detailed above became known collectively as “the
trimester framework,” and this framework irrevocably changed the landscape of abortion
regulation.
Prior to Roe, women could obtain legal abortions. To do so, however, women
either had to find a sympathetic doctor who was willing to break the law, or plead their
case before an authorized medical panel, requirements that essentially hinged the abortion
decision upon physician power. Roe, therefore, unquestionably awarded women more
latitude to govern their reproductive lives and Roe mitigated the power previously
possessed by doctors.
Nevertheless, the Court’s logic in Roe continued to stress medical authority, as
evidenced in the above passage where the Court claimed, “the abortion decision and its
effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending
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physician” (as cited in Shapiro 2007, p.43). Although Roe represents a pivotal victory in
the women’s liberation movement, legal scholars have correctly noted that the rhetoric of
Roe says very little about women’s moral autonomy per se (Atkinson, 2011, p.658; Daly,
1995; Manian, 2009, p.9). Instead, the Court continued to privilege the role of the
physician over that of the woman (Daly, 1995, p3).
The Court’s privileging of medical authority is evidenced, for example, when it
argued, “The abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily a medical
decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician” (as cited in Shapiro,
2007, p. 44).33 Likewise the Court purported, “For the period of pregnancy prior to
[viability], the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine,
without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy
should be terminated” (as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.43). Although Roe defended a
woman’s right to abortion on the basis of privacy, the Court’s concern was to protect the
privacy of the medical relationship, rather than the personal privacy of a woman’s
reproductive decisions.
Clearly there is a substantive medical component to abortion. Physicians
command specialized knowledge regarding the abortion procedure, as well as the risks
and benefits of abortion relative to a woman’s health. Yet, the abortion decision often
exceeds medical concerns, an excess that challenges the Court’s view that abortion is
“inherently” a medical decision. For example, many women seek an abortion for nonmedical reasons, such as economic strain or a disinterest in parenthood. Pregnancy and
abortion are highly specific, embodied experiences, and the need for an abortion is often
a matter of personal values rather than medical needs. In this sense, women enjoy
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epistemic privilege vis-à-vis the abortion decision. However, by delimiting abortion as
“primarily a medical decision” (as cited in Shapiro, p.44) and granting women only
auxiliary status, the Court overlooked women’s unique epistemic insights.
Problematically, the Court’s failure to recognize women’s epistemic privilege
reinforces and reproduces a long cultural narrative that discredits women’s knowledge by
subjecting their reproductive decisions to the surveillance of others.34 Evelyn Atkinson
(2011) has correctly observed, “the physician under abortion's legalization plays the same
role as under abortion's criminalization: that of social and medical arbiter of the proper
reasons for aborting a pregnancy” (p.660). In other words, the decriminalization of
abortion was less about the promotion of women’s autonomy and more about preserving
medical authority, at least within judicial rhetoric.
Notably, the Court’s valorization of physician authority in Roe echoed early court
rulings on informed consent. That is, the Court’s articulation of abortion as a medical
decision is symptomatic of the Court’s traditional reverence for the medical community.
It is also important to locate the Court’s decision within the socio-historical context of
medical practice in which Roe was penned. At the time of Roe, medical practice was still
very much governed by paternalistic models of medical decision-making, despite the
introduction of informed consent laws in the 1950s. Given the historic predominance of
paternalism within medicine, it is not surprising that the Court argued that the abortion
decision ultimately belonged to the doctor, or that the woman’s right to abortion was “not
absolute” (as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.36). In this sense, the paternalism of Roe mirrors
the paternalism that governed medical decision-making in general.
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In terms of reproductive rights, a further problem followed from the Court’s
articulation of abortion as a “medical decision.” Insofar as medical practice is itself
subject to state regulation, then abortion could be subjected to state regulation, as well. If
antiabortionists could infiltrate standard medical protocol, such as the informed consent
process, then it would be possible to impose legal hurdles to abortion without directly
violating the logic of Roe.35
It is, therefore, not surprising that in the wake of Roe, states immediately began
testing the limits of abortion regulation, an experiment that emerged under pressure from
antiabortion groups. Judith Blake (1977) reports that 260 abortion bills were introduced
in state legislatures in the first year of legalization, and 189 bills were introduced in 1974
(p.46). Craig and O’Brien (1993) explain, “[i]nstead of pushing for legislation that would
directly challenge the principle that women have a right to choose an abortion, pro-life
groups won many states over to adopting regulations that would simply cut back on the
availability of abortion” (p.80). Although Roe prohibited regulations that interfered with
medical judgment during the first trimester of pregnancy, Roe did not address every
regulative possibility, and antiabortion forces began to exploit these silences (Kurtz,
Pearson, Douglas & David, 1986).
For example, on the grounds that Roe did not require hospitals to perform
abortions, states passed laws that banned the use of public facilities for abortions (Craig
& Obrien, 1993, p.78), thereby limiting the number of facilities that could provide
abortions, particularly for poor women.36 In addition, states passed laws requiring
abortions to be performed by licensed physicians and in a licensed setting (Craig &
O’Brien, 1993, p.79). States also passed laws that prohibited the advertisement and
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promotion of abortion, as well as laws that dictated strict reporting requirements (Craig &
O’Brien, 1993, p.79).
It is within this climate of enhanced regulation that early abortion-specific
“informed consent” laws should be understood. Along with the other restrictive laws
discussed above, states also introduced laws that required parental consent, spousal
consent, and a woman’s written consent. Evelyn Atkinson (2011) reports that half of the
states passed informed consent statutes in the first five years following Roe (p. 661).
Abortion rights groups quickly challenged many of these laws, thereby requiring the
Supreme Court to clarify its position on abortion regulation.
In the following pages I will review three Court decisions that directly addressed
“informed consent” laws: Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth (1976),
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health (1983) and Thornburgh, Governor of
Pennsylvania v. American College of Obstetricians (1987). In each of these cases, the
Court’s articulation of abortion as a “medical decision” played a pivotal role in its early
assessment of “informed consent” laws, and the Court assessed “informed consent” laws
in terms of proper medical protocol. In Danforth, the Court upheld a Missouri “informed
consent” statute because it viewed the Missouri law as complying with standard medical
practice. In Akron and Thornburgh, however, the Court rejected “informed consent”
statutes that invaded and dictated physician speech. Although the Court initially
overturned aggressive “informed consent” regulations, the Court articulated informed
consent primarily as a tool of physicians, not as an ethical mechanism to recognize the
woman’s perspective and enhance her role in the decision-making process. Consequently,
the Court’s focus on physician autonomy eclipsed and displaced women’s epistemic
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insight vis-à-vis abortion, and thereby, mitigated the ethical potential of informed consent
within the abortion context.
Informed Consent and the Danforth Decision
The issue of informed consent vis-a-vis abortion makes its first appearance in the
Court’s 1976 decision Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth (1976). At
issue in this decision was a Missouri abortion law that instituted a series of abortion
regulations and banned certain practices (Missouri An Act Relating To Abortion With
Penalty Provisions and Emergency Clause, 1974). The bill prohibited the use of saline
amniocentesis, it required detailed record keeping of abortions, it dictated standards of
“professional care” for the aborted fetus, and it defined the meaning of “viability.”37 In
terms of the consent process, the Missouri bill required the women’s written consent, her
spouse’s consent, and parental consent for unmarried minors. The original text of the
legislation read:
Section 3. No abortion shall be performed prior to the end of the first twelve
weeks of pregnancy except:
(1) By a duly licensed, consenting physician in the exercise of his best clinical
medical judgment.
(2) After the woman, prior to submitting to the abortion, certifies in writing her
consent to the abortion and that her consent is informed and freely given and is
not the result of coercion.
(3) With the written consent of the woman's spouse, unless the abortion is
certified by a licensed physician to be necessary in order to preserve the life of the
mother.
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(4) With the written consent of one parent or person in loco parentis of the
woman if the woman is unmarried and under the age of eighteen years, unless the
abortion is certified by a licensed physician as necessary in order to preserve the
life of the mother. (as cited in Legal Information Institute, n.d.a, Appendix to the
Opinion of the Court, para 7)
Challengers of the Missouri law argued that it violated Roe by “imposing an extra layer
and burden of regulation on the abortion decision” and that the meaning of the informed
consent provision was “overbroad and vague” (as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.59).
Notably, this early abortion-specific “informed consent” law did not include
scripted information, nor did it compel physicians to recite antiabortion propaganda.
Wood and Durham (1978) note it demanded “only a general expression of consent” and it
did “little if anything beyond codifying common law rules” (p.818). In a footnote, the
Court determined that informed consent in this case simply meant “the giving of
information to the patient as to just what would be done and as to its consequences” (as
cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.131). Notably, the Court’s definition of informed consent in
Danforth reflected the Court’s traditional treatment of informed consent as a process of
unilateral informational purveyance determined by the physician.
In their majority ruling, delivered by Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court struck
down the spousal and parental consent provisions, the provision that prohibited the use of
saline amniocentesis, and the provision that specified the care of the fetus. However, the
Court ruled that the informed consent provision was constitutional because it did not
“restrict the decision of the patient and her physician” (as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.59).
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart reasoned that “informed consent” regulations
did not violate the Court’s trimester framework as it was established in Roe. Even though
the Court ruled in Roe that the abortion decision was to be free from state regulation
during the first trimester, Justice Stewart argued,
. . . that statement was made in the context of invalidating a state law aimed at
thwarting a woman's decision to have an abortion. It was not intended to preclude
the State from enacting a provision aimed at ensuring that the abortion decision is
made in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary fashion. (as cited in Legal
Information Institute, n.d.a, Concurrence, para 7)
In short, the Court did not believe Missouri’s “informed consent” law restricted or
interfered with medical decision-making.
The Court dismissed the charge that the “informed consent” provision was too
vague by arguing that vagueness was, in fact, an important part of the informed consent
process. In the appendix to the majority opinion, the Court reasoned, “To ascribe more
meaning than this might well confine the attending physician in an undesired and
uncomfortable straitjacket in the practice of his profession” (as cited in Legal Information
Institute, n.d.a, Appendix to the Opinion of the Court, 8). Here, the Court’s reasoning
was consistent with their ruling in Roe that the abortion decision is primarily a medical
decision that should be governed by the physician’s discretion. As Manian (2009) writes,
“although the Court upheld an abortion-specific informed consent law, the Court
interpreted the law to require no more or less information than what physicians should be
providing before any medical procedure in accordance with the general principles of
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informed consent” (p.9). In the Court’s eyes, Missouri’s “informed consent” law simply
upheld shared standards of informed consent within the medical world.
Given the Court’s historical reverence for physician authority, it is not surprising
that the Court’s majority defended an “informed consent” regulation they viewed as
befitting standard medical practice. As has been well documented, Justice Blackmun, the
author of Roe, had deep roots in the medical world.38 According to the Court’s logic, the
“informed consent” law at issue in Danforth allowed physicians to exercise professional
judgment and professional autonomy, and it provided women with medically relevant
information. The Court’s defense of the informed consent process in Danforth, therefore,
reflected their ideal of reputable physicians alerting women to relevant medical
information that the physician is equipped to recognize and deliver. When Missouri’s
“informed consent” law is read through the lens of medical protocol, there is no
constitutional violation insofar as it aligned with a legal framework devoted to
safeguarding physician’s medical authority, even if the authors of the Missouri law were
motivated by alternative, ideological reasons.
Importantly, however, the language of Danforth introduced a series of fault lines
into the Court’s logic on abortion rights, fault lines that will later be amplified to justify
deeper regulative restrictions. For example, in his majority opinion, Justice Blackmun
opined:
The decision to abort, indeed, is an important, and often stressful one, and it is
desirable and imperative that it be made with full knowledge of its nature and
consequences. The woman is the one primarily concerned, and her awareness of
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the decision and its significance may be assured, constitutionally, by the State to
the extent of requiring her prior written consent. (as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.58)
The language Justice Blackmun used in this argument raises some alarm. There is, prima
facie, something disturbingly reductive in the idea that one could obtain “full knowledge”
of an issue as morally complex as abortion and that this knowledge could be captured and
confirmed via the informed consent process.39
Likewise, Justice Stewart’s defense of informed consent provisions on the basis
that the abortion decision should be made in a “knowing” manner replicated one of the
major problems with the Court’s articulation of informed consent in general: it presumed
that the only way for a decision to be made in a “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
fashion” (as cited in Legal Information Institute, n.d.a, Concurrence, para 7) is for the
patient to receive specialized information from her provider. Although receiving
specialized knowledge is a key part of the informed consent process, the Court’s
treatment of informed consent failed to recognize how patients impart special insights
during medical decision-making. If patient autonomy is the goal, then the Court’s
articulation of informed consent also overlooked a critical component of the informed
consent process: the recognition and engagement of patient values, goals, and desires.
Once again, this oversight is particularly problematic in the abortion context where
women’s decisions are highly unique and often driven by nonmedical issues.
In general, Justice Blackmun’s assumption that the abortion decision is an “often
stressful one,” affirmed and perpetuated a general assumption lurking within dominant
judicial articulations of informed consent: patients are inherently vulnerable and lack
appropriate decision-making capacities (Katz, 1984). Problematically, this assumption
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finds particular traction in the abortion context where women’s decisions have often been
regarded with suspicion. However inadvertently, Justice Blackmun emboldened a
stereotype common in antiabortion discourse: women who choose to terminate a
pregnancy are irrational and uninformed. Under this view, informed consent becomes a
tool for physicians to correct and recalibrate their patients, rather than a tool that compels
the physician to reconsider medical options in light of the patient’s needs, beliefs, and
values.
Moreover, the Court’s argument that abortion is inherently stressful may
compound antiabortion narratives that abortion causes women stress because women
should be, and should want to be, mothers. According to antiabortion ideology, abortion
is stressful because it contradicts or undermines women’s maternal “nature.” Rarely do
antiabortion narratives characterize pregnancy, childbirth, and parenthood as stressful
even though such experiences arguably engender more lifetime stress than abortion.
Instead, antiabortionists routinely suggest that abortion yields psychological disorder, a
deceptive claim that will be tracked and unpacked in Chapter Three where I consider
state-sponsored “informed consent” materials.
Ultimately, the Court’s defense of “informed consent” statutes in Danforth should
be read as a defense of medical professionalism and provider autonomy. Notably,
however, the Court’s view of informed consent in Danforth also provides fuel for
antiabortion ideology. Although Justice Blackmun may not have had antiabortion
ideology in mind when he argued that the abortion decision is “an important, and often
stressful one,” that should be made “with full knowledge of its nature and consequences,”
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his language helped to crystallize the sentiment that women’s reproductive decisions
require regulative intervention and supervision.
Informed Consent and the Akron and Thornburgh Decisions
Emboldened by Danforth, other states soon passed “informed consent” laws.
This time, however, states introduced scripted information into their “informed consent”
provisions, forcing the Court to reexamine its position on informed consent in the
abortion context.40 In Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health (1983) and
Thornburgh, Governor of Pennsylvania v. American College of Obstetricians (1987) the
Court continued its defense of physician authority by striking down “informed consent”
laws that required physicians to parrot ideological information.
In Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health (1983) the Court struck down
regulations imposed by the Akron, Ohio city council regarding the abortion procedure
(Akron, Ohio, Regulation of Abortions, 1978). These included a twenty-four hour
waiting period and informed consent requirements that required the physician to inform
the woman of the following information:
That the unborn child is a human life from the moment of conception and that
there has been described in detail the anatomical and physiological characteristics
of the particular unborn child at the gestational point of development at which
time the abortion is to be performed, including, but not limited to, appearance,
mobility, tactile sensitivity, including pain, perception or response, brain and heart
function, the presence of internal organs and the presence of external
members . . . . That abortion is a major surgical procedure which can result in
serious complications . . . and that abortion may leave essentially unaffected or

69

may worsen any existing psychological problems she may have, and can result in
severe emotional disturbances. (as cited in Legal Information Institute,
n.d.b, Opinion, 5, § 1870.06 Informed Consent, para 5, para 7)
As evidenced in the above citation, antiabortion rhetoric (“the unborn child is a human
life from the moment of conception” and abortion can result “in serious complications,”
and “severe emotional disturbances”) aligned the informed consent process with
ideological concerns. The ideological specificity mandated by Akron’s provisions marks
a notable departure from the provisions that were at issue in Danforth.
In his majority opinion, Justice Powell argued Akron’s “informed consent”
provisions posed a constitutional violation because they exceeded the regulative limits
established by the Court in Roe. Although Roe permitted states to impose regulations
relating to maternal health after the second trimester, Justice Powell argued, “The State’s
discretion to regulate on this basis does not, however, permit it to adopt abortion
regulations that depart from accepted medical practice” (as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.126).
Reinstating the Court’s foundational belief that abortion is a medical decision, as well as
the Court’s subscription to paternalistic models of medical decision-making, Justice
Powell insisted, “it remains primarily the responsibility of the physician to ensure that
appropriate information is conveyed to his patient, depending on her particular
circumstances” (as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.130). According to Justice Powell, Ohio’s
effort to infuse the informed consent process with antiabortion ideology marked a clear
departure from “accepted medical practice,” and it “extend[ed] the State’s interest in
ensuring ‘informed consent’ beyond permissible limits” (as cited in Shapiro, 2007,
p.130).
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Notably, Justice Powell argued the city of Akron used the informed consent
process to illegitimately persuade a woman to carry her pregnancy to term. “First it is
fair to say that much of the information required is designed not to inform the woman’s
consent but rather to persuade her to withhold it altogether,” Justice Powell explained,
“ . . . a State may require that a physician make certain that his patient understands the
physical and emotional implications of having an abortion. But Akron has gone far
beyond merely describing the general subject matter relevant to informed consent” (as
cited in Shapiro, 2007, pp.130-131). As way of further example, Justice Powell noted:
Much of the detailed description of ‘the anatomical and physiological
characteristics of the particular unborn child’ required by subsection (3) would
involve at best speculation by the physician . . . . And subsection (5), that begins
with the dubious statement that ‘abortion is a major surgical procedure’ . . . and
proceeds to describe numerous possible physical and psychological complications
of abortion, . . . is a ‘parade of horribles’ intended to suggest that abortion is a
particularly dangerous procedure. (as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.130)
Importantly, Justice Powell’s argument reflected the majority’s recognition that
antiabortion ideology was perverting standard practices of informed consent. It is
important to note, however, that the Court’s primary objection to Akron’s law was that it
infringed upon physician autonomy by dictating the content of physician speech.
This line of reasoning is continued in Thornburgh, Governor of Pennsylvania v.
American College of Obstetricians (1987). Here, the Court struck down six provisions of
the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act (1982), a Pennsylvania law that included
ideologically scripted “informed consent” provisions. Included in Pennsylvania’s
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informed consent provisions was information alerting women to the “fact that there may
be detrimental physical and psychological effects which are not accurately foreseeable,”
(as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.148), the medical risks of abortion and the medical risks of
carrying a child to term, the gestational age of the fetus, a description of the availability
of medical assistance benefits, and the father’s financial responsibility. An additional
provision required the pregnant woman to be notified of the existence of written
information describing the fetus and of agencies that provide alternatives to abortion.
These written materials described the “probable anatomical and physiological
characteristics of the unborn child at two-week gestational increments from fertilization
to full term, including any relevant information on the possibility of the unborn child’s
survival” (as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.148).
Citing the Court’s prior ruling in Akron, Justice Blackmun argued, “the State may
not require the delivery of information designed ‘to influence the woman’s informed
choice between abortion or childbirth (Akron, 462 U.S., at 443-444)’” (as cited in
Shapiro, 2007, p.147). In his majority ruling, Justice Blackmun explained that advising
women of medical assistance benefits and paternal liability “are poorly disguised
elements of discouragement for the abortion decision” (as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.149).
Justice Blackmun reasoned:
. . . much of this would be nonmedical information beyond the physician’s area of
expertise and, for many patients, would be irrelevant and inappropriate. For a
patient with a life-threatening pregnancy, the ‘information’ in its very rendition
may be cruel as well as destructive of the physician-patient relationship.
(as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.149)
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In his concluding remarks, Justice Blackmun argued such provisions violate the principle
of informed consent:
This type of compelled information is the antithesis of informed consent. That the
Commonwealth does not, and surely would not, compel similar disclosure of
every possible peril of necessary surgery or of simple vaccination, reveals the
anti-abortion character of the statute and its real purpose . . . . Section 3205’s
informational requirements therefore are facially unconstitutional.
(as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.149)
Justice Blackmun’s reasoning reflected the majority’s belief that information purveyed
during the informed consent process cannot be used to facilitate an antiabortion
perspective because such efforts usurp physician autonomy. Echoing a belief expressed
in both Danforth and Akron, the Court objected to Pennsylvania’s “informed consent”
law because it assaulted medical autonomy.
From the standpoint of today’s hostile regulative environment, the Court’s
rejection of ideological “informed consent” provisions in Akron and Thornburgh shines
as a refreshing relic of a time when the Court’s rulings benefitted and protected abortion
rights. Problematically, however, the Court’s rejection of “informed consent” provisions
followed from its deference for physician authority rather than from explicit respect for
women’s reproductive autonomy. In general, the Court’s arguments were predicated on
the assumption that relevant information belongs to the physician alone, once again
advancing the anemic vision of informed consent that was discussed in Chapter One. By
routinely and almost exclusively stressing medical authority, the Court allowed women to
conceptually drop out of the informed consent process.
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Notably, the Court changed their view of informed consent in their next major
decision regarding “informed consent” regulations, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992). In Casey, the Court’s revision of informed consent
replaced physician authority with state authority. Consequently, the Court continued to
overlook women, but its revised framework turned informed consent into a tool of state
scrutiny, rather than a protocol of medical practice.
Informed Consent and the Casey Decision
It is widely recognized that the Supreme Court decision Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992) opened the legal doors to the wide range of
“informed consent” requirements now recognized as constitutionally permissible. The
constitutional backdrop and the accompanying arguments and amicus briefs that
constitute Casey have been analyzed by a bevy of legal scholars.41 For my purposes,
however, it is useful to review the defining features of this case to help explain the
creation of a legal environment that permits the antiabortion appropriation of the
informed consent process. Additionally, a short review will expose how the Court
pivoted its position on informed consent from a tool of medical practice to one of state
power.
In 1988 and 1989 the Pennsylvania legislature amended the 1982 Pennsylvania
Abortion Control Act to include a new series of abortion regulations (Friedman, L., 1993,
p.29). Notably, these regulations closely mirrored the regulations the Court rejected in
Thornburgh. Specifically, the Pennsylvania law mandated a 24-hour waiting-period,
parental consent requirements, a spousal notification rule, informed consent
requirements, and reporting requirements.
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The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act dictated that, “no abortion shall be
performed or induced except with the voluntary and informed consent of the woman
upon whom the abortion is to be performed or induced.” It also required the information
to be purveyed by “the physician who is to perform the abortion or the referring
physician” at least 24 hours prior to the abortion. Remarkably, the provision outlined in
detail the informational content requisite to an “informed” decision. More specifically,
this section required the woman to be informed of the probable gestational age of the
“unborn child,” and the medical risks of carrying “her child” to term (as cited in Legal
Information Institute, n.d.c, Appendix to the Opinion, 18 PA. Cons. Sta. Ann., §3205.
Informed Consent, para 4, para 5). In addition, the Pennsylvania law required the
physician to inform the woman that:
(i) The department publishes printed materials which describe the unborn child
and list agencies which offer alternatives to abortion and that she has a right to
review the printed materials and that a copy will be provided to her free of charge
if she chooses to review it.
(ii) Medical assistance benefits may be available for prenatal care, childbirth and
neonatal care, and that more detailed information on the availability of such
assistance is contained in the printed materials published by the department.
(iii) The father of the unborn child is liable to assist in the support of her child,
even in instances where he has offered to pay for the abortion. In the case of rape,
this information may be omitted. (as cited in Legal Information Institute, n.d.c,
Appendix to the Opinion, 18 PA. Cons. Sta. Ann., §3205. Informed Consent, para
10, para 11, para 12)
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Section 3209 of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, called the “husband notification”
provision by challengers, and the “spousal notice” by its defenders, required a married
woman to notify her husband before obtaining an abortion. Under penalty of perjury, the
woman would be required to provide a signed statement indicating that her husband had
been notified. Defenders of the provision argued it furthered state interest by “promoting
the integrity of the marital relationship and to protect a spouse’s interests in having
children within marriage and in protecting the prenatal life of that child” (as cited in
Friedman, L., 1993, p.195). Supporters of the law contended that the “spousal notice”
would ensure
. . . at least the possibility that the husband will participate in deciding the fate of
his unborn child, a possibility that might otherwise have been denied him. The
husband’s participation, in turn, may lead his spouse to reconsider her options or
rethink a hasty decision. (as cited in Friedman, L., 1993, p.230)
At the time, Pennsylvania did not require women or men to notify their spouses of any
other medical or surgical procedure.
Although supporters of the Pennsylvania provisions argued that they “are
rationally related to ensuring that the woman’s choice is fully informed and not the
product of coercion” (as cited in Friedman, L., 1993, p.191), the Pennsylvania
amendments functioned as an experimental piece of antiabortion legislation designed to
test the constitutional limits of abortion regulations. Recent Court rulings suggested that
the Court had amended its views on abortion regulation since it had struck down
“informed consent” laws in Akron (1983) and Thornburgh (1986). For example, in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989) and Hodgson v. Minnesota (1990) the
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Court countenanced laws regulating abortion provision. In Webster, the Court upheld a
Missouri law prohibiting government facilities from providing abortions, and it argued
that the law did not impede women’s access to abortion because women could still obtain
abortions from private healthcare providers. In Hodgson, the Court upheld a Minnesota
law that mandated a minor to notify one parent prior to obtaining an abortion. Both of
these rulings marked a significant departure from the privacy protections outlined by Roe,
and they demonstrated the Court’s willingness to defend state interference in the abortion
decision.42
On June 29th, 1992, the Court issued its ruling. Although the Court reaffirmed a
woman’s constitutional right to abortion, it rejected Roe’s trimester framework which had
significantly limited regulations not related to maternal health prior to fetal viability. In
its place, the Court adopted the “undue burden” standard to test the constitutionality of
abortion regulations.43 The Court defined “undue burden” as “a substantial obstacle in
the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus” (as cited in Shapiro, 2007,
p.197).44 Using the new “undue burden” standard, the Court ruled that Pennsylvania’s
informed consent provisions, parental consent provisions, and mandatory waiting periods
were constitutionally permissible, but the spousal notification provision was not.45
Although the concept of an “undue burden” had been operative in judicial
discourse on abortion for quite some time, the Casey decision formalized it as a lens of
evaluation.46 Essentially, the Court argued that the undue burden provided a form of
evaluative compromise because it mitigated the “rigidity” (as cited in Shapiro, 2007,
p.196) of the trimester framework which permitted “almost no regulation at all . . . during
the first trimester of pregnancy” (as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.195). In contradistinction to
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the trimester framework that relegated the abortion decision to physician purview, the
undue burden standard permitted states to enter the informed consent process.
The Court’s adoption of the undue burden standard in 1992 marked a notable
change in the Court’s articulation of the abortion decision, as well as its vision of the
informed consent process. Whereas in pre-Casey rulings the Court repeatedly framed
abortion as a medical decision that ultimately hinged on the discretion of the physician,
the tropes of “physician authority” and “medical decision” are less active in the Casey
ruling. Instead, the Court moved away from the medical rhetoric that dominated Roe and
it moved toward the moral and psychological dimensions of the abortion decision
(Manian, 2009, p.13; Daly, 1995). Remarkably, the Court’s shifting rhetoric indicated
the belief that physicians could no longer be trusted to manage the abortion decision
correctly. Nan D. Hunter (2006) argues that following Roe, “[t]he tone of the Court's
opinions continued to change, with increasing frequency, to skepticism about the
professional reliability of physicians who performed abortions” (p.193). In Casey, an
underlying moral distrust of the medical community, at least within the abortion context,
took hold of the majority opinion and the Court’s historical deference for the medical
community migrated into the Court’s minority opinions.
In effect, the Court’s rhetorical transition from the medical to the moral
dimensions of abortion allowed the Court to hold the woman, rather than the doctor,
primarily responsible for the abortion decision (Manian, 2009). By positioning the
woman as the primary decider, however, the Court did not present a renewed recognition
of woman’s reproductive autonomy. Instead, the Court used such positioning to justify
enhanced regulations and to justify state intrusion upon the informed consent process.
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Driven by the belief that neither women nor providers can properly negotiate the abortion
decision, the Court articulated informed consent as a means to monitor women’s
decisions.
The Court’s revised reading of informed consent as an appropriate channel for
state intervention was predicated on a number of troubling and ultimately sexist beliefs
regarding women and pregnancy. For example, the Court took as axiomatic that
pregnancy and childbirth are the preferable options for women, and the Court assumed
that women who seek an abortion have lost sight of this precept. The Court argued:
Though the woman has a right to choose to terminate or continue her pregnancy
before viability, it does not at all follow that the State is prohibited from taking
steps to ensure that this choice is thoughtful and informed. Even in the earliest
stages of pregnancy, the State may enact rules and regulations designed to
encourage [a woman] to know that there are philosophic and social arguments of
great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy.
(as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.196)
Likewise, the Court argued:
To promote the State’s profound interest in potential life, throughout pregnancy
the State may take measures to ensure that the woman’s choice is informed, and
measures designed to advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their
purpose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.
(as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.198)
Here, the Court’s logic coupled a “thoughtful and informed” decision with the
recognition that pregnancy is preferable, and it configured the state as a morally
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omniscient moderator of this knowledge. This configuration is evident when the Court
claimed that the state has a right to use the informed consent process to argue, “in favor
of continuing the pregnancy” without also recognizing that abortion is often in the
woman’s best interest, for either medical or nonmedical reasons. That is, the Court
assumed that carrying a pregnancy to term is simply the right thing to do and that women
who choose abortion are missing this insight. With this presumption in hand, the Court
interpreted informed consent as an appropriate channel to deliver information designed to
encourage women in the direction of childbirth.
Legal scholars have correctly observed that the Court’s argument in Casey
mobilized a series of stereotypes that depict women as irrational, ignorant, and essentially
maternal, thereby justifying the need for enhanced regulation (Atkinson, 2011, Manian,
2009, Siegel 1992; Siegel & Blustain, 2006). The Court argued, for example,
It cannot be questioned that psychological well-being is a facet of health. Nor can
it be doubted that most women considering an abortion would deem the impact on
the fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to the decision. In attempting to ensure that a
woman apprehend the full consequences of her decision, the State furthers the
legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only
to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision
was not fully informed. (as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.201)
Here, the Court assumed that women have not factored the fetus into their decision and
that women are somehow ignorant of the fact that an abortion terminates a developing
embryo or fetus. Likewise, the Court assumed that if women really took the time to
consider the fetus, the abortion decision would seem less attractive. Both assumptions
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are predicated on the stereotype that women are rationally undeveloped (women do not
sufficiently understand what an abortion does to a fetus or embryo) and women are
inherently maternal (women who have abortions suffer psychological fallout). In
addition, the Court’s argument that women who have abortions may experience
“devastating psychological consequences” contributed to a growing trend in antiabortion
rhetoric that abortion is psychologically damaging to the woman herself (Siegel &
Blustain, 2006; Siegel, April, 2008), and the Court failed to recognize the wide-ranging
multiplicity of emotional experiences generated by the abortion decision.47
The Court’s adoption of nefarious stereotypes regarding women’s agency is
further evidenced by the Court’s defense of Pennsylvania’s mandatory waiting period.
The Court argued,
The idea that important decisions will be more informed and deliberate if they
follow some period of reflection does not strike us as unreasonable, particularly
when the statute directs that important information become part of the background
of the decision. (as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.202)
Once again, this assumption treats women as incapable of contemplating the abortion
decision independently, thus justifying the need for state intrusion upon the informed
consent process. Moreover, the Court’s argument in favor of mandatory waiting periods
demonstrates an unnerving ignorance of the economic and practical hardships waiting
periods impose on some women.
It is also important to note that although the Court recognized the infinitely
variable moral beliefs that accompany abortion and fetal ontology (Shapiro, 2007, p.191),
the Court’s logic was driven by an underlying presumption that the fetus or embryo is
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physiologically equivalent to a postnatal infant or child, and the Court’s rhetoric suggests
that the fetus or embryo deserves the same moral standing as a person. For example, to
defend its argument that a state may require doctors to advise women of materials
“relating to the consequences to the fetus” (as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.201), the Court
deployed the analogy of a kidney transplant operation. “We think it Constitutional,” the
Court argued, “for the State to require that in order for there to be informed consent to a
kidney transplant operation the recipient must be supplied with information about risks to
the donor as well as risks to himself or herself” (as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.201). This
analogy is strange insofar as a kidney transplant involves two people, whereas abortion
involves a person and an embryo or fetus, and, on the Court’s own admission in Roe, a
developing embryo or fetus is not the same as a person.48
Indeed, throughout the Casey decision, the Court’s rhetoric collapses the
important physiological distinctions that mark gestation. The Court’s unmodified use of
the word “fetus,” for example, is questionable given that the term “fetus” is not typically
used until the eighth week of conception (Sandler, 2010), and 63.1 % of abortions occur
before nine weeks of pregnancy (Guttmacher Institute, July, 2014). Following standard
medical lexicon, many women are aborting an embryo, not a fetus. The Court’s routine
claim regarding the State’s right to “express profound respect for the life of the unborn”
(as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.198) further suggests that the Court assumed that a
developing embryo or fetus should be awarded and accorded the same moral status and
moral respect as a child. In turn, this presumption bolstered the Court’s stereotypical
belief that maternity is the right choice for women.
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In summation, the Court’s ruling in Casey treated informed consent as a means to
monitor women’s reproductive decisions, rather than an ethical mechanism to enhance
and safeguard women’s autonomy. The Court justified its defense of the state’s
heightened involvement in the informed consent process on the basis that women are
poor decision makers, especially in the abortion context. Once the Court adopted this
position, it interpreted the informed consent process accordingly. That is, the informed
consent process became a legitimate means to facilitate the Court’s normative view that
pregnancy is preferable. If neither women nor physicians can be counted upon to
contemplate the abortion decision “correctly,” then the state’s involvement in the
informed consent process is calculated as an asset rather than a “substantial obstacle.”
Even though Casey upheld Roe’s central ruling, the Court transformed the
landscape of abortion provision, and the Court lent institutional credence to antiabortion
ideology. In particular, Casey helped to legally enshrine the belief that women who wish
to terminate a pregnancy require moral correction, and that the state knows what is best
for women. Although Casey used this sexist narrative to institute a new era of abortion
regulation, the belief that women’s epistemic capacities are relatively inferior, whether in
comparison to the doctor’s or to the state’s, has a long history in abortion jurisprudence.
Consequently, the sexist stereotypes at work in Casey should be read as an iteration of a
long cultural narrative that depicts women as incompetent decision-makers vis-a-vis the
abortion decision.
Conclusion to Chapter Two
To conclude, the trajectory of the Court’s treatment of abortion and “informed
consent” can be summarized as follows. In Roe, the Court articulated abortion as a
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“medical decision,” and the Court overturned regulations that exceeded medical concern
prior to fetal viability. This articulation led the Court to reject “informed consent”
statutes that invaded physician speech with ideologically driven information. In Casey,
however, the Court turned informed consent into a tool of state surveillance, and the
Court argued that the state’s intrusion upon the informed consent process is warranted in
order to make sure “. . . that a woman apprehend the full consequences of her decision”
(as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.201). This argument is shaped by the belief that the embryo
or fetus is an unborn child, that childbirth is always preferable to abortion, and that
women are often ignorant of these facts. Once the Court adopted the moral precept that
pregnancy is preferable, their interpretation of informed consent was reconfigured in
favor of heightened state intervention.
Of particular note for this work, however, is that Casey demonstrated a
metamorphosis of the Court’s informed consent doctrine. Whereas the Court defended
physician authority in its early informed consent rulings, the Court later expanded states’
rights to eclipse physician expertise during the informed consent process. Throughout
these evolving articulations of informed consent and abortion, women are never once
granted the status of primary decision-maker. In general, a thoughtful recognition of
women’s privileged perspective vis-à-vis abortion is missing throughout abortion
jurisprudence. Although Casey marked a turning point in informed consent law, it
perpetuated an abiding dismissal of women’s reproductive authority that originated with
Roe. Echoing a point I made in Chapter One, the Court’s historical displacement of
women’s autonomy within informed consent jurisprudence demands a deeper rethinking
of informed consent doctrine in general, and its relationship to abortion in particular.
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CHAPTER THREE
“INFORMED CONSENT” IN THE CLINICAL CONTEXT
In Chapter Three I turn to state-sanctioned “informed consent” materials to
demonstrate the troubling deployment of bioethics rhetoric within the clinical context of
abortion. “Informed consent” practices vary across the states, and states rely upon
different mediums to transfer abortion-specific information, ranging from printed
materials to verbal recitations to websites. Here, I focus specifically on “informed
consent” materials that are notable for their medical inaccuracies and aggressive
antiabortion ideology. In general, this chapter will show in detail how antiabortion forces
are using bioethics language to facilitate an antiabortion agenda.
As discussed in Chapter Two, the 1992 Supreme Court decision Planned
Parenthood v. Casey opened the door for a tsunami of abortion regulations, including the
“informed consent” laws at issue in this work. By 1996, eleven states—Idaho, Kansas,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, and Utah—had passed a biased “informed consent” law (Kolbert & Miller,
1998, pp. 100, 108). As of February 2015, twelve states include information regarding
fetal pain, five states require that women be told that personhood begins at conception,
five states incorrectly ascribe a link between abortion and breast cancer, and nine states
emphasize negative emotional responses to abortion (Guttmacher Institute, February,
2015b).
Researchers at the Guttmacher Institute have compiled invaluable data on the
existence of “informed consent” materials across the states. Yet, the rhetoric of
“informed consent” materials has not been critically theorized. I ask, what strategies do
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antiabortionists use to incorporate scientifically misleading information into “informed
consent” materials? An answer to this question will help to destabilize misleading
“informed consent” laws and it will clarify why abortion-specific “informed consent”
materials are violating standard practices of informed consent.
In this chapter, I expand upon preliminary research carried out by the Guttmacher
Institute to discuss three rhetorical strategies trending within “informed consent”
materials. More specifically, these strategies include: a) the deceptive use of
methodologically flawed and discredited research studies; b) an embellished and
empirically reductive discussion of post-abortion emotional response; and c) the careful
construction of a fetal subject that sanctions antiabortion ideology. Collectively, these
three tactics allow antiabortion politicians to appropriate terminology common to medical
and research discourses to deliver information that is misleading, inaccurate, and
ideologically driven.49
In general, Chapter Three explores the dramatic perversion of informed consent
doctrine by antiabortionists, and it will explain why the antiabortion appropriation of
informed consent bears little resemblance to informed consent doctrine as originally
espoused and practiced by the courts, bioethicists, and clinicians. Although founding
articulations of informed consent are plagued by a number of theoretical deficiencies,
traditional articulations of informed consent are nonetheless motivated by ideals of
equality, autonomy, and liberty, noble ideals even if they are not always substantiated in
practice. Contrary to the liberatory aspirations that helped to beget informed consent
practices, the “informed consent” materials considered in this chapter intend to erase,
rather than empower, women’s reproductive autonomy.
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Strategy One: Flawed and Discredited Research Studies
In the current legal climate, abortion is an exceptionally safe medical procedure
(Weitz, Taylor, Desai, Upadhyay, Waldman, Battistelli, & Drey, 2013; Gillman &
Holmquist, 2008). Nevertheless, antiabortion ideology has managed to infect informed
consent materials with deceptive information regarding the health “risks” of abortion.
More specifically, the misleading and scientifically unsound claim that abortion causes
breast cancer has been successfully incorporated into several states’ “informed consent”
materials.50 Although the argument that abortion causes breast cancer has been a staple
of antiabortion discourse for several decades, its mandated incorporation into medical
practice marks a troubling new iteration. Currently, Alaska, Kansas, Mississippi,
Oklahoma, and Texas provide information that inaccurately reports a causal link between
abortion and breast cancer in their “informed consent” materials (Guttmacher Institute,
February, 2015b). Each state includes information discussing the link between abortion
and breast cancer in the written materials they administer to women seeking an abortion,
and abortion providers in Kansas are required to discuss the abortion-breast cancer link in
a verbal counseling session, as well (Guttmacher Institute, February, 2015b).
In general, “informed consent” materials manufacture a link between breast
cancer and abortion by referencing fringe or discredited research studies and by falsely
suggesting that the existence of such studies evidences an ongoing debate within the
medical community over the relationship between breast cancer and abortion. 51
Although a few research studies claiming a causal relationship between abortion and
breast cancer do exist, such studies have been widely discredited for their methodological
weaknesses. Moreover, most major cancer organizations reject a causal relationship
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between abortion and breast cancer, and organizations that champion a connection
between abortion and breast cancer are explicitly associated with antiabortion politics. 52
In the following paragraphs, I review the history of abortion-breast cancer
research, and I explain why studies purporting a correlation are methodologically flawed.
Next, I turn to the “informed consent” materials themselves, and I critique the language
and arguments used to perpetuate a fallacious relationship between breast cancer and
abortion. Along the way, I explain why “informed consent” materials that purport a
causal relationship between abortion and breast cancer violate standard practices of
informed consent despite their use of rhetoric common to informed consent discourse.
Beginning in the 1980s, research into a possible link between abortion and breast
cancer escalated as researchers explored the relationship between hormone levels,
pregnancy, and breast cancer. According to Boonstra, Gold, Richards, & Finer (2006),
abortion opponents “seized upon” (p.23) a 1996 study (Brind, Chinchilli, Severs, &
Summy-Long) that suggested a relationship between abortion and breast cancer amongst
women who had terminated past pregnancies. Then, at the beginning of George W.
Bush’s presidency, the National Cancer Institute (NCI) succumbed to political pressure
and included information on its website discussing a possible link between abortion and
breast cancer (Joffe, 2009, pp.67-68).
However, the NCI’s decision to include this information on its website incited
boisterous protest from many members of the scientific community. Consequently, in
February 2003, the U.S. National Cancer Institute assembled a panel “of the world’s
leading experts who study pregnancy and breast cancer risk” (American Cancer Society,
n.d., What do experts say, para 1) to assess the relationship between abortion and breast
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cancer. After a three-day workshop whose outcomes were jointly reviewed by the NCI
Board of Scientific Advisors and the Board of Scientific Counselors, the panel concluded
that “induced abortion is not associated with an increase in breast cancer risk” (National
Cancer Institute, n.d.b, Epidemiologic Findings, para 6); the panel claimed that the
evidence for this conclusion is “well established,” the highest rating possible (National
Cancer Institute, n.d.b, Strength of Evidence Rating Key). The National Cancer Institute
(n.d.b) has since removed information purporting a link between breast cancer and
abortion from its website, and the NCI website now offers a detailed discussion
discrediting the argument that abortion causes breast cancer.
For example, the NCI (n.d.c) explains that early studies were methodologically
flawed and scientifically mishandled because they either used a small sample size or
relied upon self-reporting rather than on medical records, and, thereby, were
compromised by problems of recall bias (Background, para 1). According to the
American Cancer Association, recall bias can occur in case-control studies or
retrospective design studies where two groups of people, one group with a disease and
one group without the disease, are asked to review their past exposures in hopes of
identifying an exposure common only to those who are sick. There are a number of
problems with this approach. For example:
[P]eople with a disease like cancer often think very hard about what they may
have done in the past that could have contributed to their getting cancer. They are
more likely to remember things that the healthy people don’t. They are also more
likely to tell the researchers about things that they would otherwise feel was too
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personal or embarrassing to mention – like abortion. (American Cancer Society,
n.d., How is this studied, para 3)
In other words, having a disease can influence a patient to remember certain events that a
healthy person may not be motivated to recall or feel compelled to disclose. According
to the American Cancer Society, studies suggesting a link between abortion and breast
cancer are retrospective studies and, therefore, are weakened by the issue of recall bias
(American Cancer Society, n.d., What do the studies show?, para 1).
Current studies that control for such problems as recall bias or small samples
evince no correlation between abortion and breast cancer (Erlandsson, Montgomery,
Cnattingius, & Ekbom, 2003; Mahue-Giangreco, Ursin, Sullivan-Halley, & Bernstein,
2003; Sanderson, Shu, Jin, Dai, Wen, Hua, & ... Zheng, 2001; Ye, Gao, Qin, Ray, &
Thomas, 2002). The American Cancer Society argues that the largest “and probably the
most reliable” study (n.d., Cohort and other prospective studies, para 1) was conducted in
Denmark during the 1990s. This Danish study took advantage of Denmark’s meticulous
medical record system—Denmark maintains detailed medical records for all of its
citizens—to look for evidence of a causal relationship between abortion and breast
cancer. Researchers linked the medical records of all Danish women born between 1935
and 1978, a total of 1.5 million women, to the National Registry of Induced Abortions
and the Danish Cancer Registry. After correcting for breast cancer risk factors, the study
found no evidence to suggest that induced abortion increases breast cancer risk (Melbye,
Wohlfahrt, Olsen, Frisch, Westergaard, Helweg-Larsen, & Andersen, 1997). By
grounding their study in medical data drawn from a system of mandatory reporting, the
Danish study avoids problems of recall bias and other concerns that can arise when
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research on a stigmatized issue, like abortion, is conducted through interviews and selfreports.
Other exhaustive studies carried out in both the United States and Europe that
correct for problems of recall bias and small sample size have found no link (ACOG
Committee Opinion No. 434, 2009; ACOG Committee Opinion Number 285, 2003;
Collaborative Group on Hormonal Factors in Breast Cancer, 2004; Henderson et al.,
2008; Lash & Fink, 2004; Michels, Xue, Colditz, & Willett, 2007; Reeves et al., 2006;
Rosenblatt et al., 2006). Along with the National Cancer Institute (n.d.a), the American
Cancer Society (n.d.) dismisses the correlation between abortion and breast cancer. From
the perspective of breast cancer-abortion research as a whole, studies purporting a link
between breast cancer and abortion are uncommon and are overshadowed by studies that
demonstrate no causal relationship.
Nevertheless, some states continue to include information purporting a link
between breast cancer and abortion in their informed consent materials. In Alaska, for
example, a state-sponsored website discusses a host of issues relevant to abortion and
pregnancy (Alaska Department of Health and Social Services Division of Public Health,
2013a; Alaska Informed Consent Requirements, 2013), including a subsection titled,
“Possible Medical Risks or Complications of Abortion” (Alaska Department of Health
and Social Services Division of Public Health, 2013b). Along with information
discussing infection, incomplete abortion, cervical injury, blood clots, uterine perforation,
hemorrhage, and allergic reaction, Alaska also includes a short discussion on the causal
relationship between abortion and breast cancer.
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Alarmingly, the Alaska website suggests that the breast cancer-abortion topic is
still debated within scientific circles. The website fabricates this deception by
juxtaposing the competing views of different professional medical associations while
simultaneously failing to mention that organizations defending a causal link are in the
minority and are affiliated with antiabortion organizations. For example, the website
references a June, 2009 report issued by the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG) which clearly states “… prospective studies conclude there is no
association between induced abortion and breast cancer” (Alaska Department of Health
and Social Services Division of Public Health, 2013b, para 8). Yet, in contradistinction to
the ACOG’s stance, the website also states: “The American Association of Pro-Life
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (AAPLOG) supports the view that there is a causal
relationship between breast cancer and the termination of pregnancy” (Alaska
Department of Health and Social Services Division of Public Health, 2013b, para 9). The
website’s visual presentation of this contradictory information falsely suggests that the
competing arguments carry equal weight in scientific communities, when in fact the
AAPLOG is an outlier on this issue. Although most professional cancer organizations
eschew any causal correlation between abortion and breast cancer, the Alaskan website
does not share this important information with its viewers. In explanation of the
competing reports, the website simply instructs viewers to consult the website’s reference
list.
Oklahoma uses a similar tactic in their “informed consent” booklet, A Woman’s
Right to Know (Oklahoma State Board of Medical Licensure & Supervision, May 2013).
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In the short section, “Is There A Link Between Abortion and Breast Cancer?” the
Oklahoma booklet reads:
Studies on this issue have reached differing conclusions. Some studies indicate
that there is no increased risk of breast cancer after a woman has had an abortion.
Other studies indicate that there might be an increased risk. If you have a family
history of breast cancer or have clinical finding of breast disease, you should seek
the advice of your physician in order to be informed. (The Oklahoma State Board
of Medical Licensure and Supervision, May 2013, p.14)
Like Alaska, Oklahoma’s informed consent material suggests that studies purporting a
causal relationship between abortion and breast cancer carry equal weight in comparison
to studies denying such a relationship, when in fact there is a significant imbalance
between the competing arguments in terms of methodological rigor and scientific
support.
In Kansas, abortion providers must present women with an informational
pamphlet titled, If You are Pregnant (Kansas Department of Health and Environment,
n.d.a).53 In the section “Long Term Medical Risks” (p.29) the Kansas pamphlet warns
women of a possible link between breast cancer and abortion. The Kansas booklet states:
There are also studies that have found an increased risk of breast cancer after
induced abortion, but other studies have found no risk. A 2003 National Cancer
Institute panel reviewing studies at that time concluded there was no increased
risk; however, study and review of the relationship continues.
(Kansas Department of Health and Environment, n.d.a, p.29)
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The Kansas booklet does not provide references or context for the various studies it cites.
Despite the National Cancer Institute’s (n.d.a) insistence that “women who have had an
induced abortion have the same risk of breast cancer as other women,” (Is abortion linked
to breast cancer risk, para 2), Kansas’ booklet obfuscates the details of breast cancerabortion research to suggest that the issue is still deeply unsettled within the cancer
research community. This suggestion is duplicitous as, in the words of the American
Cancer Society (n.d.a), “At this time, the scientific evidence does not support the notion
that abortion of any kind raises the risk of breast cancer or any other type of cancer”
(Conclusion, para 1).
Of course, it is not technically a lie to claim that the abortion-breast cancer link
has been debated by different professional medical organizations, and studies claiming a
link between abortion and breast cancer do exist (Jiang, Gao, Ding, Li, Liu, Cao, & ...
Tajima, 2012; Hajian-Tilaki, & Kaveh-Ahangar, 2011). However, in the realm of
medical research and clinical practice, it is insufficient to simply say, “A study exists.”
Instead, healthcare providers should clarify that studies claiming a correlation between
breast cancer and abortion are in the minority, they have methodological flaws, they are
aligned with antiabortion ideology, and they have been dismissed as tenuous by leading
scientific organizations. Informed consent practices are designed to deliver patients with
the most reputable and reliable medical information available, a standard that is
unabashedly ignored when “informed consent” materials suggest that abortion causes
breast cancer. In the world of healthcare provision, medical and research information is
not relative; some forms of information are indeed better than others and medical science
is expected to privilege different forms of information. When “informed consent”
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materials discuss the abortion-breast cancer link, they recklessly bypass the standards,
research guidelines, and rules of practice that guide the identification of sound medical
information.
Finally, there is something particularly nefarious about the claim that abortion is
medically dangerous and childbirth is preferable given that women are fourteen times
more likely to die in childbirth than during an abortion (Raymond & Grimes, 2012). In
addition to imposing the deep moral and material obligations that come with parenthood,
carrying a pregnancy to term also introduces other medical complications like pregnancyrelated hypertension and placental abnormalities that can be avoided with early-term
abortion (Raymond & Grimes, 2012, p.217). In this sense, not only do fabricated claims
of the health “risks” of abortion corrupt the informed consent process by distorting the
best scientific evidence available, but they could also endanger women’s lives by inciting
unfounded fears. Unfortunately, the abortion-breast cancer link is not the only example
of misleading information found in state-sponsored material on abortion.
Strategy Two: Embellishing the Reduction
A second tactic at work in “informed consent” materials involves a selective and
empirically reductive discussion of post-abortion emotional response. As of February
2015, twenty-two states include information on the psychological consequences of
abortion; nine of these states—Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia—only discuss negative emotional
responses to abortion (Guttmacher Institute, February, 2015b). As I will demonstrate
below, this second tactic mobilizes the language of “post-abortion syndrome” and it
frames the stories of women who report traumatic emotional responses—most of whom
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are working with religiously conservative, antiabortion organizations—as representative
of abortion experience in general. To help embellish this empirical reduction,
antiabortion narratives of psychological disorder also conveniently downplay or omit the
positive or neutral emotions some women report following an abortion. In general,
“informed consent” materials that suggest abortion triggers emotional dysfunction defy
institutionalized standards of medical information provision, and they contradict the
viewpoints of major psychological organizations, such as The American Psychiatric
Association and the American Psychological Association (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013; American Psychological Association, 2008; Cohen, 2006, p.10).
Moreover, antiabortion arguments espousing emotional disorder fail to situate abortion
within a political climate that stigmatizes abortion, and they rely upon entrenched cultural
stereotypes that depict women as poor decision-makers prone to irrational hysteria, a
stereotype that also infected the Casey decision and other segments of abortion
jurisprudence.
I begin this section with a brief history of the duplicitous concept of “postabortion syndrome,” a faux psychological disorder engineered through the personal
testimonies of women who regret their abortion decisions, and I highlight the continued
use of this concept within antiabortion discourse. Secondly, I turn to “informed consent”
materials to show how the argument that abortion causes psychological disorder is being
incorporated into the literature distributed to some women seeking an abortion. Thirdly, I
draw upon peer-reviewed research to explain why antiabortion arguments purporting a
causal link between abortion and emotional dysfunction are deceptive, inaccurate, and
reductive.
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To begin, the argument that abortion causes psychological disorder first found
academic traction during the early 1980s when Dr. Vincent Rue, a professor of family
relations and a vocal antiabortion advocate, articulated the concept of “post-abortion
syndrome” during Senate hearings on the social effects of abortion (Siegel, April 2008,
p.117). Later, Dr. Rue worked with a graduate student, Anne Speckard, to develop the
concept of post-abortion syndrome in more detail. Speckard and Rue (1992) argued that
women who suffer from post-abortion syndrome experience feelings of depression, grief,
survivor guilt, substance abuse, and flashbacks, and they likened post-abortion syndrome
to post-traumatic stress disorder experienced by some Vietnam War veterans. In the
1980s, women activists within the antiabortion movement seized upon Rue and
Speckard’s work, and aggressively distributed literature on post-abortion syndrome,
while Crisis Pregnancy Centers incorporated threats of psychological disorder into their
“counseling” procedures (Siegel, April 2008, p.118).
More recently, advocates of post-abortion syndrome, all of whom are committed
to the antiabortion agenda, have turned to women’s first-person narratives of postabortion, emotional distress to help advance their argument. For example, the
conservative law firm, The Justice Foundation, and their subsidiary project, Operation
Outcry, claim to host the “largest collection of legally admissible, written sworn
testimonies from women hurt by abortion” (Operation Outcry, 2015).54 As way of
example, Operation Outcry’s webpage offers the video story of “Luna,” who reports that
her three abortions “started a life of devastation for me.” Luna explains that after the
abortions she “became very depressed,” she “started drinking, started doing drugs,” and
“she became very promiscuous.” Luna also “tried to kill herself three different times.”
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Using highly religious rhetoric, Luna preaches that, “guilt and shame prisons women who
have abortions” and that it is necessary “to talk out about this from your pulpits”
(Operation Outcry, 2015b). Luna’s story is representative of many of the women
showcased on Operation Outcry’s website, all of whom describe in detail the ways they
were traumatized by abortion.55 In addition to supplying antiabortion groups with strong
rhetorical weaponry, stories like Luna’s lend support to “informed consent” materials that
claim abortion causes psychological trauma. That is, “informed consent” materials can
now claim that, “Some women have reported serious psychological effects after their
abortion” (Texas Department of Health, 2003, p.16) because some women do, in fact,
make this claim.
The migration of post-abortion trauma into clinical practices becomes evident
when we turn to “informed consent” literature. It is important to note that the language
used to discuss psychological trauma varies across states’ “informed consent” materials.
Whereas some states detail the emotional damage triggered by abortion, other states only
allude to the emotional threats of abortion. In all cases, however, “informed consent”
materials codify a biased and reductive narrative of women’s emotional experiences with
abortion, and the underlying message in each negative provision is the same: women who
have abortions run the risk of debilitating emotional fallout.
For example, Kansas’s informed consent booklet includes a section devoted to the
“Psychological Risks of Abortion.” The booklet claims:
After having an abortion, some women suffer from a variety of psychological
effects ranging from malaise, irritability, difficulty sleeping, to depression and
even posttraumatic stress disorder. The risk of negative psychological
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experiences may increase if a woman has previously suffered from mental health
problems.
Talking with a counselor or physician may help a woman to consider her
decision fully before she takes any action. Many pregnancy resource centers offer
counseling services; a list of centers is available in the resource directory.
(Kansas Department of Health and Environment, n.d.a, p.22)
Although the booklet does recognize a relationship between previous mental health
problems and negative psychological responses to abortion—an important correlation not
recognized by other states—the full range of emotional responses to abortion, such as
feelings of relief or empowerment, are not mentioned. The Kansas booklet assumes
women do not adequately consider the emotional hazards of having an abortion and that
this failing that can be corrected by “talking with a counselor or physician” (p.22).
Problematically, many of the centers listed in the resource directory operate on the
premise that abortion harms women, and they aim to encourage women to carry their
pregnancy to term regardless of their individual circumstances.
Likewise, Texas’s informational booklet provides a biased view of emotional
response. In the section “The Emotional Side of Abortion,” the booklet reads:
You should know that women experience different emotions after an abortion.
Some women may feel guilty, sad, or empty, while others may feel relief that the
procedure is over. Some women have reported serious psychological effects after
their abortion, including depression, grief, anxiety, lowered self-esteem, regret,
suicidal thoughts and behavior, sexual dysfunction, avoidance of emotional
attachment, flashbacks, and substance abuse. These emotions may appear
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immediately after an abortion, or gradually over a longer period of time. These
feelings may recur or be felt stronger at the time of another abortion, or a normal
birth, or on the anniversary of the abortion.
(Texas Department of Health, 2003, p.16)
Once again, an “informed consent” booklet overemphasizes negative psychological
experiences, and it suggests that all women are equally at risk for “suicidal thoughts” and
“sexual dysfunction.” Although the booklet admits that women “experience different
emotions,” its recognition of positive emotional responses is notably limited. More
specifically, the booklet articulates relief as relief that the abortion procedure is over
(p.16), rather than relief that one has avoided the undesired role of motherhood. Thus,
even in its recognition of positive emotional experiences like relief, Texas still suggests
that abortion itself is a terrifying event incapable of engendering positive outcomes.
In West Virginia, state law requires that the written material provided to women
discuss the psychological effects of abortion (West Virginia Women’s Right to Know
Act, 2002, 16-21-3-(2)). In a section titled “Possible Detrimental Psychological Effects
of Abortion” (West Virginia Department of Health and Human Services, n.d., p.15), the
booklet lists “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Syndrome” as a possible outcome of
abortion. The booklet warns, “Many women suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
Syndrome following abortion. PTSD is a psychological dysfunction resulting from a
traumatic experience” (West Virginia Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.,
p.15). The booklet proceeds to enumerate the following panoply of possible symptoms
associated with abortion-induced PTSD: guilt, depression, nightmares, fear and anxiety,
alcohol and drug abuse, flashback, grief, suicidal thoughts or acts, sexual dysfunction,
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eating disorders, low self-esteem, and chronic relationship problems (West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Services, n.d., p.15).
West Virginia’s claim that “many” women suffer from abortion-related PTSD is
scientifically unsubstantiated, and the language of “flashbacks” and “alcohol and drug
abuse” demonstrates the appropriation of PTSD symptoms typically reserved for war
veterans. Without stating so explicitly, the booklet suggests that post-abortion emotional
response is on par with other psychological disorders catalogued by The Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.) (American Psychiatric Association,
2013); this suggestion is predicated on the assumption that women, like soldiers, have
survived something terrible. The list of symptoms included in the booklet is disquieting
for both its simplicity and its volume. A large range of traumatic outcomes is listed
without qualification or modification, thereby suggesting that women who have an
abortion risk landing somewhere in a frightening spectrum of emotional trauma and
social dysfunction.56
In general, the “informed consent” materials catalogued above demonstrates a
biased and empirically reductive picture of post-abortion psychology, one that
embellishes and amplifies antiabortion anecdotes in an attempt to ascribe a causal
relationship between abortion and psychological trauma. Subsuming the manifold of
emotional responses under a false psychological disorder disregards the multiplicity of
contextual factors that influence the abortion decision, and it precludes important
discussions regarding emotional response and moral decision-making in a social climate
hostile to abortion. Moreover, the suggestion that abortion causes psychological disorder
blatantly ignores the experiences of women who experience positive emotions subsequent
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to the abortion decision. Indeed, it is highly reductive to make blanket claims about the
relationship between abortion and emotional response given the idiosyncratic experience
of unwanted abortion, an insight recognized by The American Psychological Association
Task Force on Mental Health and Abortion (2008) when it claims there “is unlikely to be
a single definitive research study that will determine the mental health implications of
abortion ‘once and for all’ given the diversity and complexity of women and their
circumstances” (p.4). Put another way, any study claiming a causal relationship between
abortion and mental disorder is deceptively reductive insofar as abortion is not a generic
experience that precipitates uniform emotional response (Major, Appelbaum, Dutton,
Russo, & West, 2009, p.866).
Leading psychological organizations have rejected the claim that abortion is
psychologically damaging. For example, The American Psychiatric Association (2013)
does not recognize Post-abortion Syndrome in its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (5th ed.). In 2008, after a rigorous analysis of peer-reviewed literature,
The American Psychological Association Task Force on Mental Health and Abortion
(TFMHA) concluded, “the best scientific evidence published indicates that among adult
women who have an unplanned pregnancy the relative risk of mental health problems is
no greater if they have a single elective first-trimester abortion than if they deliver that
pregnancy” (p.4). In addition, the report explained, “TFMHA reviewed no evidence
sufficient to support the claim that an observed association between abortion history and
mental health was caused by the abortion per se, as opposed to other factors” (p.4). In
general, peer-reviewed research suggests that the strongest indicator for gauging a
women’s mental health after an abortion is her emotional state prior to the abortion
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(American Psychological Association Task Force on Mental Health and Abortion; 2008;
Kimport, Foster, & Weitz, 2011; Major, Appelbaum, Dutton, Russo, & West, 2009;
Major, Cozzarelli, Cooper, Zubek, Richards, Wichita, & Gamow, 2000). Collectively,
this research demonstrates, contrary to the message underlying “informed consent”
materials, that women who terminate an unwanted pregnancy do not risk psychological
disorder.
In fact, a number of peer-reviewed research studies report that many women
report positive feelings subsequent to abortion and “cope well” after the procedure,
(Major, Appelbaum, Dutton, Russo, & West, 2009, p.882). And, in a meta-analysis of
women’s psychological responses to abortion, Adler et al. (1990) observe that women
“most frequently report feeling relief and happiness” (p.41) after having a first trimester
abortion and that “the time of greatest distress is likely to be before the abortion” (p.43).
Thus, the notion of post-abortion syndrome obscures the very real fact that many women
view their abortion as a psychologically empowering experience (Baumgardner, 2008;
I’m not sorry.net, n.d.; Winter, 2013).
It is also important to note that antiabortion narratives of post-abortion syndrome
rely upon a clumsy and unrefined understanding of emotional response. For example,
arguments that claim abortion entails psychological disorder frequently conflate
emotional response with psychological disorder. Of course, sadness, regret, and anxiety
are all possible emotional reactions to an abortion, but, as Rubin and Russo (2004) wisely
note, “having an emotion is not the same as having a mental disorder” (p.74). Regret,
grief, and other “negative” emotions are complex experiences and cannot be taken prima
facie as signs of abortion-induced pathology nor as evidence that abortion was a poor
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decision. It does not follow from experiences of grief, for example, that a woman has
made an immoral or wrong choice. Like many ethical decisions, abortion can sometimes
involve the coexistence of conflicting feelings and desires. It is possible for a woman to
simultaneously experience relief and grief over her abortion decision, without rendering
the abortion decision a poor or pathological one.
Moreover, in a society that routinely discredits women’s decision-making
capacities and stigmatizes abortion into constrictive practices of silences, it is not
surprising that many women are left feeling vulnerable and insecure in their abortion
decision. For these reasons, assessing and discussing emotional responses to abortion
must be done with a critical eye to the social stigma and moral approbation that revolve
around this issue. Yet, “informed consent” materials ignore such structural influences
when they suggest that abortion itself causes psychological dysfunction.
Indeed, there is some research that demonstrates that negative emotional
responses to abortion can be attributed to a lack of social support. For example, in one of
the few research studies conducted to explore women’s post-abortion negative emotions,
where negative refers to “emotional difficulties” such as regret or depression (Kimport,
Foster, & Weitz, 2011, p.103), analysts identified several social aspects that “produced,
exacerbated, or mitigated” women’s negative responses (Kimport, Foster, & Weitz,
2011). Negative responses arose when women experienced pressure from partners,
parents, or others to have the abortion, and, consequently, felt that the abortion decision
was not truly their own. Likewise, women who lacked emotional support or encountered
hostile judgment after the abortion also reported negative emotional responses. Finally,
women also experienced negative emotions due to the social stigma that shrouds
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abortion. Kimport, Foster, and Weitz (2011) write, “Although not telling anyone about
their abortion may have saved some respondents from expected negative responses, it
exacerbated feelings of secrecy and stigma. Women described insomnia, panic attacks
and anxiety that stemmed from their effort to hide their abortion” (p.107). It is also
possible that the additional burdens of accessing and paying for an abortion are adding to
women’s negative emotional experiences with abortion. Considered alone, negative
emotional responses do not provide sufficient grounds to infer psychological disorder.57
Instead, post-abortion emotional distress demonstrates a need to address the larger social
issues of unwanted pregnancy, social stigma, and economic instability.
Problematically, our culture’s longstanding tendency to pathologize women’s
emotions likely lends support to antiabortion narratives of post-abortion trauma.
Nineteenth-century diagnoses of hysteria, for example, are a good example of how
women’s emotional experiences have long been interpreted and configured as medically
deviant or neurotic. With this history in mind, “post-abortion trauma” both perpetuates
and reflects a misogynistic intersection of patriarchal and medical paradigms that
discredit women’s emotions. Tenacious cultural narratives of women’s emotional and
moral ineptitude suggests that a successful revocation of “informed consent” laws will
also require a deep rethinking of cultural attitudes toward women’s emotional
experiences in general.
Finally, it is important to observe that “informed consent” discussions of
psychological trauma not only violate medical standards of informational content, but
they violate competency standards, as well. As discussed in Chapter One, the three
pillars necessary to an informed consent include information, competency, and
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voluntariness. Within bioethics literature, patient competency is generally defined as a
patients’ ability to reason, understand, communicate and deliberate, and that an informed
consent cannot occur absent such skills. Notably, information and competency are
interrelated. Misinformation, when not recognized as such, interferes with decisionmaking capacity, and diminished capacity cannot properly assess medical information.
Of course, bioethicists debate the appropriate standards for evaluating patient
competency, but one promising and widely-recognized framework is found in Buchanan
and Brock’s (1986) essay, “Deciding for Others.” In this lauded article, Buchanan and
Brock argue that patient competency is a decision-making capacity (p.22) that must be
evaluated relative to the riskiness of a particular medical decision, where risk is a
function of physical harm. Buchanan and Brock (1986) argue against deploying a single
standard of patient competency across all medical cases, and instead propose that the
“appropriate level of competence properly required for a particular decision must be
adjusted to the consequences of acting on that decision” (p.34). That is, competency
assessments should be made relative to the medical decision at hand; the greater the risk
and the “more complex the array of possible benefits and burdens,” (p.39) then the
greater standard of competency required.
Buchanan and Brock’s (1986) decision-relative concept of competency carries a
number of interesting implications, but for the purposes of this work, I want to spotlight
their argument that competency must be assessed patient by patient, case by case. On
Buchanan and Brocks’ (1986) model, the abortion-specific “informed consent” literature
that I consider in this chapter perverts standard conceptions of competency. Insofar as
“informed consent” materials are predicated on the assumption that all women seeking an
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abortion are mentally incompetent, they render the objective of informed consent
incoherent in the abortion context. That is, if a woman seeking an abortion is already
deemed incompetent, then an informed consent can be neither given nor sought. A deceit
flawed with circularity, antiabortionists assume incompetency and then conclude that all
women seeking an abortion are incompetent. Once incompetency is presumed,
antiabortionists short-circuit the informed consent process and thwart women’s
autonomy. Of course, constricting women’s reproductive autonomy has been the intent
of the antiabortion movement from its inception. The novelty of “informed consent”
materials, however, is that antiabortion forces use language that sounds supportive of
women’s rights to undermine women’s rights.
Strategy Three: Fetal Constructions
A third strategy at work within “informed consent” materials involves the careful
construction of a fetal subject that sanctions antiabortion restrictions. In general, the fetal
subject of “informed consent” materials is constructed using two techniques: first,
“informed consent” materials turn the fetal subject into an “unborn child” that is capable
of experiencing pain, thus collapsing important physiological distinctions between the
developing fetus and the postnatal infant; secondly, “informed consent” provisions use
mandatory ultrasound readings to stress physiological continuities between a developing
fetus and a postnatal infant. With this strategy, we once again see the assumption
underlying the Supreme Court’s view in Casey that the embryo or fetus deserves the
same moral standing as a person. “Informed consent” materials that discuss the fetus or
compel women to contemplate sonogram images do not provide genuine assistance for
women interested in discussing the meaning and morality of fetal ontology and fetal
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imagery. Instead, they are designed to support antiabortion ideology and to usurp
women’s reproductive autonomy.
To begin, “informed consent” materials adopt the controversial and partisan
position that personhood begins at conception in order to facilitate the claim that the fetus
is tantamount to a postnatal being.58 Currently, five states—Indiana, Kansas, Missouri,
North Dakota, and South Dakota—“inform” women that personhood begins at
conception (Guttmacher Institute, February, 2015b). The specific language used to make
this claim varies across states. In South Dakota, for example, providers are required to
tell women that an abortion will:
[T]erminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being; that the
pregnant woman has an existing relationship with that unborn human being, and
that the relationship enjoys protection under the U.S. Constitution and under the
laws of South Dakota; and that by having an abortion, her existing relationship
and her existing constitutional rights with regards to that relationship will be
terminated. (South Dakota Performance of Abortions, 200434-23A-10.1-1(a)-(d))
In addition to recklessly glossing over the philosophical questions regarding the meaning
of a “living human being,” South Dakota suggests that pregnant women hold the same
responsibilities to a developing fetus as they do to other individuals by insisting that
women already have “an existing relationship with that unborn human being.”59
Kansas’s “informed consent” material also advances the claim that personhood
begins at conception, but they do so by giving a more detailed account of embryological
development. In the opening lines of the section titled, “Human Development Before
Birth” (p.4) the Kansas booklet reads, “Pregnancy begins at conception with the union of
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a man’s sperm and a woman’s egg to form a single-cell embryo. This brand new being
contains the original copy of a new individual’s complete genetic code” (Kansas
Department of Health and Environment, n.d.a, p.4). Although medical terminology
refers to the “brand new being” as a zygote or blastocyst, the booklet describes
implantation as “the process whereby the unborn child embeds itself into the wall of the
womb” (p.5). The Kansas booklet proceeds to explain, “At four weeks, the unborn child
is less than 1/100th of an inch long” (p.6). Beside this claim, the booklet contains an
enlarged picture of a fertilized egg, a glowing orb that resembles a translucent bubble or
shiny sea stone. To the critical eye, the fact that the fertilized egg looks nothing like a
“child” creates an incongruous disjunction between the book’s written and pictorial
depictions. Nevertheless, the language of “unborn child” is used throughout the booklet’s
description of fetal development, thereby collapsing important ontological, physiological
and neurological differences between postnatal human beings, embryos, and fetuses.60
To further the construction of the fetal “person,” twelve states currently provide
information on the ability for the fetus to feel pain. In six states—Alaska, Georgia,
Kansas, Louisiana, South Dakota, and Texas—women are given information on fetal pain
regardless of their stage of pregnancy. In five states—Arkansas, Minnesota, Oklahoma,
and Utah—providers are only required to deliver information on fetal pain to women who
are in their 20th week of pregnancy or more, and in Missouri, women must be in their
22nd week of pregnancy or more. In Indiana, the law is currently unenforced as the
courts adjudicate the measure (Guttmacher Institute, February, 2015b).
Of course, the claim that the early-term fetus can feel pain is not new to
antiabortion discourse. What is new, however, is the inclusion of biased information on
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fetal pain within informed consent materials. This inclusion is cause for alarm because
“informed consent” discussions of fetal pain contradict reputable scientific research on
fetal pain and they disregard a number of important philosophical points regarding the
concept of pain in general.
Professional medical organizations have long opposed the argument that early
term fetuses experience pain. For example, in response to a 1980 antiabortion
propaganda film, The Silent Scream (Dabner & Smith, 1984) which claimed that a
twelve-week fetus experiences pain, Planned Parenthood organized a panel of medical
doctors to co-author a report debunking many of the falsehoods fabricated by the film.
The Planned Parenthood report (Dorfman et al., 1985/2002) referenced the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists to explain:
We know of no legitimate scientific information that supports the statement that a
fetus experiences pain early in pregnancy. We do know that the cerebellum
attains its final configuration in the seventh month and that mylenization (or
covering) of the spinal cord and the brain begins between the 20th and 40th weeks
of pregnancy. These, as well as other neurological developments, would have to
be in place for the fetus to receive pain. To feel pain, a fetus needs
neurotransmitted hormones. In animals, these complex chemicals develop in the
last third of gestation. We know of no evidence that humans are different.
(Dorfman et al., 1985/2002, pp.2-3)
Since then, professional medical organizations continue to reject the argument that a
fetus can experience pain prior to the third trimester (American Congress of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, June 20, 2013). After reviewing over 2,000 articles on fetal pain, a
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2005 meta-analysis published in The Journal of the American Medical Association
concluded:
Pain perception requires conscious recognition or awareness of a noxious
stimulus. Neither withdrawal reflexes nor hormonal stress responses to invasive
procedures prove the existence of fetal pain, because they can be elicited by
nonpainful stimuli and occur without conscious cortical processing. Fetal
awareness of noxious stimuli requires functional thalamocortical connections.
Thalamocortical fibers begin appearing between 23 to 30 weeks’ gestational age,
while electroencephalography suggests the capacity for functional pain perception
in preterm neonates probably does not exist before 29 or 30 weeks.
(Lee, Ralston, Drey, Partridge, & Rosen, 2005, p.947)
The Journal of the American Medical Association’s meta-analysis challenges antiabortion
arguments that conflate fetal movement with fetal pain. It is scientifically spurious to
ascribe human senses such as “pain” to a being that lacks the enabling anatomical
structures and neurological pathways necessary to experience pain (Royal College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, March, 2010; The American Congress of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, June 20, 2013). Recent research also suggests that the fetus “never
experiences a state of true wakefulness in utero and is kept, by the presence of its
chemical environment, in a continuous sleep-like unconsciousness or sedation” (Royal
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, March 2010, p.viii). Although the subject of
pain is complex, and philosophers and neuroscientists commonly disagree over the very
meaning of the terms “pain,” “awareness,” and “conscious recognition,” the fact that
“informed consent” materials fail to include the conclusions generated by major
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professional medical organizations marks a gross deviation from standard informed
consent practice.
It is also worth noting that that a heightened focus on fetal pain may deflect
attention from other pertinent issues that shape the abortion decision. Problematically,
antiabortion arguments conflate a concept (fetuses experience pain) with a value (fetal
pain must be avoided at all costs and, thus, abortion is always immoral). Common
cultural practices demonstrate that pain itself is neither the ultimate nor lone factor in
dictating the moral permissibility of actions. Although pain is something we generally
seek to avoid, moral decisions are commonly predicated upon values and goals that
exceed the issue of pain. Women considering an abortion, for example, are juggling a
number of variables such as maternal health and personal circumstances, and sociological
work on abortion demonstrates that the abortion decision is typically informed by a
matrix of complex questions and concerns (Gilligan, 1982; Finer, Frohwirth, Dauphinee,
Singh, & Moore, 2005). The reductive conclusion that fetal pain (a troubled concept, as
discussed above) necessarily entails the impermissibility of abortion glosses over the
phenomenology of moral decision-making vis-à-vis unwanted pregnancy.
The second technique used in the construction of the fetal subject of antiabortion
ideology is the mandatory ultrasound.61 In recent years, antiabortionists have turned to
ultrasound technology as a potential ally and instrument in their co-option of the
informed consent process. Unlike the provisions discussed above where women are
provided with scientifically faulty or irrelevant information, ultrasound images do not
inherently contradict sound scientific research on fetal ontology or fetal development.
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Nevertheless, mandatory ultrasound images unjustly interfere with the informed consent
process.62
Proponents of mandatory ultrasounds allege that women seeking to terminate a
pregnancy are ignorant of the “reality” of fetal life, and that mandatory sonograms will
correct this ignorance. For example, Republican Senator Tony Fulton of Nebraska, who
in 2009 sponsored legislation that would require women to view an ultrasound image
before having an abortion, explained, “If we can provide information to a mother who is
in a desperate situation—information about what she’s about to choose; information
about the reality inside her womb—then this is going to reduce the number of abortions”
(as cited in Reeves, February 11, 2009, para 3). As a further example, Texas Governor
Rick Perry has argued that mandatory ultrasounds would "[e]nsure that every Texas
woman seeking an abortion has all the facts about the life she is carrying and understands
the devastating impact of such a life-changing decision" (as cited in Basset, July 25,
2011). In 2011, Governor Perry made sonogram legislation an “emergency” item, and he
signed into law a bill that requires women to undergo a sonogram and to hear a detailed
description of the image before they can procure an abortion (Texas A Woman’s Right to
Know Act, 2003 & Supp 2011). In a subsequent court ruling that upheld the Texas law, a
panel of the 5th U.S Circuit Court of Appeals explained that this information is “the
epitome of truthful, non-misleading consent” (Texas Medical Providers v. Lakey, 2012,
p.12). 63
Although ultrasounds are not considered medically necessary for a first-trimester
abortion, twelve states—Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin—now provide either

113

written or verbal information on accessing ultrasounds to all women seeking an abortion.
Ten states—Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, and Virginia—currently require the abortion provider to offer the
woman the opportunity to look at the ultrasound image. Three states—Louisiana, Texas
and Wisconsin—require the abortion provider to show and describe an ultrasound image
to the woman (Guttmacher Institute, January, 2015).
As way of example, Texas’ mandatory ultrasound law institutes a notable
interplay of both visual and verbal cues to construct an autonomous fetal subject that is
the ontological equivalent of a post-natal infant.64 For example, Texas law requires the
sonographer to attest to “the presence of cardiac activity, and the presence of arms, legs,
external members, and internal organs” (Texas A Woman’s Right to Know Act, 2003 &
Supp.2011,§ 171.012 (4) (A) (B)). Texas House Bill Fifteen also requires the
sonographer to make “makes audible the heart auscultation for the pregnant woman to
hear, if present, in a quality consistent with current medical practice” and to provide, “in
a manner understandable to a layperson, a simultaneous verbal explanation of the live,
real-time heart auscultation” (Texas A Woman’s Right to Know Act, 2003 & Supp.2011,
§ 171.012 (4) (D)). The Texas law does not require the physician or provider to discuss
inchoate or nonexistent organs or physiological features. In Texas, the physician is
literally required to personify the fetus in ways that obscure the gradations of fetal
development, or what doctors and scientists refer to as epigenesis. There is, of course,
nothing medically false about identifying a “beating heart,” but a more medically
comprehensive reading of the sonogram should also call attention to the physiological
aspects of the fetus that are absent, such as functioning lungs, or a fully developed or
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operational central nervous system. The omission of these important elements alongside
the illumination of other elements works to bias the meaning of ultrasound images in the
direction of antiabortion ideology.
In addition to obscuring important physiological differences that
distinguish fetuses from postnatal infants, mandatory ultrasound laws, like those
instituted in Texas, also overlook representational issues posed by ultrasound
technology. New visualizing technologies that allow one to peer through a
woman’s body to see the fetus simultaneously document the fetus and erase the
context within which the fetus develops, i.e., the woman’s body. There is nothing
in the ultrasound image itself that explicitly reflects the fact that the fetus
develops inside the woman and the ultrasound laws at subject in this chapter do
not require providers to emphasize nor explore this point. Indeed, mandatory
ultrasound laws work very hard to construct a fetal subject that is unique and
distinct from the woman within which it develops.
Requiring abortion providers to describe sonograms in ways that equate the fetus
with a post-natal human subject distorts the rich interdependency of fetal ontology, and it
glosses over the ethical import of this ontology.65 Although the fetus’ biological
autonomy increases over the course of pregnancy, the fetus is tethered to, and dependent
upon, the woman within which it gestates. This biological derivativeness institutes a
particular form of ambiguous existence: fetuses are both of, and other to, the woman
(Young, 2005, pp.46-61). Notably, the inextricable biological intertwinement of the fetus
and the pregnant woman is not a symbiotic relationship; the woman supports and
nourishes the fetus, a life-sustaining favor not returned by the fetus. To overlook this fact
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is to ignore the very significant fact that pregnancy occurs within women’s bodies and
exerts a biological toll upon women, though the specific health impact of pregnancy
clearly varies across cases. Articulating the fetus as a “unique” human being, therefore,
ignores the moral and medical implications that follow from the fact that fetuses develop
inside, and are dependent upon, the woman’s body, and it contributes to the mythology
that pregnancy is easy and natural whereas abortion is dangerous and unnatural. One of
the implicit dangers of ultrasound images is that they can inscribe a false autonomy to the
fetal subject and draw attention away from the physiological context of pregnancy.
Although antiabortionists routinely use sonograms to further the illusion that “one is
looking directly at the fetus, rather than at an image of the fetus” (Mitchell, 2001, p.36),
ultrasounds are ultimately only simulacra, a condition that should be recognized when
discussing ultrasound images.
Finally, the very act of producing and reading an ultrasound image is itself
a cultural event that is informed by the power structures endemic to any medical
interaction. This point problematizes the use of ultrasounds as “objective”
information. Women don’t perceive an ultrasound image in a neutral social
vacuum, and if providers are legally bound to interpret the image in specific ways
then the image’s meaning will be narrowly circumscribed from the start. The fact
that ultrasounds are not always easy to read raises additional concerns regarding
the use of ultrasound imagery in the informed consent process. Ultrasound
images, particularly those produced during the first trimester of pregnancy—when
the vast majority of abortions occur—are typically nebulous, blurry, and distorted
and they require interpretation. As Janelle Taylor (1992) writes, “Ultrasound
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images themselves do not look exactly like photographs—they are grainier,
fuzzier, less distinct. Their “reading” is in large measure a matter of specialist
interpretation” (p. 76). In this sense, the ultrasound doesn’t innocently speak to a
woman to reveal the “truth” of the “unborn child.” Rather, the scripted reading
exploits the power endemic to medical vernacular, the informed consent process,
and the clinical setting to legitimize the political message that a developing fetus
is an unborn child. And although feminist work on fetal subjects demonstrates
that ultrasound images signify different meanings to different women, the
interplay of power, medical authority, and medical vernacular may significantly
narrow the range of what gets recognized as a legitimate interpretation.
Conclusion to Chapter Three
In concluding this section on “informed consent” within the clinical context, I
would like to reiterate two central claims of this chapter. First, abortion-specific
“informed consent” laws pervert standard practices of informed consent. Secondly, the
ideology that underwrites “informed consent” laws demonstrates a striking ignorance of
women’s phenomenological experiences with an unwanted pregnancy, as well as the
issues and priorities that shape their decisions.
Informed consent practices were originally articulated on the premise that medical
dialogue would help patients and providers to make better medical decisions. Although
dominant articulations of informed consent are riddled with a number of theoretical
deficiencies, patient autonomy is a constant, albeit at times underemphasized, value
across informed consent literature. As this chapter argues, however, women’s
reproductive autonomy is repeatedly disrespected and undermined by “informed consent”
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laws. When antiabortion politicians pass “informed consent” laws on the basis that such
laws will protect women from making bad decisions, their true aim is to negate women’s
autonomy altogether, despite dressing their agenda in language that sounds helpful to
women. By smuggling false information into “informed consent” practices, antiabortion
forces resort to scare tactics in an effort to restrict women’s abortion choices. The irony
here is clear: a medical practice originally designed to promote patient autonomy is being
refitted to limit women’s autonomy.
It also bears mention that the topics discussed within “informed consent”
literature, such as fetal subjectivity and potential infertility, do not reflect the pivotal
concerns of many women who are facing an unwanted pregnancy. A 2002 survey of the
socioeconomic conditions of women who have abortions revealed that 27% of abortion
patients identify as Catholic and 13% percent of abortion patients identify as evangelical
or “born-again” (Jones, Darroch, & Henshaw, 2002). It is reasonable to conclude that
many of these women view the moral status of the fetus as commensurate with postnatal
human beings, yet they still chose to terminate their pregnancy. This would suggest that
the logic driving mandated ultrasounds does not square with women’s moral decisionmaking processes; in other words, the phenomenology of abortion decision-making
cannot be reduced to a formulaic equation that hinges the permissibility of abortion on
the (always constructed) status of the fetus.
The sociological research conducted by Carol Gilligan (1982) demonstrates that
most women do not hinge their abortion decision on abstract questions of fetal ontology
and instead assess the decision within the context of their socio-economic circumstances,
their relationships with others, and their own goals and life projects.66 According to
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Gilligan, women’s central concerns involve issues such as the ability to parent
responsibly, their responsibilities toward others, and the meaning of motherhood
(Gilligan, 1982, pp.64-105). Yet, “informed consent” materials ignore such concerns
with an almost perverted focus on fetal subjectivity and emotional distress. The notion
that a woman’s abortion decision should be determined by an ultrasound image or by the
specter of insanity insults the complex moral reasoning that accompanies an abortion
decision. In this sense, “informed consent” laws have nothing to do with protecting or
enabling women’s autonomy and everything to do with short-circuiting women’s ability
to make autonomous medical decisions.
In short summation, state scripted “informed consent” materials impose a series of
problematic hurdles for women seeking abortions, leading Dr. Gretchen Ely (2007), a
professor of social work at the University of Kentucky, to argue that such laws
. . . can be understood as part of a larger societal and political climate that seeks to
punish women who get abortions and take away their confidence in their moral
ability to know the best means by which to control the size of their families.
(p.70)
In a similar vein, Rachel Benson Gold (2009) argues that antiabortion policies
. . . at their heart, are premised on the notion that women who intend to have an
abortion (and to some extent, the public at large) do not fully understand what an
abortion really is—and that, if they did, they would behave differently. (p.1)
Of course, there is nothing new about sociopolitical campaigns that discredit women’s
ability to make sound reproductive decisions. What is new, however, is the use of
informed consent rhetoric to service antiabortion ideology.
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CHAPTER FOUR
“INFORMED CONSENT” AND WOMEN’S LIVES
The focus of Chapter Four is the material effects of “informed consent” laws upon
women’s lives. Whereas the previous three chapters considered the bioethical, judicial,
and clinical discourses that structure the meaning of abortion and informed consent,
Chapter Four turns its eye to the voices of individual women who directly experience
“informed consent” laws. A turn to anecdote is necessary because it is individual women
who encounter, suffer, and resist abortion laws. That is, the intersection of abortion with
informed consent is not simply a theoretical topic that requires further address; it is an
experiential and morally lived problem as well. Consequently, insofar as this work is
premised on the notion that “informed consent” laws are harmful to women’s
reproductive autonomy it is important to provide concrete examples of how “informed
consent” laws are impacting women specifically.
To date, women’s perceptions of, and responses to, “informed consent” laws are
vastly understudied and undertheorized. Currently, there is limited empirical research on
“informed consent” laws, and little is known about women’s idiosyncratic experiences
with “informed consent” regulations. Despite this paucity of research data, I argue that it
is still possible to illuminate the negative impacts of “informed consent” laws through a
close analysis of the available data. To help theorize an undertheorized field of human
experience, I break this chapter into three distinct sections.
In section one, I summarize limited research on women’s perceptions of
“informed consent” laws in order to delineate the current research scene. Although
empirical research indicates that “informed consent” laws are not influencing abortion

!

120

demand, I argue this research nevertheless contains clues that suggest “informed consent”
laws hurt women’s autonomy. More specifically, I draw on structured interviews to
propose that “informed consent” practices that require providers to offer women an
opportunity to view an ultrasound image may interfere with some women’s autonomy. In
addition, I explore a common opinion surfaced by Cockrill and Weitz’s (2010) research
on women’s perceptions of “informed consent” laws: “I do not require heightened
regulation, but other women, do.” I suggest that this opinion is both a cause and an effect
of antiabortion ideology.
In section two, I turn to the story of Carolyn Jones whose first-person account of
“informed consent” laws in Texas has received wide-ranging press. I recount Jones’
distressing experience with abortion laws, and I expand upon her anecdotal observations
to further demonstrate the insidious impact of “informed consent” laws. Jones’ narrative
is useful as it provides rich insight into both the psychological and administrative
dimensions of abortion regulation in Texas, and her story demonstrates how the
autonomy of abortion providers is being violated as well.
In section three, I couple Jones’ story with feminist theories of intersectionality
and relational autonomy to hypothesize other obstacles women may encounter during the
“informed consent” process. More specifically, Jones’ story provides a springboard from
which to imagine the negative impact of “informed consent” laws upon women from
other social locations. By integrating Jones’ anecdote with theoretical insights, I argue
that “informed consent” laws undermine, assault, and diminish women’s reproductive
autonomy, although not necessarily in any uniform way.
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This chapter’s focus on the impact of abortion-specific “informed consent” laws
continues the argument established in Chapter Three that “informed consent” laws
dramatically pervert the original doctrine of informed consent. More to the point, these
laws not only fail to operationalize women’s autonomy, but they aggressively limit and
undermine women’s reproductive autonomy as well. Thus, “informed consent” laws
represent an appropriated discourse of the most troubling kind for reproductive rights
advocates.
Current Research Exploring “Informed Consent” Laws
Inarguably, there is a shortage of scholarly research exploring women’s
experience with “informed consent” mandates, and the voices of women facing these
regulations are notably absent from critical review (Ely, 2007; Cockrill & Weitz, 2010).
In a 2010 journal article, Ely, Dulmus, and Akers write, “despite the large percentage of
women affected by the mandatory counseling that accompanies an abortion procedure, a
review of the literature indicates that little-to-no research has been conducted to explore
patient perceptions of the pre-abortion counseling process” (pp.103-104). In the
intervening time between Ely, Dulmus, and Akers’ (2010) assessment and the completion
of this work, additional research has occurred, although more is clearly needed.
The research that has been conducted suggests that “informed consent”
regulations do not change women’s minds about abortion (Cockrill & Weitz, 2010, p.16;
Medoff, 2009, pp.639-649), and researchers do not report cases of women feeling
dramatically undermined or assaulted by these laws.67 In addition, some women report
positive experiences with optional ultrasound-viewing laws. Nevertheless, I argue

!

122

“informed consent” laws are undermining women’s reproductive autonomy, and that it is
possible to glean negative impacts from extant research.
To begin, the Bixby Center for Global Reproductive Health (2014) and their
research group Advancing New Standards in Reproductive Health (ANSIRH) (June,
2014) have begun researching the use and perception of ultrasound viewing within the
abortion context (Gatter, Kimport, Foster, Weitz, & Upadhyay, 2014; Kimport, Preskill,
Cockrill, & Weitz, 2012; Kimport, Upadhyay, Foster, Gatter, & Weitz, 2013). Through
the use of medical record data collection and in-depth interviews, these studies
collectively argue that ultrasound viewing does not “have a uniform effect,” upon women
and “the vast majority of women proceed to termination whether they view the
ultrasound or not.”68 The ANSIRH study (June, 2014) also demonstrates that many
women “are interested in viewing their ultrasound image” (p.1), and that option-to-view
law “increases the odds” that the woman will view the ultrasound image and,
consequently, increase their feelings of control over the medical decision (p.1).
For example, Kimport et al. (2012) interviewed a woman named Joy, who
requested to view her ultrasound image. In Joy’s own words:
I had an ultrasound so I could actually see it right there. And I actually have that
imprinted in my mind. You know, I wanted to be completely aware as to what I
was doing . . . I think it’s also kind of traumatizing but it is what’s occurring. I
don’t think there’s any reason to pretend like it’s not. (p.516)
Likewise, Jenifer, another interviewee, explained, “When she showed me the sonogram,
it made me feel even better [about my abortion] . . . I really liked it. I really liked it
because it made it feel more real” (p.516). In each of these cases, the women proceeded
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to termination, a decision that Kimport et al. (2012) argue challenges the antiabortion
argument that women who view their ultrasound will choose to carry their pregnancy to
term.69
Similarly, Wiebe and Adams (2009) found women who reported ultrasoundviewing as a positive experience, lending credence to anecdotal evidence from abortion
providers that “most women who choose to see the [ultra sound] pictures are relieved to
see that it is not what they had imagined, namely, something which looks like a small
baby” (p.98). As Wiebe and Adams (2009) report:
We have been aware that women tend to imagine something more like a miniature
baby and this may be partly due to the images spread by antiabortion
organizations. Since most abortions are carried out in the first trimester, often no
more than a gestational sac is seen and many women find this reassuring. (p.101)
In such cases, viewing the ultrasound helped to bolster women’s confidence in their
abortion decision.
It would be rash, however, to conclude that option-to-view laws necessarily
enhances the autonomy of all women. Notably, the ANSIRH data also demonstrates that
ultrasound viewing “does have a small effect on the odds” that the woman will continue
her pregnancy, if the woman expressed some uncertainty or ambivalence about her
abortion decision prior to viewing the ultrasound (p.515). These data raise a series of
questions that deserve further attention. Did the ultrasound image compel a woman to
continue a pregnancy she would have otherwise terminated? If so, what did the woman
see in the ultrasound that tipped her decision against the abortion? Did the woman’s
prior uncertainty allow her to see the ultrasound image differently than a woman
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resolved? Does the very act of offering an ultrasound image summon pronatalist norms?
When do options carry normative subtexts? Scott Woodcock (2011) notes for example,
that “the mere offering of certain kinds of information . . . can be disruptive [so] that in
some cases it will significantly undermine the decision-making abilities of a patient
facing an unplanned pregnancy” (p.497). The concern here is that within the context of a
patriarchal society that circumscribes women’s identity in terms of maternity, providers
may inadvertently invoke feelings of guilt or doubt in some women by even mentioning
the option of ultrasound viewing. With the rise of social networking websites like
Facebook and Instagram, ultrasound images are increasingly becoming part of the public
birth experience, making it difficult, if not impossible, to read ultrasounds as neutral
medical information.
Moreover, there is the concern that even if some women find ultrasound images
reassuring or empowering, other women may find them disturbing or upsetting. For
example, Kimport et al. (2012) interviewed a woman named Cheryl for whom the
ultrasound “exact[ed] an emotional toll” and caused “negative emotional consequences”
(p.2012). In Cheryl’s words:
I said [to the doctor], ‘You can tell me if I’m pregnant. I need to know because
I’m going to terminate the pregnancy.’ And he turned the screen around and said,
‘Right there’s the fetus.’ And thump, thump, thump, you know, I could hear the
heart beating and I put my hands on my ears and I said, ‘That’s enough . . . .’ That
gave me some psychological problems right there, because then I knew there was
a human life there and all. But still, I knew I didn’t want to give birth to it. I
couldn’t. (p.515)
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Although Cheryl proceeded to have an abortion after viewing her ultrasound, it would be
difficult to argue that ultrasound viewing enabled or empowered her decision. Instead,
the ultrasound functioned as a form of state-sanctioned moral chastening. Notably,
Cheryl was shown her ultrasound without request. However, it is possible to imagine a
situation where a woman feels pressured to participate in an ultrasound viewing and
subsequently experiences a similar set of “psychological problems” (p.515). In such
cases, ultrasounds function more as disciplines of punishment, rather than as technologies
to enhance autonomy.
The ANSIRH study concluded that “mandating that women view their ultrasound
images may have negative psychological and physical effects even on women who wish
to view . . .” and that mandating viewing may “. . . reduce women’s perceptions of
decisional control regarding abortion” (Advancing New Standards In Reproductive
Health, June, 2014). What I am suggesting here, however, is that the coercion
occasioned by mandatory ultrasound viewing can also occur with optional viewing laws.
This is not to argue that women should never be offered the opportunity to view an
ultrasound image. Rather, I am suggesting offered viewings could interfere with some
women’s reproductive autonomy if the offer is experienced as carrying a normative
injunction to carry a pregnancy to term, or if the law channels women into an
unnecessary or unsettling experience. When states institute a law that requires abortion
providers to offer all women, in all cases, an opportunity to view an ultrasound, the state
forecloses the providers’ ability to respond to women’s individual needs vis-à-vis
ultrasound technology.
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We can glean further insight into the possible negative ramifications of “informed
consent” laws from the research by Cockrill and Weitz (2010) on women’s perceptions of
abortion regulations. In general, the 20 interviewed women were unaware of the
existence of “informed consent” regulations prior to seeking an abortion (p.15), and most
of the women were unable to distinguish state-mandated material from other materials
provided by the clinic (p.15). Overall, the women surveyed by Cockrill and Weitz did
not feel that state-mandated restrictions “impaired” (p.17) their experience.70
Nevertheless, the Cockrill and Weitz (2010) study does suggest that the
antiabortion ideology underwriting “informed consent” laws may be infecting some
women’s perceptions of “informed consent” laws. More precisely, while some of the
women interviewed by Cockrill and Weitz objected to state-mandated information and
voiced concern that such information could mislead or coerce women, many women
argued that this information might help “other women” make an informed decision.
Cockrill and Weitz report, “In fact, responses to the question of whether a waiting period
was a good law often included a caveat that while ‘for me’ it was unnecessary, ‘other
women’ might benefit from the law” (p.16). According to Cockrill and Weitz:
Most women in our study characterized their own abortion decisions as a good
and thoughtful decision made in difficult circumstances. Yet their consideration
for abortion regulation indicates that accepting their own reasons for abortion did
not always translate into beliefs that other women had equally thought through
their decisions. There was a consensus among our participants there are some
circumstances or some women who need more regulation. (p.17)
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Here, we witness a double standard at work in women’s attitudes toward abortion
regulation: few of the participants interviewed by Cockrill and Weitz self-identified as
irresponsible, although they ascribed these qualities to “other” women.71 This is to say,
the subjects of this study opposed their need for regulation even as they defended the
need to regulate “other” women.
It is important to clarify, however, that the opinions recorded by Cockrill and
Weitz (2010) defend the regulation of abortion decision-making in general, not the
appropriation of the informed consent process to deliver misleading information.
Nevertheless, women’s opinion that “other” women require heightened regulation is
problematic if it lends support to “informed consent” laws. When women vocalize the
belief that “other” women require abortion counseling, they may inadvertently reproduce
and fortify sexist stereotypes of women’s epistemic and moral incapacity.72
More specifically, the argument that “other” women require counseling may also
interfere with efforts to challenge or dismantle “informed consent” laws. As Moore,
Frohwirth, and Blades (2011) write:
[T]he need to hold oneself apart, as we found in our data and as others have found
(Cockrill & Weitz, 2010) hampers advocacy efforts to unite women’s voices on
behalf of the right to defend the right to an abortion, which is perhaps why in the
first months of 2011, we have seen an assault on the right to access an abortion in
the United States unparalleled in history. (p.438)
When we couple the observation made by Moore, Frohwirth, and Blades (2011) with the
opinions captured by Cockrill and Weitz (2010), there is reason to argue that “informed
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consent” laws are both a cause and an effect of a belief system that discredits women’s
reproductive authority.
The Story of Carolyn Jones
Although peer-reviewed, published research on “informed consent” laws provides
important, methodologically monitored insight into women’s experiences with “informed
consent” law, we can find other venues that also illuminate the disturbing ramifications of
“informed consent” laws. For example, Texas journalist Carolyn Jones wrote a story for
The Texas Observer detailing her distressing experience with the Texas sonogram law in
March 2012. Upon publication, Jones’ story received ample attention in both feminist
forums (Baker, 2012; Dusenberry, 2012) and mainstream news sources (Egan, 2012;
Rochman, 2012), and in January 2013, Jones was a guest speaker on Terry Gross’
popular NPR program, Fresh Air (Gross, 2013).
It is possible that Jones’ story received widespread attention because Jones is a
sympathetic character, one whose abortion decision did not challenge social values of
motherhood, as we will witness below. In this sense, there is an interesting continuum
between her and Sherri Finkbine, the woman whose abortion decision in the pre-Roe era
helped to bring the abortion debate into the public sphere and incite the abortion reform
movement of the 1960s (Condit, 1990, pp.28-31; Solinger, 2005, pp.178-181).73 What
Michelle Condit (1990) writes about Finkbine could be applied to Jones: “her abortion
clearly did not attack the key social symbols of ‘family’ and ‘motherhood’” (p.29).
Consequently, Jones, like Finkbine, becomes a sympathetic figure in terms of public
discussions of abortion restrictions. I note the connection between Jones and Finkbine in
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order to highlight long-standing social attitudes about what constitutes a “justified”
abortion.
In the following paragraphs I recount Carolyn Jones’ distressing experience with
“informed consent” laws in Texas. This overview will provide a specific example of how
“informed consent” laws negatively impact women’s reproductive autonomy. Jones’
narrative is useful as it provides rich insight into both the psychological and
administrative dimensions of abortion regulation in Texas, insights that are not currently
captured by academic studies.
To begin, Jones was pregnant with her second child when a routine
sonogram revealed that the fetus had a malformed head. On the same day, a
second sonogram at a specialists’ office confirmed that the fetus had a
neurological problem that prevented the normal formation of the spine, legs, and
arms. The physician warned Jones that her child would face a lifetime of physical
suffering and medical care, if he even survived the pregnancy. Jones (March 15,
2012) writes:
Our options were grim. We learned that we could bring our baby into the
world, then work hard to palliate his pain, or we could alleviate that pain
by choosing to ‘interrupt’ my pregnancy. The surgical procedure our
counselor described was horrific, but then so seemed our son’s prospects
in life. In those dark moments we had to make a choice, so we picked the
one that seemed slightly less cruel. Before that moment, I’d never known
how viscerally one might feel dread. (para 10)
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That afternoon, Jones and her husband drove to a Planned Parenthood clinic to
obtain an abortion. Once there, Jones learned that Texas’ new sonogram law
required Planned Parenthood to perform another sonogram, Jones’ third one of the
day. In conjunction with the sonogram, Jones was required to hear a detailed
description of the fetus and then wait an additional twenty-four hours before the
abortion could be performed. Notably, the scripted reading her provider was
obligated to recite provided no medical benefit for Jones; the procedure was done
under the onus of state law. Although Jones and her team of healthcare providers
denounced the sonogram requirements, they all complied unwillingly. Jones’
first-person account is telling, and so I quote her at length:
‘I’m so sorry that I have to do this,’ the doctor told us, ‘but if I don’t, I can lose
my license.’ Before he could even start to describe our baby, I began to sob until
I could barely breathe. Somewhere, a nurse cranked up the volume on a radio,
allowing the inane pronouncements of a DJ to dull the doctor’s voice. Still,
despite the noise, I heard him. His unwelcome words echoed off sterile walls
while I, trapped on a bed, my feet in stirrups, twisted away from his voice.
‘Here I see a well-developed diaphragm and here I see four healthy chambers of
the heart . . .’ I closed my eyes and waited for it to end, as one waits for the car to
stop rolling at the end of a terrible accident. When the description was finally
over, the doctor held up a script and said he was legally obliged to read me
information provided by the state. It was about the health dangers of having an
abortion, the risks of infection or hemorrhage, the potential for infertility and my
increased chance of getting breast cancer. I was reminded that medical benefits
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may be available for my maternity care and that the baby’s father was liable to
provide support, whether he’d agreed to pay for the abortion or not.74
(Jones, March 15, 2012, para 20)
To comply with Texas law, Jones returned home to endure the mandatory waiting period.
She returned to Planned Parenthood the next day. During the procedure the nurses held
her hand and let her “cry like a child in their arms.”
Jones later learned that the Texas ultrasound law contains an exemption for cases
of rape, incest, and fetal abnormality. Upon learning about such exemptions, she
contacted the Planned Parenthood staff to ask why an exemption had not been recognized
in her case. After reviewing Jones’ case, Planned Parenthood apologized and explained
that at the time of Jones’ abortion, the sonogram law was too new to have allowed for
appropriate review.
Upon further investigation, however, Jones discovered that Texas had not issued
technical guidelines, such as exemptions, until four days after her abortion. In Jones’
words: “So for three weeks, abortion providers in Texas had been required to follow the
sonogram law but had not been given any official instructions on how to implement it”
(Jones, March 15, 2012, para 29). This lack of legal clarity demonstrates the increasingly
ambiguous intersection of law and medicine that abortion providers must navigate.
Notably, the exemptions that were later inserted into Texas’ ultrasound law
presume that women like Jones (read: women who want to become mothers, but are
victims of nature-gone-wrong) should not be subjected to a mandatory ultrasound, but
women who reject maternity should be. Proponents of mandatory sonogram laws might
respond that Jones’ experience was the result of an unfortunate bureaucratic oversight,
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and that the law now clearly provides guidelines for women in similar circumstances.
Such a defense, however, does not negate the coercive affects this law has on women’s
reproductive autonomy, and it assumes that women who choose to terminate a pregnancy
for reasons other than fetal abnormalities, or pregnancies that result from rape or incest,
are misguided and morally impaired.
Clearly, Jones’ story contains a number of elements that are unjust and unnerving.
It is shocking to imagine an emotionally distressed woman in stirrups “closing her eyes”
and “twisting away from [the doctor’s] voice.” This scenario reads like a chapter from
Margaret Atwood’s (1986) dystopian novel The Handmaid’s Tale where the theocracy of
Gilead reduces women to reproductive vessels. In addition, the trajectory of Jones’
particular experience—beginning the day with a routine sonogram to learn the gender of
her baby and terminating the same pregnancy 24 hours later—increased the sympathy of
many of her readers. Texas’ sonogram law compounded an already sad day.75
Jones’ story strikes abortion rights supporters as an unequivocal and egregious
affront to women’s reproductive autonomy. Moreover, the physician’s admission that he
“was sorry he had to do this,” and the nurses’ attempt to drown out his voice by
“cranking up the volume of the radio,” indicates that their professional autonomy was
also violated. After reading Jones’ story, it is clear that the Texas “informed consent”
law has nothing to do with patient autonomy and everything to do with antiabortion
power.
Jones’ narrative also demonstrates the harmful absurdity of a uniform distribution
of information in the abortion context. As evidenced in Jones’ story, she was alerted to
the “health risks” of abortion, as well as options for maternity care and paternal liability
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during the “informed consent” process. Although this work aims to underscore the
limitations of traditional articulations of informed consent, it is also important to
recognize that many of the influential texts in American bioethics, including the
President’s Commission’s (1982) report on informed consent and Beauchamp and
Childress’ (2009) Principles of Biomedical Ethics, rightly insist that the disclosure of
information should be neither a monological process nor follow a unilateral model. This
injunction is not reflected in “informed consent” laws that override any injunction for
variation. Indeed, these laws compel abortion providers to share the same information
regardless of the woman’s particular circumstances and they usurp the healthcare
providers’ ability to determine and discuss relevant information. As demonstrated in
Jones’s case, the orchestrated reading of the health “risks” of abortion, and the
declaration that “the baby’s father is liable to provide support,” can be irrelevant and
emotionally cruel addendums.
Further troubles arise when we consider the ultrasound procedure itself. Notably,
the procedure used on Jones differs from the procedure used on women who are in the
early stages of pregnancy, the time period when most abortions are performed. During
the early stages of pregnancy, a transvaginal ultrasound is the only way to produce a
high-quality image and to make the fetal heartbeat audible. Contrary to a transabdominal
ultrasound, sometimes termed “jelly on the belly ultrasound,” a transvaginal ultrasound
involves the insertion of a wand into the woman’s vagina. The invasive nature of this
procedure has led some commentators to liken mandatory ultrasounds to rape. “It’s statesanctioned abuse,” said Dr. Curtis Boyd, a Texas physician who provides abortions. “It
borders on a definition of rape. Many states describe rape as putting any object into an
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orifice against a person’s will. Well, that’s what this is. A woman is coerced to do this,
just as I’m coerced” (as cited in Kristof, March 3, 2012). In the quest for high quality
“information,” state-sanctioned rape is a justified means to an end. As Jones herself
recounts,
‘I don’t want to have to do this [have a sonogram] at all,’ I told [the Planned
Parenthood counselor]. ‘I’m doing this to prevent my baby’s suffering. I don’t
want another sonogram when I’ve already had two today. I don’t want to hear a
description of the life I’m about to end. Please,’ I said, ‘I can’t take any more
pain.’ I confess that I don’t know why I said that. I knew it was fait accompli.
The counselor could no more change the government requirement than I could.
Yet here was a superfluous layer of torment piled upon an already horrific day,
and I wanted this woman to know it. (Jones, March 15, 2012, para 17)
Here, it is difficult to view “informed consent” mandates as anything other than a tool to
displace women’s reproductive authority. As Carol Sanger (2008) insightfully explains:
Mandatory ultrasound disrupts a woman's control over her pregnancy, at least as
far as the organization of her own attitudes. While an ultrasound screening is not
quite like lining up with the kids at Kinder-Photo, once her fetus has had its little
mug shot taken, the woman has embarked on the social experience of
motherhood. Ultrasound operates as a technological quickening, though it works
through visual rather than somatic sensation. (p.382)
Following Sanger’s argument, Jones’ case provides a clear example of how mandated
ultrasounds “disrupt” women’s reproductive autonomy.
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Relational Autonomy, Intersectionality, and “Informed Consent” Laws
Feminist theories of relational autonomy and intersectionality remind us that
“informed consent” laws, like any social practice, will not affect women uniformly, and
there is reason to argue that “informed consent” laws target the most vulnerable of
women. In addition to providing important insights into the “counseling” experience,
Jones’ story also affords the opportunity to imagine the impact of “informed consent”
laws on women who are further disadvantaged along economic, sexual, or racial lines.
By coupling theoretical insights with clues culled from Jones’ story, it is possible to
illuminate how these laws may impact women from different social locations.
In recognizing the benefits that come from being a white, heterosexual women of
certain economic standing, I do not mean to downplay Jones’ experience with Texas’
“informed consent” laws. The Texas sonogram laws violated Jones’ reproductive
autonomy, and her maternal experience was shaped in objectionable ways. Rather, her
story furnishes the material to imagine how women from other social locations may
experience “informed consent” laws.
To begin, Carolyn Jones’ ability to discuss and defend her abortion decision is
evidence of her strong autonomy skills, even if her autonomy was episodically violated
during the “counseling” process. Jones is a professional woman who spoke elegantly on
Fresh Air. She is clearly well educated and she holds professional status as a freelance
writer. Jones is also white, heterosexual, and married.
Additionally, we learn that Jones’ husband accompanied her through the entirety
of her ordeal. While narrating her story, Jones repeatedly uses the pronouns “our” and
“we,” thereby indicating that she had an important network of support. She writes, “Our
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options were grim. We learned that we could bring our baby into the world . . . .” (Jones,
March 15, 2012, para 10). This network extended beyond emotional support and
includes pragmatic support, as well. For example, Jones recounts how “that afternoon,
my husband and I drove through a spaghetti of highways,” (para 11) and “[w]hile my
husband filled out the paperwork, I sat on a hard chair in the spartan reception area and
observed my fellow patients. I was the oldest woman in the waiting room, as well as the
only one who was visibly pregnant. The other patients either sat with their mothers or,
enigmatically, alone” (para 12). These details are important because they tell us that
Jones did not have to worry about transportation and that she had someone to help
manage logistics like “paperwork.” Jones did not have to sit “enigmatically alone;” she
had a partner who provided both emotional and administrative support.
There are clues in Jones’ story that alert us to her class status as well: she has a
car, she has access to maternity care, and she later has the time and resources to publicize
her story. Although the “informed consent” process was clearly traumatic for Jones,
having specific resources—a car, maternity care, and the benefits that come from being
married in a heterosexist society—may have contributed to Jones’ ability to think and
respond autonomously to the “informed consent” process, even while “being trapped in
bed,” feet in stirrups, listening to unwanted information.
Although “informed consent” laws require all women to go through the same
process, the initial impact of this process may differ in relation to a woman’s social
location. Feminist thinkers like Natalie Stoljar (2011) have shown that “the agent’s
social situation has an impact not only on her identity and self-conception but also on the
nature of important capacities like autonomy” (p.376). Insofar as women’s social
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situations vary widely, it follows that women’s capacity for autonomy will vary as well.
This reasoning, in turn, suggests that some women may respond less critically to the
abortion “counseling” experience. Jones was capable of assessing the “informed
consent” process as an unjust intrusion in her private life, but other women may lack that
capability insofar as the ability to assess, judge, and respond to the process, i.e., to think
autonomously, are themselves socially learned skills.
The reproductive autonomy of poor women, for example, may be more vulnerable
to the “informed consent” process if they lack the financial resources or social standing
that are useful to autonomous actions. Women who have to miss work, or women who
have to struggle to find the money to pay for an abortion, may enter the clinic with
increased anxiety or agitation, feelings that may be enhanced by the ritual of mandatory
abortion “counseling.” Diana Meyers (1987) views autonomy as a complex synthesis
and coordination of different “skills” that collectively allow an individual to consider her
choices vis-à-vis specific values and objectives. For Meyers, autonomy isn’t reducible to
one mode of behavior, like rational reflection. Instead, autonomous choices depend upon
both the presence of other capabilities. Insofar as financial strain can cause heightened
anxiety or doubt, then it follows that economically disadvantaged women may be at a
greater risk for decreased autonomy skills during an “informed consent” session.
There are other hurdles to autonomy that can arise as a result of women’s unique
social locations. For example, women who don’t speak English, or who speak English
poorly, may not understand that providers disagree with ultrasound laws and they may
not recognize their providers’ efforts to mitigate the impact of “informed consent” laws
(by way of apology or “turning up the radio”). Indeed such contradictory actions may

!

138

lend additional ambiguity to an already confusing situation and thereby complicate a
woman’s ability to assess and respond to “informed consent” laws autonomously. If the
physician or provider doesn’t provide caveats, and if the woman doesn’t have a critical
consciousness about abortion politics in the United States (a consciousness that is often a
function of social location), then the counseling ritual may have enhanced power because
the provider occupies a position of authority. Insofar as “informed consent” laws are
predicated on an antiabortion message, the upshot of this message may register more
strongly with patients who do not understand that providers are acting under the pressure
of state law.
This scenario is demonstrated in a brief scene in the popular television show,
Friday Night Lights (Carpenter & Mann, 2010). In what may be the only television
drama to recognize the reality of current “informed consent” laws, we witness a mother
and daughter encountering Texas’ “informed consent” law. Becky Sproles, a tenth grader
living with a struggling single mom, becomes pregnant after a fling with a high school
football star, Luke Cafferty. After discussing her options with Tami Taylor, the student
guidance counselor, Becky makes a confident but emotionally wrought decision to
terminate her pregnancy. Accompanied by her mother, Cheryl, Becky goes to an
abortion clinic, where they are subjected to unwanted and clearly distressing information,
although not without resistance. “We get it doctor, alright? This isn’t necessary, you
don’t need to go through the whole procedural options, blah, blah, blah,” Cheryl protests.
“She’s not having a baby; she’s having an abortion.” As they leave the clinic, Becky’s
agitated mother dissents, “Its unbelievable. I’m supposed to listen to some right-wing
doctor . . . I’m supposed to take another day off from work so he can tell us we are trash.”
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This is Cheryl’s assessment of the doctor’s politics despite the doctor’s confession that he
is compelled to provide state-mandated information. Of course, it is unlikely that any
abortion provider in Texas is “right-wing” and opposes abortion. Rather, abortion
providers in Texas must be staunch and resilient supporters of abortion rights to be
practicing in a state where they are heavily demonized. It is certainly possible, however,
that some women, like Cheryl in the episode from Friday Night Lights, would perceive
their providers as “right-wing” ideologues insofar as provider speech has been coercively
conscripted for antiabortion ideology.
It is important to note that having a minority status or low economic standing does
not necessarily mean that a woman will lack autonomy skills or be negatively impacted
by “informed consent” laws. In fact, minority status may provide some women with
critical distance vis-à-vis the message of “informed consent” practices. Rosemarie Tong
(1989) speaks to this point when she writes:
The condition of otherness enables women to stand back and criticize the norms,
values, and practices that the dominate culture (patriarchy) seeks to impose on
everyone, including those who live on its periphery—in this case, women. Thus,
Otherness, for all of its associations with oppression and inferiority, is much more
than an oppressed, inferior condition. Rather, it is a way of being, thinking, and
speaking that allows for openness, plurality, diversity, and difference. (p.219)
Other feminist scholars have likewise argued that nonwhite women may operate
with a critical consciousness that is necessary to the challenge of institutional power
(Anzaldua, 2007; Collins, 2009). For example, Dorothy E. Roberts (1996) argues
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women of color may be more willing to resist medical domination. Because
racism makes the oppressive use of medicine so obvious to many of them, women
of color may be more suspicious of doctor’s claims of beneficence. Denied the
privileges of race and class, these women have the least to gain from the present
institution of medicine and the most to gain from changing it. (p.117)
This is to say, different social locations will influence patients’ perception of information,
but minority status does not necessarily mean a woman is more vulnerable to the political
ideology of “informed consent” laws. This insight is key to feminist efforts to overturn
“informed consent” statutes, and it carries important implications for informed consent
policies in general.
Moving on, Jones’ story also awards us the opportunity to consider how women’s
“self-referring attitudes” (Stoljar, 2011, p.378) may impact their experience with
“informed consent” laws. In general, self-referring attitudes include capacities like selftrust and self-esteem. As discussed in Chapter One, recent work by feminist theorists
considers how autonomy skills can be diminished if a subject doubts or devalues her own
epistemic capacities and moral worth (Benson, 1994; Dillon, 1997; Govier, 1993;
McLeod, 2002).
It is likely that women will respond differently to “informed consent” practices
depending on their various levels of self-trust. Carolyn Jones’ narrative suggests that she
had a strong degree of self-trust, an attitude that helped to fortify her abortion decision,
and to defend her decision in subsequent discussions. This self-confidence is evident in
her description of the decision-making process in her interview with Terry Gross (2013):
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And so to us, it was actually—it was a terrible choice; it was a heart-wrenching
one. But it was also a simple one because as his parents, we chose what we
believed was best for him, to prevent him from knowing a life of pain. And that
was, in fact, quite a quick choice we were able to make as well, within minutes of
my doctor giving us the terrible news. It was also almost an instinctive response
about the choice that we would make. And this month, it's almost a year to the
day that we made that decision. It was still the right decision for us because it
was an instinctive one about protecting our child from pain.
Although Jones clearly experienced distress during the mandated ultrasound and the
“informed consent” session, she retained confidence in her decision to terminate her
pregnancy. In the Fresh Air interview, Gross (2013) asked Jones if the ultrasound had
any impact on her decision to terminate her pregnancy. Jones responded:
It had no impact on my decision to go ahead with the abortion; none whatsoever.
It was a private choice I'd made, and I was going to stick with that private choice
no matter the people who tried to interfere with me. In terms of my broader frame
of mind, it did make me feel very angry, and I still do. (Gross, 2013)
Here, Jones’ anger testifies to her self-trust as a decision-maker. Although Jones’ selftrust did not preclude the emotional trauma precipitated by the Texas sonogram law, it
did position her to critically evaluate her experience with “informed consent” laws.
Women who have a healthy degree of self-trust and who are confident in their
decision to terminate their pregnancy may be more likely to view the delivery of
unsolicited information as a nuisance or as state propaganda. For example, Cockrill and
Weitz’s (2010) study on patient perceptions of abortion regulations demonstrates that
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some women hold a critical stance towards the state’s involvement in the delineation of
informational content. One woman in their study, for example, expressed skepticism
over the ideological intent that underwrites mandatory ultrasounds:
This to me is one of those things where they want you to look and see what it is.
And they want you to, they want you to look, and, and see exactly what it is that
you’re doing. And they, it’s almost, it’s almost like they want, they want you to
understand that this is, that they are right, this is murder, you are killing a living,
breathing thing, and we’re gonna tell you, you know, what’s going on exactly.
(Cassie, age 25). (as cited in Cockrill & Weitz, 2010, p.15)
Of course, such critical skepticism does not necessarily mitigate the emotional dissonance
and manipulation wrought by “informed consent” laws, but it does suggest that some
women may be better equipped to respond autonomously to this information.
On the other hand, women who have diminished levels of self-trust may not be
able to sustain the same level of critical reflection exhibited by Jones and Cassie. Given
that women’s decisions have faced historical hostility and disdain from a variety of
fronts, some women’s capacities for self-trust may be particularly vulnerable, especially
in contexts of aggravated power-relations, like the medical or clinical setting. Insofar as
cultural stereotypes of women as irrational or ignorant may infect practitioners’
assessments of female patients’ medical questions, responses, and informational needs
(Sherwin, 1992, p.143), many women may enter the abortion context already
uncomfortable with medical dialogue. If some women are accustomed to having their
questions discredited or dismissed, then they may lack the confidence or self-trust to
challenge, question, or debate the meaning of ultrasound images with their abortion-
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provider. Women who lack self-trust may already second-guess many of their life
decisions. In a climate hostile to abortion rights it is reasonable to assume that many
women will face heightened moral doubt when deciding how to respond to an unwanted
pregnancy (Joffe, 2013), and they may be more sensitive to the normative import of
“informed consent” laws.
Conclusion to Chapter Four
In short summation, the institutionalization of “informed consent” laws subjects
women to a practice predicated upon inimical stereotypes of women’s moral ineptitude.
As demonstrated in the story of Carolyn Jones, “informed consent” laws are evolving into
a form of state-sanctioned psychological abuse. Although empirical data is still limited,
my goal has been to illuminate some of the social and psychological damages of
“informed consent” laws by anchoring my theoretical discussion in the perspectives of
individual women.
Catriona Mackenzie (2008) argues, “a just society has an obligation to promote
autonomy by ensuring that its basic social, legal, political, and economic institutions
provide the recognitive basis for its citizens to realize their autonomy” (p.524).
“Informed consent” laws invade the provider-patient relationship and they attempt to
short-circuit the “recognitive basis” that is crucial for reproductive autonomy. Although
physicians and providers may themselves recognize women’s autonomy, they are
required to enact a ritual that suggests otherwise. In general, abortion-specific “informed
consent” laws are a disciplinary practice that symbolically and systematically erodes
women’s reproductive autonomy. To this end, “informed consent” laws circumvent the
obligations of a just society.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUDING QUESTIONS AND SPECULATIONS
In the previous four chapters, I tracked “informed consent” across multiple
discourses, looking at how it functions in judicial rulings, bioethics rhetoric, abortion
discourse, and women’s lived experiences. In doing so, this dissertation likely raised
more questions than answers, as is often the case with theoretical work. Although, I can
neither anticipate nor answer all of the questions generated by my research on “informed
consent” laws, in this concluding chapter I explore three questions that especially warrant
further address.
First, how are “informed consent” laws being challenged? In this section, I
identify resistance to antiabortion hegemony. Although “informed consent” laws are an
abusive instance of power, it is important to remember that women and abortion
caregivers are not simply victims; they are also agents capable of critical response and
counter-action. This section illuminates some of the ways resistance to “informed
consent” laws occurs.
Secondly, how are professional medical associations responding to “informed
consent” laws? In earlier chapters, I argued that traditional formulations of informed
consent focus disproportionately on physician authority. Insofar as “informed consent”
laws override medical authority and assault physician autonomy, they veer dramatically
from both theoretical formulations and medical practices of informed consent. In light of
this departure, I consider how professional medical associations are responding to
“informed consent” laws. In particular, I illustrate the American Medical Association’s
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(AMA) silence on this issue, and I challenge the AMA’s current policy on abortion
provision.
Finally, how should informed consent practices proceed in the abortion context?
Although my work is clearly critical of the doctrine and practice of informed consent, I
also believe it would be calamitous if informed consent practices disappeared. Policies
that protect and enable patient autonomy are still necessary, particularly in the context of
reproductive healthcare where women’s autonomy is assaulted on a number of fronts. In
this section, I draw upon feminist clinical practice to espouse a renewed vision of
informed consent practices within the abortion context.
Resistance and Insurgence
Feminist scholarship is freighted with the difficult task of revealing the injustices
women suffer without simultaneously typecasting women as agentless victims. As
important as it is for contemporary feminist scholarship to dwell on social inequities,
adverse consequences can follow if we tarry exclusively with the negative. For example,
an exclusive focus on social injustice can be disheartening and overwhelming, feelings
that can discourage and frustrate activism. Moreover, shining a lone spotlight on the
obstacles that obstruct women’s autonomy paints a partial picture of reproductive
healthcare practices and it further victimizes women, politicians, and healthcare providers
by erasing their resistance. For these reasons, and to add balance to my previous focus on
the darker corners of reproductive politics, I use this section to foreground resistance to
“informed consent” laws.
This is a difficult task. As we know by now, sociological research on any
dimension of “informed consent” law is lacking. Nevertheless, it is possible to glean acts
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of resistance from available research and reports. In this section I identify and discuss
four modes of resistance: legal challenges, provider strategizing, first-person narratives,
and academic and research publications.
To begin, it is important to call attention to the legal challenges issued by
abortion-rights groups, politicians, and lawyers. Although abortion-rights groups face a
formidable network of antiabortion legislation, legislative success has not been entirely
elusive. For example, the Center for Reproductive Rights, a legal advocacy group that
uses “the law to advance reproductive freedom as a fundamental human right that all
governments are legally obligated to protect, respect, and fulfill” (Center for
Reproductive Rights, 2013a), has challenged many restrictive abortion laws (Center for
Reproductive Rights, 2013b, p.2). As way of specific example, The Center for
Reproductive Rights, in conjunction with American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of
North Carolina Legal Foundation, Planned Parenthood, and the law firm of O’Melveny
and Myers, challenged a North Carolina law that required abortion providers to perform
scripted readings of ultrasound images. The legal team succeeded in winning a
preliminary injunction preventing the ultrasound requirements from taking effect, and in
January 2014, the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina
permanently blocked the ultrasound law, later arguing that “the state cannot commandeer
the doctor-patient relationship to compel a physician to express its preference to the
patient” (as cited in Center for Reproductive Rights, December 22, 2014, para 1). The
North Carolina court’s ruling is an inspiring testimony to the possibility of overthrowing
unjust “informed consent” legislation via the courts.
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Of course, state lines circumscribe the impact of legal rulings, a limiting
demarcation that underscores the need for a formal federal rejection of “informed
consent” laws. Auspiciously, in November of 2013, Senator Richard Blumenthal,
Senator Tammy Baldwin, Representative Judy Chu, Representative Lois Frankel and
Representative Marcia Fudge introduced the Women’s Health Protection Act (2013). If
passed, “states could no longer impose oppressive restrictions on reproductive health care
providers that apply to no similar medical professionals” and “Dangerous regulations
passed under pretext that stifle access to abortion care and endanger women’s lives would
be prohibited” (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2013c, para 9). The Women’s Health
Protection Act would invalidate laws that impose excessive or unwarranted regulations
on abortion providers, laws that require women to make multiple trips to their abortion
provider for nonmedical reasons, and restrictions on medication abortions and
previability abortions (Boonstra & Nash, Winter 2014, p.14). In the words of Boonstra
and Nash (Winter 2014), this Act represents “the first major proactive abortion rights
legislation to be introduced in Congress in many years” (p.14). Though the law was
referred to committee, and GovTrack.us (n.d.) predicts the bill only has a 2% chance of
being enacted, it is encouraging to see congressional opposition, albeit marginal, to
“informed consent” laws.
While legal experts are pursuing legal avenues of resistance, abortion providers
are also working to neutralize the impact of “informed consent” laws. Carolyn Jones’
(March 15, 2012) story, for example, provides an important window into provider efforts
to counteract the impact of intrusive abortion regulations. Jones reported that the nurse
turned up the music while the doctor “interpreted” the sonogram, and she also relayed
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that the doctor apologized for having to implement the law. Both acts helped to discredit
the content of the law, even if they made for a more disjointed abortion experience.
Dr. Carol Joffe’s (2009) book Dispatches From the Abortion Wars documents one
strategy shared by a provider on a closed listserv. After fulfilling the “breast cancer
requirement,” the provider offered this addendum:
By law I am required to tell you that there is a ‘possibility’ of an increased risk of
breast cancer later in life for women who have an abortion. However, there is no
medical evidence to support this idea. In fact, this has been taken very seriously
and proven by medical research not to be so . . . . To put the risk of abortion in
perspective, let me say this: Be sure to buckle your seatbelt and drive carefully on
the way to the clinic and back home. Your trip to and from the clinic in your car
will probably be the most dangerous part of your abortion.
(as cited in Joffe, 2009, p.71)
By couching misleading “informed consent” provisions in this manner, providers may be
able to mitigate the impact of deceptive abortion mandates. Likewise, in an early study
of patient perceptions of abortion regulations, Cockrill and Weitz (2010) report a
pragmatic strategy for negotiating mandatory waiting periods: “Our recruitment site in
State B was able to maintain a one-day appointment schedule for out-of-town patients by
having a doctor available for phone consultations on certain days” (p.15). Such phone
consultations save patients’ time, money, and effort without strictly violating the law.
Unfortunately, a number of states have proposed recent legislation that would ban phone
consultations and other forms of telemedicine (Boonstra, 2013).
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Notably, some states permit providers to distance themselves from the content of
“informed consent” materials. Nebraska’s law, for example, contains such a provision:
“The physician and his or her agent may disassociate themselves from the materials and
may comment or refrain from commenting on them as they choose” (Nebraska’s
Informed Consent for Abortion, 2010). In Kansas, providers have incorporated their
objections directly into the informed consent form. In response to state-mandated
information regarding fetal pain, Kansas’ Certification of Voluntary and Informed
Consent form includes the following disclaimer: “The State of Kansas requires us to
make the following statements, which we believe to be medically inappropriate,
misleading, and ideologically motivated. We are currently challenging the validity of this
requirement in court” (Kansas Department of Health & Environment, n.d.b, p.6). And
later, in a rider on the final page of the informed consent form, abortion patients are
advised:
The State of Kansas requires us to inform you of the risks of breast cancer and
preterm birth related to abortion . . . . Although a lot of junk science has been
published by opponents of safe and legal abortion, there is no credible scientific
evidence that abortion causes breast cancer or preterm birth in subsequent
pregnancies. (Kansas Department of Health & Environment, n.d.b, p.11)
Both interpolations challenge antiabortion hegemony, and they are powerful countermeasures to misinformation otherwise legitimated by the authority of governmentsanctioned documents.
Of course, the coexistence of competing claims may be confusing for many
women, and the fact that counselors are now required to devise resistance tactics in order
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to do their jobs without punitive consequence is cause for alarm. Moreover, examples of
providers explicitly distancing themselves from “informed consent” literature is further
testimony to how far “informed consent” laws have drifted from standard practices of
informed consent. In the high-paced world of healthcare provision, providers should not
be required to devote their limited time to inventing creative solutions to minimize the
adverse health impacts of scientifically unsound information.
Moving on, resistance to “informed consent” laws occurs through the words of
women themselves, despite longstanding social taboos that have blocked women from
publically discussing their abortion experiences. Historically, the topic of abortion has
been inflicted by the silence of stigma. Rhetorician Celeste Michelle Condit (1990) notes
that prior to 1960 abortion was “a whisper-word, not to be spoken in polite company or in
public” (p.1). Although public discussions of abortion have proliferated substantially
since the 1960s, social conventions continue to limit the scope and domain of socially
acceptable abortion discourse. Most Americans are wise to the inflammatory and
polarizing nature of abortion, and abortion is an issue many people avoid raising as a
topic of casual conversation. The deeply personal nature of abortion and the manifold
moral issues that orbit abortion, along with abortion’s intimate link to sexual intercourse,
further contribute to the common belief that abortion is a private issue that should not be
discussed openly. One of the unfortunate consequences of such discursive constraints,
however, is the reinforcement of antiabortion ideology. When women’s silence is the
rule, then the meaning and morality of abortion belongs to those who are authorized to
speak, or to those who speak the loudest. Arguably, the voices of antiabortion protestors
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and politicians have dominated the airwaves in past decades, effectively overshadowing
the experiences of women who seek an abortion.
Unfortunately, antiabortion discourse received further institutional support with a
2014 unanimous United States Supreme Court ruling that overturned a Massachusetts law
that created a 35-foot buffer zone around abortion clinics (McCullen et al. v. Coakley,
Attorney General of Massachusetts et al., 2014). Abortion-rights activists argue buffer
zones are necessary in light of clinic violence and antiabortion infringements upon patient
privacy; in essence, buffer zones allow women to enter abortion clinics free from closecontact street harassment. The Supreme Court ruled, however, that buffer zone laws
violate protestors’ First Amendment rights, a decision that effectively increases the
acoustics of antiabortion voices within the clinical context.
In recent years, however, abortion rights groups have adopted a number of
strategic policies to help pivot women’s voices to the center of abortion discourse. For
example, abortion rights activists have developed important online forums for women to
discuss their abortion experiences openly (I’m not sorry.net, n.d.; Exhale, n.d.), and the
work of groups such as the 1 In 3 Campaign (n.d.) and film productions like I Had an
Abortion (Aldrich & Baumgardner, 2005) are making notable strides in challenging the
stigmatic silences that still riddle abortion discourse by encouraging women to publically
personalize abortion. As way of further example, a recent New York Magazine’s cover
story, “My Abortion” (Winter, 2013) featured twenty-seven women recounting their
abortion experiences,76 and Emily Letts broke new cyber ground when she posted a
nongraphic video of her surgical abortion to her Facebook page (Rudolph, 2014).
Collectively, such stories help to expand the ethical boundaries of the abortion debate
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beyond the confines of the deceptively simplistic pro-choice/pro-life binary that has
dominated abortion discourse for decades, and they help to challenge antiabortion
discursive monopolies.
More specifically, women who positively affirm their abortion experiences help
to support and reassure other women who have had an abortion, or are considering
having an abortion, by demonstrating that the abortion decision is not psychologically
devastating and is often empowering. In addition, anecdotal stories can help other
women to feel less alone, and they serve as a powerful countermeasure to “informed
consent” literature that suggests abortion is traumatizing or dangerous. Women who
discuss their abortions take control of how their abortion experience is framed and
consequentially challenge the narratives favored by antiabortion protestors and
politicians. One of Emily Letts’ motivating factors for posting her surgical abortion to
Facebook, for example, was to show that a surgical abortion in the early stages of
pregnancy is quick and safe, and not necessarily scary. Letts (Rudolph, 2014) reports
that most of the comments responding to her Facebook abortion were “breathtakingly
supportive” (para 19), a testimony to the networks of camaraderie and resistance women
can create when they share their abortion experience.
Although there is a paucity of women discussing their experiences with “informed
consent” laws, an unsurprising lacuna given the discursive gaps that structure abortion
discourse in general, some examples do exist. In the New York Magazine’s cover story,
for example, Abby notes, “They gave me all this paperwork that said, “This is serious.
You could die . . . .” (as cited in Winter, 2013, sec. 6). Another woman, Madeline,
writes, “I was at twenty weeks, just a few days away from being too late. During the
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ultrasound, the technician told me how big the head was—it was the most scarring thing.
The next day, the procedure took fifteen minutes” (as cited in Winter, 2013, sec. 8).
Although these passing references do not stand out as brazen acts of resistance to
antiabortion legislation, I argue they can be understood as micro acts of antiabortion
insurgency given social prohibitions on abortion as an acceptable topic of conversation.
This is to say, the fact that women are discussing their experiences is politically
important, whether or not they explicitly couple an abortion-rights prescription with their
story. In simply mentioning the existence of abortion regulations, women like Amy and
Madeline increase public awareness of the issue and complicate the reductive simplicity
typical of antiabortion arguments.
Finally, opposition to antiabortion legislation has kindled important academic and
research publications. Recently, a number of articles across a variety of disciplines have
found their way to publication (Atkinson, 2011; Cockrill & Weitz, 2010; Graham,
Ankrett, & Killick, 2010; Manian, 2009; Medoff, 2009; Woodcock, 2011). Although this
work can really only be considered preliminary, the fact that research and analysis has
begun indicates a growing awareness within academic and research circles of the
problems precipitated by “informed consent” practices. I consider this dissertation,
informed as it is by feminist methodology, to contribute to this growing body of
literature.
In terms of quantitative research, the Guttmacher Institute continues to track and
publish data on emerging configurations of state laws regulating abortion. In addition to
analyzing social policy pertaining to sexual and reproductive health issues such as
pregnancy, contraception, and biotechnologies, the Guttmacher Institute has considered
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the co-option of “informed consent” by antiabortionists. For example, Richardson and
Nash’s 2006 policy review, “Misinformed Consent: The Medical Accuracy of StateDeveloped Abortion Counseling Materials,” and Joyce et al.’s (2009, April) “The Impact
of State Mandatory Counseling and Waiting Period Laws on Abortion: A Lit Review” are
notable examples of early work that calls attention to the misuse of “informed consent” in
the abortion context. Likewise, the Bixby Center for Global Reproductive Health and
their research group Advancing New Standards in Reproductive Health (ANSIRH)
(2014) have begun investigating women’s perceptions of “informed consent” laws, and
their project, Evaluation of Abortion Restrictions Project, promises to unearth additional
insight into the impact of abortion restrictions.
In the field of sociology, Ely (2007) and Ely, Dulmus, and Akers (2010) make a
plea for additional studies considering patient satisfaction with abortion counseling in the
era of heightened regulations, and Ely and Dulmus (2010) call attention to the impact of
heightened regulations upon vulnerable women. In legal journals, the work of Atkinson
(2011), Daly (1995), Gans (1995), Manian (2009), Siegel (1992; April, 2008; June,
2008), Siegel and Blustain (2006), and Suk (2010) stand out as alert and perceptive legal
analyses of “informed consent” laws, and this community of legal scholars have
provided powerful analyses of how abortion regulations deviate from informed consent
law and practice. Concurrently, philosophers and political theorists, like Scott
Woodcock (2011), James Rocha (2012), and Joanne Boucher (2004), bring a theoretical
eye to “informed consent” regulations, unpacking the philosophical implications of
autonomy and the rhetoric of ultrasound regulations. Although such articles are
individually limited in scope and content, a limitation this work attempts to remedy
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through a sustained analysis of informed consent across multiple discursive practices,
each academic publication provides a unique angle of theoretical critique, and
collectively they work to expand the discursive territory of abortion rights resistance. Of
course, academic work is not sufficient to challenge or end “informed consent” laws, but
it is a necessary component as theoretical accounts can help to inform, incite, and drive
legislative action, just as legislative actions help to drive theoretical discourse.
Finally, it is important to notice and enhance the connections between each of the
discrete strategies discussed above. Although legal challenges, provider strategizing,
first-person narratives, and academic publications each pursue unique routes of
resistance, they are not isolated discourses and they certainly interconnect and influence
one another. For example, abortion providers must remain fluent in the legal discourses
that govern abortion provision in order to comply with the law and to develop legal
modes of resistance. Likewise, the testimony of abortion providers often informs amicus
curiae briefs submitted during court hearings on abortion regulations. Moreover,
academic publications like those produced by Cockrill and Weitz (2010) engage and
document the multiple resistance methodologies deployed by healthcare providers,
thereby providing a forum for providers to learn from one another. In addition, it is
indubitable that women’s first-person narratives inform other resistance practices, even if
their names are not always directly cited due to privacy reasons. For example, doctors
and clinicians who are committed to providing abortions often anonymously reference
their patients’ personal stories as reason why they continue to work in such a socially
divisive, and oftentimes dangerous, field (Physicians for Reproductive Choice and
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Health, June 2005). Patient narratives clearly serve as a grounding inspiration for
provider strategizing.
The previous examples offer a brief sampling of the myriad ways the discrete
discourses of abortion interact. As reproductive rights advocates continue to challenge
“informed consent” laws, they would do well to interweave the various strategies
deployed by different groups working at different fronts of the “abortion wars” (Joffe,
2009; Solinger, 1998). Insofar as abortion is a multifaceted experience that is configured
by a host of distinct discourses, then a robust and informed response to “informed
consent” laws should deploy an interdisciplinary strategy that incorporates the unique
perspectives and insights of lawyers, politicians, clinicians, academics, and patients.
Professional Medical Associations Respond
In this section, I consider the policy statements issued by professional medical
associations in response to “informed consent” legislation.77 It is important to consider
policy statements because in the words of the American Medical Association, policies
“provide the conceptual foundation and organizational framework for the activities that
the Association undertakes to achieve its Core Purpose of promoting the science and art
of medicine and the betterment of public health” (American Medical Association, 2014a).
In other words, a policy statement serves as both an indicator and an instigator of action;
if an organization lacks a policy statement on “informed consent” legislation, then it is
unlikely that the organization will issue challenges to “informed consent” laws.
Here, I suggest that the “informed consent” policy statements of the American
College Of Gynecologists (ACOG), the American Woman’s Medical Association
(AWMA), and the American College of Physicians (ACP) are important initial volleys
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against “informed consent” laws. However, I critique the American Medical
Association’s (AMA) official policy on abortion for its tepidity and rhetorical
imprecision. Given that the AMA wields the most social power of any medical
organization, the AMA’s silence on “informed consent” laws is particularly troubling.
Mainstream judicial and medical discourses have long emphasized and underscored
the supremacy of physician knowledge, and the courts have traditionally recognized and
protected the privacy of doctor-patient communication. As argued in previous chapters,
even the doctrine of informed consent, originally proposed as a means to mitigate
physician power and to strengthen patient autonomy in a context of medical power
relations, characterizes physician knowledge as authoritative and primary. Given the
dominance of this view, one would expect professional medical organizations to
boisterously object to legislation that overrides their professional expertise.
The powerful role historically played by the American Medical Association vis-àvis abortion policy supports this expectation. Whether in the era of legalization or in the
era of criminalization, physicians have long held deep control over women’s abortion
decisions, and this control has received legal sustenance from the courts. As scholars of
abortion know well, the AMA fronted the nineteenth-century campaign to criminalize
abortion. Historians Kirstin Luker (1984) and James Mohr (1978) have both illustrated
that the AMA’s antiabortion campaign reflects physician efforts to consolidate their
power and legitimize medical authority in an era prior to the professionalization of
medicine. By advocating for the criminalization of abortion, and then arguing that some
abortions were medically necessary and that physicians alone had this knowledge, the
AMA configured abortion as a strictly “medical” decision. Later, when the AMA
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reversed its position on abortion in the direction of legalization, physicians continued to
articulate abortion as a medical decision, one that criminal abortion statutes unfairly
interfered with. Historian Rickie Solinger (2005) confirms that physician challenges to
criminal abortion statutes were primarily driven by the desire to safeguard physician
authority, rather than feminist concerns regarding women’s reproductive autonomy. All
of this is to say, professionalized medicine has long monitored and controlled abortion
regulation.
Given this history, and given the fact that abortion-specific “informed consent”
laws displace physician autonomy, it is unsurprising that professional medical
associations object to invasive legislation. However, individual medical associations
have responded very differently to abortion legislation. The range of responses varies
from explicit rejection of abortion-specific requirements to generalized disapproval of
government interference with patient-provider relationships. In terms of policy positions
on “informed consent” legislation, the most explicit and robust opposition has come from
the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) and the American
Medical Women’s Association (AMWA).
In May 2013, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the
American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists issued a policy statement
addressing legislative interference with the patient-physician relationship, and they
mentioned abortion legislation specifically. The ACOG states:
The College and ACOG strongly oppose any governmental interference that
threatens communication between patients and their physicians or causes a
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physician to compromise his or her medical judgment about what information or
treatment is in the best interest of the patient.
(American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, May 2013)
The ACOG clarifies that “examples of such problematic legislation include . . . laws that
require medically unnecessary ultrasounds before abortion and force a patient to view the
ultrasound image; laws that mandate an outdated treatment protocol for medical
abortion” (American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, May 2013). The
ACOG urges physicians to “oppose” and “advocate against” any legislation that
interferes with professional medical care, and they argue that such legislation affects all
physicians, not only OBGYNs. In addition, the ACOG has targeted specific abortion
laws, such as those passed by the North Dakota and Texas legislatures. In response to
Texas abortion legislation, ACOG Executive Vice President Hal C. Lawrence argues,
The Texas bills set a dangerous precedent of a legislature telling doctors how to
practice medicine and how to care for individual patients. ACOG opposes
legislative interference and strongly believes that decisions about medical care
must be based on scientific evidence and made by licensed medical professionals,
not the state or federal government.
(American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists , July 2, 2013)
The American Medical Women’s Association (AMWA) has also issued a policy
statement on legislative interference with abortion decisions. In a position paper on
abortion access, they carve out their clear opposition to “informed consent” laws. The
AMWA writes,
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The American Medical Women's Association will oppose efforts to overturn or
weaken Roe v. Wade. We will oppose laws and court rulings that interfere with
the doctor-patient relationship, either in requiring or proscribing specific medical
advice to pregnant women. We will oppose measures that limit access to medical
care for pregnant women, particularly for poor or underserved groups.
(American Medical Women’s Association, n.d.)
The AMWA views abortion care as a necessary ingredient to social equality, and their
policy position is notable for its emphasis on the medical, individual, and social benefits
of abortion. The AMWA contends:
Abortions will be chosen whether they are legal or illegal. When abortion was
illegal in this country, it was brought about by dangerous, self-induced methods or
by clandestine, often untrained, practitioners under unsterile conditions with no
follow-up care. Many women suffered reproductive tract damage, infection,
bleeding, permanent sterility, or death. Since the advent of legal abortion in the
United States, there has been a dramatic decrease in all pregnancy-related deaths
and in pregnancy and abortion-related complications.
(American Medical Women’s Association, n.d.)
Although the policy statements of both the ACOG and the AMWA may be partly
driven by a guild mentality that resents outside influences upon medical authority, I argue
their policy statements are also deeply informed by a genuine concern for women’s
reproductive autonomy and general compassion for women’s well-being. The opening
lines of the AMWA’s (n.d.) policy position on abortion evidences this concern: “The
American Medical Women's Association, an organization of women physicians and
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medical students, values equality for women and equal opportunity for women to achieve
their full professional and personal potential.” By recognizing the enabling relationship
between abortion and social equality, the AMWA expands the meaning and importance
of abortion beyond strictly medical concerns. Likewise, the ACOG’s (July 2, 2013)
language indicates their belief that Texas abortion legislation affronts women’s medical
autonomy:
Both bills are plainly intended to restrict the reproductive rights of women in
Texas . . . . All women, including the women of Texas, must have the legal right
to abortion, unconstrained by harassment, unavailability of care, procedure bans,
or other legislative or regulatory barriers, including those posed by these Texas
bills. (para 1, para 5)
Both the ACOG and the AMWA recognize that a meaningful defense of women’s
reproductive autonomy requires a vocally specific opposition to “informed consent” laws.
Like the ACOG and the AMWA, The American College of Physicians (ACP)
explicitly challenges “informed consent” laws, although they do not defend abortion
rights as boldly as the ACOG and the AMWA. In July of 2012, The American College
of Physicians published a paper explicitly addressing legislative mandates that infringe
upon the physician-patient relationship and jeopardize patient safety and autonomy.
Among examples of inappropriate regulations, the ACP mentions abortion laws such as
mandatory ultrasounds and multiple unnecessary visits to the clinician’s office (p.3). In
this paper, the ACP offers a series of principles to guide the assessment of laws
governing clinical practice. For example, the ACP (July, 2012) argues,
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Laws and regulations should not mandate the content of what physicians
may or may not say to patients or mandate the provision or withholding
of information or care . . . . Patients should not be required to undergo tests or
interventions, especially invasive and potentially harmful interventions, that
violate the patient’s values, are not medically necessary . . . . Physicians should be
guided by evidence-based clinical guidelines that allow flexibility to adapt to
individual patient circumstances. (pp.6-7)
Notably, however, the ACP states the purpose of their paper is to provide “a framework
for broadly addressing” issues relating to government infringement without “expressly
taking positions on the controversial and related issues of abortion, reproductive rights,
and gun control” (p.1). In other words, the ACP’s paper argues that “informed consent”
laws are misguided not because abortion care is an ethical good or a constitutional right,
but because such laws “inappropriately infringe on clinical medical practice and patientphysician relationships” (p.2). Apparently, the ACP seeks to defend the legal sanctity of
medical relationships while simultaneously avoiding the quagmire of abortion politics. In
seeking to adopt a politically neutral position, however, the ACP produces an arguably
anemic policy position vis-à-vis reproductive healthcare. The fact that a professional
medical organization hesitates to take a more aggressive position on abortion is troubling,
for reasons which will be explored in richer detail below.
Of the major professional medical organizations, The American Medical
Association’s policy statement on abortion-specific “informed consent” laws is the most
anemic when it comes to abortion rights. In general, the AMA paints its position with
broad strokes, and the AMA does not mention “informed consent” for abortion laws
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specifically. To clarify, the AMA unequivocally objects to legislative acts that
straightjacket healthcare providers and the AMA supports legalized abortion (American
Medical Association, 2014b). However, unlike the ACP, the AMWA, and the ACOG,
the AMA does not specifically mention abortion in their policy discussions of
problematic legislation.
Instead, the AMA frames its opposition to undue government intrusion upon the
medical process with terminology that is troubling for its generality. For example, the
AMA’s policy on “procedure-specific” informed consent reads, “Our AMA opposes
legislative measures that would impose procedure-specific requirements for informed
consent or a waiting period for any legal medical procedure” (American Medical
Association, 2014c). Likewise, AMA policy on Government Interference in Patient
Counseling dictates, “Our AMA vigorously and actively defends the physician-patientfamily relationship and actively opposes state and/or federal efforts to interfere in the
content of communication in clinical care delivery between clinicians and patients”
(2014d, para 1). Absent from the AMA’s position are specific examples of the type of
legislation that is at issue, such as mandatory ultrasounds. Indeed, the AMA is
remarkably reticent when it comes to restrictive abortion legislation specifically. While
researching the AMA’s policy database, I was unable to find any direct mention of
abortion-specific “informed consent” laws.
I argue that the AMA’s failure to aggressively challenge “informed consent” laws
can be understood in terms of the AMA’s overall policy on abortion, which has been
arguably impacted by antiabortion politics. Although the AMA defends the right of
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practitioners to provide abortion services, the AMA distances itself from the issue of
abortion by articulating abortion as a matter of “personal value.” AMA policy states:
The issue of support of or opposition to abortion is a matter for members of the
AMA to decide individually, based on personal values or beliefs. The AMA will
take no action which may be construed as an attempt to alter or influence the
personal views of individual physicians regarding abortion procedures.
(American Medical Association, 2014e)
Although the AMA supports legalized abortion, the AMA fails to proffer a robust defense
of abortion rights.
The AMA’s effort to maintain political neutrality in the face of abortion and their
defense of provider opposition to abortion is likely informed by an escalation of provider
conscience laws in recent decades, a legislative tactic fronted by abortion opponents.
Provider conscience clauses allow healthcare providers and medical institutions to refuse
to provide abortion services with legal impunity (Guttmacher Institute, 2014, December).
Although conscience clauses are justified using the language of physician rights, such
laws can interfere with women’s ability to obtain abortion care (Sonfield, 2005). In
effect, the AMA’s defense of provider-conscience clauses can carry negative
consequences for some women seeking an abortion, a consequence that antiabortionists
surely applaud. As it stands, AMA rhetoric on abortion provision does more to protect
physicians who oppose abortion services than physicians who struggle to provide them.
In this vein, the AMA’s stance on abortion training is also watered-down. AMA
policy explains,
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The AMA encourages education on termination of pregnancy issues so that
medical students receive a satisfactory knowledge of the medical, ethical, legal
and psychological principles associated with termination of pregnancy, although
observation of, attendance at, or any direct or indirect participation in an abortion
should not be required. (American Medical Association, 2014f)
Insofar as abortion can be a life-saving procedure, it is disturbing that the AMA does not
take a position stronger than simple “encouragement.”78 This is especially true in light of
the alarming decrease in abortion training that has occurred in the United States over
recent years.79 It matters little if abortion is technically legal if there is no one who can
provide the service, an enabling condition not lost on abortion opponents.
Ultimately, contemporary AMA policy on abortion proffers what I take to be a
negative-rights view of abortion provision. That is, AMA policy supports the position
that abortion providers should be free from laws criminalizing abortion, but it does not
place an ethical imperative upon physicians and state governments to provide abortions.
AMA policy on abortion states, “The Principles of Medical Ethics of the AMA do not
prohibit a physician from performing an abortion in accordance with good medical
practice and under circumstances that do not violate the law” (American Medical
Association, 2014b). This language is problematic as an ethical injunction to “not
prohibit” differs from an ethical responsibility to provide. The former obliges inaction
while the latter obliges action, and in the world of abortion provision this distinction is
not trivial. When it comes to abortion, a suspension of laws outlawing abortions is
insufficient to secure reproductive autonomy; in order for women to obtain abortions, the
medical infrastructure necessary to abortion services must also exist, as must institutional
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support of physicians willing to provide abortion services. When antiabortion efforts are
enjoying wide-ranging success and abortion services are dwindling (Jones & Jerman,
2014), then the failure to actively encourage abortion provision lends support to the
antiabortion crusade.
Although the AMA offers no official explanation for their weak defense of
abortion provision, I argue their effort to retain political neutrality is an unfortunate
consequence of antiabortion pressures. The advent of “informed consent” laws marks a
novel moment within informed consent rhetoric where the authority of physicians is
diluted by nonmedical agendas. One would expect the AMA to lead the charge against
“informed consent” laws given its historical defense of physician authority over the
abortion decision and its stated opposition to excessive government infringement upon
the medical process. Instead, the AMA is conspicuously absent from professional
challenges to intrusive abortion regulations.80 Carole Joffe (2009) draws upon thirty
years of reproductive-health research to observe, “what I have come to see, over and
over, is that in a peculiarly medical version of ‘not in my backyard,’ American physicians
often don’t support abortion provision in their own medical institutions” (p.17). Joffe
(2009) attributes this failure of support to the stigma of abortion, persistent stereotypes of
medical practitioners as the “back-alley butcher,” a history of clinic violence and
harassment, and American medicine’s aversion to controversy (p.19). Joffe (2009) also
argues that the “political mobilization by antiabortion activists has reached into
medicine” (p.17), and she notes the existence of antiabortion caucuses within the ACOG
and other medical organizations, such as the American Academy of Family Physicians
(p.17). Given social hostility to abortion, it is surely probable that the AMA’s tepid
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support of abortion rights in the current era is traceable to the zealotry of abortion
opponents, coupled with the reluctance and reticence of abortion supporters within the
medical community.
In a culture that continues to curtail abortion-rights, the AMA has a moral
obligation to vociferously defend access to a routine and safe medical procedure. I argue
that the AMA must issue a more aggressive policy position opposing abortion-specific
“informed consent” laws. After all, it is possible to advocate for abortion rights without
violating the legal rights of providers who refuse to provide abortions.
Revisions of Informed Consent
Thus far, this work has taken a critical approach to the concept and practice of
informed consent. In Chapter One, I argued that traditional articulations of informed
consent fail to address the power dynamics that structure society and medical
relationships, and in subsequent chapters I considered how the rhetoric of informed
consent has been turned against women who wish to terminate a pregnancy. In turn, my
critique raises the question, if we agree that current informed consent practices are
unacceptable and inadequate, how should informed consent practices proceed for women
seeking an abortion?
This is not an easy question to answer. When it comes to informed consent,
abortion problematizes the criteria of information and patient competency. Given the
host of seemingly irreconcilable philosophical questions abortion poses, what information
should providers tell their patients, and to what depth should this information be
discussed? In theory, an informed consent requires that patients understand their medical
condition and their treatment options. However, when philosophers, religious leaders,
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and ethicists continue to disagree over how abortion should be understood, what criteria
should be used to identify and assess patient understanding? Given the deep moral
particularity of abortion, is it reasonable to expect healthcare providers to serve as the
primary conduits of information and the official gatekeepers of understanding?
Although coupling abortion with informed consent yields a profusion of potential
philosophical and practical pitfalls, I do not mean to suggest that informed consent
practices should be expunged from the abortion process. Indeed, a dialogical process of
informational interchange still remains the most likely vehicle for respecting and
encouraging patient autonomy during the medical decision-making process. In this
concluding section, I articulate an alternative vision of informed consent for abortion, one
to replace the current network of problematic restrictions that endanger women’s
reproductive autonomy.
More specifically, I argue it is imperative that legislators eliminate the “informed
consent” laws critiqued in this work. In their place, we should adopt a renewed practice
of informed consent that recognizes the value of the subjective standard of informational
disclosure (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p.122) and includes an option for discussing
emotional response and fetal ontology, subjects that have often been avoided by feminists
in the past. Notably, many members of the abortion care community advocate for and
implement many of the techniques I champion in this section. Despite antiabortion
characterizations of abortion clinics as capitalist “mills” or abortion-factories, abortion
providers have long recognized the moral complexities of abortion and the necessity of
dialogue in the context of abortion.81

!

169

To begin, any discussion of informed consent must tangle with questions of
information disclosure. What, and how much, information should a healthcare provider
supply? What criteria should be used to assess and determine informational content?
When has a healthcare provider supplied enough information to permit an informed
consent, and when have they provided too much information? Insofar as patients’ needs
vary, it is difficult to formulate general criteria to answer such questions. It is thus
unsurprising that there is a lack of precision regarding the issue of informational content
within legal discourse and clinical practice. As Berg et al. (2001) report,
Despite the large number of court decisions and varying formulae, there is a lack
of clear definition of the scope of required disclosure. The legal requirements for
informed consent remain unclear, and probably inherently so, given the
development of judicially created rules from particular cases with idiosyncratic
factual settings. (p.64)
Currently, informed consent literature recognizes three standards of disclosure
and content: the professional standard, the patient-oriented or “reasonable person”
standard, and the subjective standard. The professional standard identifies sufficient
medical disclosure in terms of “what is customary and usual in the profession” (Berg et
al., 2001, p.46). That is, medical professionals dictate the standard of informational
content from their professional standpoint; medical custom governs medical disclosure
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p.122).
The second most widely used standard is the patient-oriented standard. This
standard dictates the scope of disclosure on the basis of what “a reasonable person in the
patient’s circumstances would find material to a decision either to undergo or forgo
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treatment” (Berg et al., 2001, p.48). Advocates of the patient-oriented standard applaud
the dialogical requirements it places upon the provider insofar as patient needs dictate the
standard of measure, rather than medical authority. In general, the courts recognize one
of these two standards and Berg at al. (2001) report, “roughly half the states use a
professional standard of disclosure, and half use a patient standard” (p.58).82
As mentioned in Chapter Two, a third standard, the subjective standard, also
exists within informed consent literature, although according to Beauchamp and
Childress (2009), the “courts have generally avoided it” (p.122). This is unfortunate as
the subjective standard of disclosure is perhaps the most promising in terms of abortion
care. Insofar as the abortion decision is highly unique and relative to each woman’s
concrete circumstances, it is imperative that healthcare providers assess informational
needs relative to individual patients. Whereas the professional standard overlooks the
insights and epistemic contributions of the patient, and the patient-oriented standard is
limited by the imprecise and abstract concept of a “reasonable person,” the subjective
standard dictates informational content in terms of the individual patient. That is, the
subjective standard mandates providers to familiarize themselves with the patient’s value
systems, unique health problems, and family histories (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009,
p.123), a requirement that compels deeper degrees of patient-provider dialogue. In
addition, the subjective standard resonates most closely with the ideal of shared decision
making as articulated by Jay Katz (1984) and the President’s Commission (1982), a
model that, despite certain weaknesses, offers perhaps the most auspicious guidelines for
medical decision-making within the abortion context.

!

171

Beauchamp and Childress (2009) recognize the subjective standard as the
“preferable moral standard of disclosure,” but they maintain this standard is impractical
because, “we cannot reasonably expect a doctor to do an exhaustive background and
character analysis of each patient” (p.124). It is lamentable that Beauchamp and
Childress fail to provide a more energetic endorsement of the subjective standard given
its focus on individual patient needs. Although the subjective standard certainly places
more demanding obligations upon providers, this standard’s dedication to patient
specificity makes it indispensable in the context of abortion care.
Insofar as the abortion decision is often informed by factors that fall outside the
jurisdiction of medical expertise, such as patient values, it is especially important that
providers operate with a model of disclosure that works to bring patient concerns to
voice. As has been reiterated throughout this work, women may seek an abortion for
economic reasons, for circumstantial reasons such as work or family life, or because they
are not interested in birthing or raising a child. Although abortions are sometimes
necessary for medical reasons—Carol Joffe (2009), for example, relates the story of a
seventeen-year-old with a recurrent pulmonary embolism who accidentally becomes
pregnant and requires an abortion because pregnancy “could exacerbate her condition,
possibly leading to death” (p.84)—many abortions are sought for nonmedical reasons.
Although abortion is a medical procedure, the meaning of abortion always exceeds
medical issues. In the words of Kristin Luker (1984), an individual’s thoughts about
abortion are but the “tip of the iceberg” of that individual’s entire “world-view” (p.158).
Insofar as abortion is interwoven with a host of other ethical beliefs, including the moral
significance of parenthood, female sexuality, and fetal personhood, and insofar as the
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abortion decision is intimately tied to a woman’s other life projects and goals, then a
woman’s relationship to abortion will always be informed by her unique set of values and
beliefs.
Here, my point is that the abortion decision must always be evaluated in light of
the individual’s social context and ethical perspectives. Given the highly personalized
and irreducible specificity of pregnancy and abortion, and because women exist within
different social configurations of abortion and motherhood, dialogical options and
opportunity are key to a robust and meaningful practice of informed consent that
recognizes and engages patients’ unique value systems. The subjective standard demands
dialogical exchange, and thus it stands as the most appropriate standard to be used within
the abortion-care context where recognizing and engaging patient values is imperative.
Along with deploying the subjective standard, I argue it is also necessary for
abortion caregivers to recognize the topics of emotional response and fetal ontology.
Insofar as reproductive discourse is saturated in antiabortion ideology, a deeper
discussion of these topics may help to bolster some women’s reproductive autonomy.
Given the highly politicized nature of abortion, and given the stigmas that continue to
restrict abortion discourse, the informed consent process may be the only time that some
women are afforded an opportunity to discuss topics of emotional response and fetal
ontology. In the following paragraphs, I explain why it is necessary for abortion
providers to be cognizant of the topics of emotional response and fetal ontology, an
explanation that consequently provides further support for the value of the subjective
standard as the preferred measure of information disclosure.
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For one, current “informed consent” materials that warn women of psychosis
following abortion, or only stress negative psychological consequences of abortion, must
be removed from state-sponsored “informed consent” materials. However, this does not
entail that abortion providers should sidestep the subject of abortion-related
psychological response. Historically, abortion rights activists have avoided the
ambivalent psychological responses wrought by abortion. In an article for The American
Prospect, Dana Goldstein (2008) argues,
The feminist movement is built upon the cornerstone of women controlling their
reproductive destinies—on the imperative of valuing women’s lives over the
potential for life represented by a pregnancy. In the past, that often meant not
talking at all about post-abortive women’s feelings about the fetus. (para. 3)
Feminists, Goldstein notes, “worried that discussing abortion's after effects would play
into Christian right talking points” (para. 7).
Although there is good reason to trouble over reductive discussions regarding the
psychological consequences of abortion, a failure to attend to the psychological
dimensions of abortion may let the pendulum swing too far in the other direction. After
all, overlooking women’s emotional responses to abortion only perpetuates the historical
omission of women’s perspectives and experiences. Some women may find the abortion
decision psychologically disruptive and they may have a real need for further discussion
of their affective experiences. As mentioned earlier, the taboo nature of abortion means
that many women lack the opportunity to tangle with the moral ambivalences of
unwanted pregnancy free from the pressures of antiabortion ideology. In a society that
routinely stigmatizes and castigates abortion, many women experience conflicting and
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complex emotions about their abortion, the moral status of the fetus, and the meaning of
motherhood. In such cases, the informed consent process may be the only opportunity
they have to candidly discuss their thoughts and feelings.
Phenomenologically speaking, pregnancy is inimitable; there is no other somatic
experience in which a human being harbors, co-exists, and grows another potential
human being. Although the fetus or embryo is not interchangeable with a human subject,
it is undeniable that the developing fetus or embryo exists along a trajectory that
uninterrupted culminates in another human subject. Of course, the moral significance of
embryonic development is contested, variable, and ever-shifting. Yet, the biological
potentiality inherent to a fetus as an organism, the not-yet-but-soon-to-be quality that so
many ascribe to the developing fetus, distinguishes pregnancy from any other human
experience. The mistake made by antiabortionists is to assume that fetal potentiality
necessarily entails the strict moral imperative to carry all pregnancies to term, but the
mistake made by many reproductive rights advocates is to avoid the cultural ascriptions
and phenomenological insights that accompany pregnant biology, a point well-made by
Morgan and Michaels (1999). Rather than avoiding the ethical implications of
pregnancy, these implications should be recognized in a way that does not disempower
women or concedes to antiabortion dogma.
In fact, engaging women’s unique feelings about abortion during the informed
consent process could carry added benefits in terms of abortion rights. That is, a failure
to address the emotional aspects of abortion may inadvertently lend credence to
antiabortion narratives and leave women vulnerable to antiabortion opportunists. Lisa
Rubin and Nancy Felipe Russo (2004) note:
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For some women, the effects of unwanted pregnancy and abortion are more
profound and serious. If they do not receive help from unbiased therapists they will
be ripe for manipulation by antiabortion organizations seeking to exploit their
vulnerabilities to advance an antiabortion political agenda.83 (p.72)
Affording women a nondirective opportunity to discuss their emotional experiences with
unwanted pregnancy would help to legitimate their perspectives and to advance their
autonomy, powerful defenses against antiabortion crusaders who would use women’s
emotional responses as reason to mitigate women’s autonomy.84
Of course, other women may neither desire nor require further discussion of the
psychological or ethical dimensions of abortion. Such emotional versatility, therefore,
requires that providers bring flexibility to the informed consent process. Rather than
following a predetermined script, healthcare providers should tailor the informed consent
process to women’s individual emotional needs. Terry Nicole Steinberg (1989) notes, for
example, “some women, but not all, may benefit from a waiting period and extensive
information. Other women may actually be harmed by extensive information” (p.501).
This is to say, the particularity of women’s experiences with unwanted pregnancy should
inform the type of conversations that occur during the informed consent process. Some
women may not want to discuss their abortion decision any further with a stranger; other
women may have questions or concerns.
Although it is unrealistic to expect abortion providers to be omniscient counselors
who thoroughly understand each woman’s unique psyche and character, it is reasonable
to expect providers to clear the space for discussion of issues relating to the psychological
dimensions of abortion. Terry Nicole Steinberg (1989) argues abortion counseling
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should be unbiased, nondirective, and responsive to the variable needs of women. She
defines the term “unbiased” to mean “a counselor who recognizes differences among
women, providing information and emotional support on an individual basis, without
advocating a particular moral view of abortion” (p.484, footnote 8). Following
Steinberg’s blueprint, abortion providers should cultivate a responsive and humbled
sensitivity to each woman’s unique condition, recognizing when women are emotionally
conflicted and desire further discussion of their decision, yet also cognizant of cases
when further dialogue is unnecessary. Women’s emotional diversity further underscores
the benefits of the subjective standard of disclosure.
Secondly, informed consent practices should include optional discussions
pertaining to fetal ontology and sonogram imagery. The ontology and moral meaning of
the fetus is, after all, a real concern to many women, and the irreducible and contested
nature of fetal semantics makes this issue particularly volatile. As the Supreme Court
noted in Roe, when “those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy,
and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus [as to when life begins]” (as cited in
Shapiro, 2007, p.40), it is unlikely that the ethical issues relevant to fetal ontology will
ever be fully resolved. Therefore, abortion providers and abortion-rights activists alike
should recognize the potential need to discuss the fetus during the informed consent
process.
Like issues of psychological response, however, feminists have historically avoided
discussing the fetus, though scholars rightly point out that this lacuna is not without
merit. “To talk about fetuses,” writes Lynn M. Morgan and Meredith W. Michaels
(1999), “has been thought to cede to the pro-life movement its major premises, and so to
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foreclose the feminist insistence on reproductive freedom for women” (p.2). More
recently, however, the proliferation of sonogram imaging and the rise of the “public
fetus” (Taylor, 1992) has led some scholars to suggest that eschewing the fetus is a
political misstep (Petchesky, 1987; Casper, 1998; Morgan & Michaels, 1999). “To the
extent that feminists avoid ‘fetal subjects,’” caution Morgan and Michaels (1999), “we
risk leaving the field entirely in antagonistic hands and unwittingly contribute to the
persistent and insidious backlash against women’s procreative integrity” (p. 2). Instead,
abortion-care providers should critically engage the meaning of fetal subjects during the
informed consent process, when such discussion is beneficial to the woman. Once again,
the subjective standard of disclosure is the most promising insofar as it recognizes the
specificity and variability of women’s informational needs.
Of course, it is often difficult to know when enhanced discussion is beneficial and
when it is potentially patronizing or unwarranted. In some cases, even raising the topic
of sonogram images can be problematic. The fact that women live in a patriarchal
society that systematically promotes norms of maternity (even as it fails to provide proper
social support for mothers) complicates the mere mention of ultrasound in the abortion
context. As feminist bioethicist Janet Farell Smith (1996) observes, “Because of the
authority physicians have in our society, a patient may hear as an imperative or command
what the physician-speaker intends only as an factual assertion or one among many
options” (p.189). Indeed, the antiabortion legislators who introduce “informed consent”
laws are counting on the innate power structures of the clinical setting to reinforce their
normative message; medical descriptions are meant to operate as medical prescriptions.
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The solution to this predicament lies not in avoiding the subject of fetal ontology,
however, but in recognizing the impact of social power upon medical discourse, and
incorporating this recognition into medical discussion. Although there can be no way to
fully exorcise politically prescriptive messages from discussions of fetal subjectivity, it is
possible to introduce other readings and interpretations into medical dialogue and,
thereby, reclaim some discursive territory from antiabortion rhetoric. Lisa Rubin and
Nancy Felipe Russo (2004) suggest:
Therapists must equip women to recognize how images of the fetus are
manipulated to create feelings of distress and guilt in women . . . . In addition to
exposing women to alternative viewpoints, therapists need to be prepared to
explain how the nervous system develops and what this means for the idea that
the fetus can feel pain . . . . Practitioners can reassure women by giving them
accurate information, including the fact that the neocortex, where human
consciousness, thinking, problem-solving, and language are located, does not
develop until late in pregnancy, in the third trimester. (p.83)
Rubin and Russo’s suggestions are useful strategies that help to produce a more informed
and multidimensional discussion on fetal ontology. In general, we should be less
concerned with identifying and articulating an overarching methodology to guide
discussions of fetal ontology and instead we should be mindful that fetal ontology is a
contested subject that generates different emotional responses and informational needs.
In conclusion, Kim Atkins (2000) writes,
Respect for autonomy is an acknowledgment of the limitations of our knowledge
of other people and a willingness to incorporate that understanding into our world
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views. When we respect autonomy we don’t simply observe another’s freedom
from a distance, as it were; we accede to our fundamental fallibility and
epistemological humility. (p.75)
In the case of informed consent for abortion, such epistemic humility in the face of fetal
subjectivity and emotional response is key to respecting women’s autonomy and
preventing informed consent practices from deteriorating into inflexible acts of empty
protocol. Informed consent practices must recognize women’s irreducible specificity,
and informed consent practices should be crafted in response to unique patient needs.
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ENDNOTES
1

The statistics reported in this paragraph are cited from Jones and Jerman’s

(2014) report, which documents abortion rates for the 2010-2011 year. Although Jones
and Jerman’s (2104) study offers an updated glimpse on abortion and service availability,
it is important to note that certain factors limit the collection of abortion data. Despite
surveying “the known universe of abortion providers” (p.2), Jones and Jerman also
recognize the likelihood that “some abortion providers were not counted because we were
unable to identify them” (p.9). There are several reasons why some providers may not
have been counted. For one, Jones and Jerman (2014) speculate that some providers who
offer early medication abortions went uncounted (p.9). Secondly, some women may be
obtaining the drug misoprostol (available only with a prescription and generally
prescribed in conjunction with mifepristone, in the United States) from the Internet, or
from other countries to terminate their pregnancies without medical supervision
(Grossman, D., Holt, K., Pena, M., Lara, D., Veatch, M., Cordova, D., . . .Blanchard, K.,
2010; Jones, R., 2011). Additionally, Jones and Jerman (2014) were unable to obtain
data from some hospitals and physicians’ offices, though these facilities generally
perform a low number of abortions. Collectively, these factors lead Jones and Jerman
(2014) to concede the possibility that their “estimate of the number of abortions [may be]
artificially low, and the actual drop in the abortion rate was not as large as it appears”
(p.10). Alternatively, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDCP) also
records abortion rates. The last year for which the CDCP has data is 2011. According to
the CDCP, 730,322 abortions were performed in 2011 (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, November 18, 2014). The discrepancy between the CDCP’s data and the
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!
Guttmacher Institute’s data is easily explained. In order to collect data on abortions, the
Guttmacher Institute periodically conducts an independent collection survey, as states are
not required by federal law to submit data to the CDCP. The CDCP’s data for 2011 does
not include abortions that were performed in California, Maryland, or New Hampshire
(Pazol, Creanga, Burley, Hayes, & Jamieson, 2014) and thus the CDCP reports a lower
number of abortions.
2

This work assumes that autonomy is a valuable ideal. Although I recognize the

difficulty that accompanies any formal definition of “autonomy,” and I doubt that
sufficient criteria can be identified to anchor autonomy into perennial definitional place, I
do not think either of these difficulties prevents one from identifying “autonomy” as a
working ideal in women’s reproductive lives. In a nutshell, I understand autonomy as an
agent’s socially constituted capacity for self-determination and self-rule. There is, I
maintain, very good reason to keep autonomy at the forefront of medical ethics, though a
revised conception of autonomy that is aware of autonomy’s socially constructed nature
is necessary. In this sense, I distinguish my work from other feminist analyses of
autonomy in bioethics, many of which raise concern about the decision to privilege
autonomy as the guiding ethical ideal in the doctor-patient relationship. For an example
of such a feminist critique see Tronto (2009, p.184). For further example of
bioethicists who challenge autonomy’s privileged position see O’Neill (Feb 2003),
O’Neill (2003), and Schneider (1998).
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3

Throughout the course of this work, I will place the phrase informed consent in

quotation marks when I am referring to antiabortion appropriations of the informed
consent process, or I will follow the Guttmacher Institute and use the phrase: abortionspecific “informed consent” laws (Richardson & Nash, 2006, p.11). Therefore, if I use
the term informed consent without quotation marks or without the qualifier “abortionspecific,” then I am referring to traditional deployments of informed consent or to
informed consent discourses other than antiabortion ones.
4

To the degree that I ground my analysis in linguistic practices, the spirit of my

methodology is informed by Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language as espoused
in his Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein (1953/2001) argues, “For a large class
of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined
thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (43). Accordingly, if we want to
know the significance of a word, we must look and describe how the word functions in
and across discourses. Thus, Wittgenstein’s imperative, “don’t think, but look!” (66).
5

See also Gold and Nash (2007).

6

For a fresh critique of informed consent see Manson and O’Neil (2007).

7

Beauchamp and Childress (2009) define competence as the “capacity to

understand the material information, to make a judgment about this information in light
of their values, to intend a certain outcome, and to communicate freely their wishes to
caregivers or investigators” (p.113).
8

Beauchamp and Childress (2009) argue a voluntary action occurs if the patient

“wills the action without being under the control of another’s influence” (p.132).
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9

For a useful overview of the different models of medical decision-making see

Emanuel and Emanuel (2003).
10

See Pratt v. Davis (1905), Schloendorff v. The Society of the New York Hospital

(1914), Haskins v. Howard (1929), and Hunt v. Bradshaw (1955). For an analysis of
these cases, see Faden and Beauchamp (1986, pp.116-125) and Katz (1984, pp.48-84).
For a much earlier ruling on consent in the medical context see Slater v. Baker and
Stapleton (1767).
11

Faden and Beauchamp (1986) claim that prior to the 1950s, “we have not been

able to locate a single substantial discussion in the medical literature of consent and
patient authorization” (p.86).
12

Although Justice Bray is typically identified as the progenitor of the term

“informed consent,” the term actually originated in an amicus brief submitted by the
American College of Surgeons to the California Court of Appeals (Katz, 1984, p.64).
13

This is not to suggest, however, that disclosure requirements immediately

became the law of the land. Shortly after Salgo, a physician was ruled as liable for
“mental anguish” for the troubling information he disclosed to a patient in the New York
case Ferrara v. Galluchio (1958). See Berg et al. (2001, p.44).
14

Such questions include: How much information are physicians liable to share?

Who determines this information? How exhaustive must physicians be in their
enumeration of possible risks and benefits? How do physicians determine if the patient
has adequately processed the necessary information?
15

Along with the Natanson case, the cases of Canterbury v. Spence (1972) and

Scott v. Bradford (1979) contributed to the judicial and legal development of informed
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consent. For a useful discussion of the importance of these cases, see the work of Katz
(1984, pp.71-84).
16

It is important to note that many physicians resisted these new legal

requirements. Physicians voiced concern that informed consent set impossible standards
and that the ideal of informed consent did not translate well into the reality of medical
practice. Moreover, some physicians worried that bombarding patients with detailed
information might discourage them from surgery and treatment (Faden & Beauchamp,
1986, pp.90-91). After all, informing patients of their medical condition, procedural
risks, and possible alternatives expands the range of choices available to the patient and
increases the possibility of patient-physician dispute. For an early example of physician
critiques of informed consent see Fellner and Marshall (1970).
17

For a lively account of problematic western medical constructions of female

patient competency see Ehrenreich and English (2005).
18

Smith’s (1996) article originally pointed me to this citation (p.195).

19

For an excellent discussion of the import and impact of implicit stereotypes

upon women’s self-perceptions see Fine (2010).
20

First published in 1977, Principles of Biomedical Ethics is described by

Dr. Albert Jonsen, former member of The National Commission and The
President’s Commission, as “the thesaurus of bioethical discourse” (as cited in the
Oxford University Press, 2015, para 7). Likewise, Daniel Callahan, co-founder
and president emeritus of The Hastings Center, asserts it is “the most used, most
praised, and most distinguished book in the field [of bioethics]” (as cited in the
Oxford University Press, 2015, para 1). In this book, Beauchamp and Childress
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(2009) propose four moral principles that are “basic for biomedical ethics” (p.2):
1) respect for patient autonomy, 2) nonmaleficence, 3) beneficence, 4) justice.
Beauchamp and Childress defend their principled approach on the basis that it
provides “a framework of norms with which we can start in biomedical ethics”
(p.16). Referred to as “principlism,” this strategy attempts to provide moral
anchorage without assuming the truth or supremacy of any particular moral theory
(Iltis, 2000, p.273). Although this strategy is debated in bioethics literature
(Clouser & Gert, 1990; Evans, 2000), Beauchamp and Childress’ four principles
remain a guiding framework of the field.
21

Diana Meyers (1987) distinction between episodic and programmatic autonomy

insightfully reminds us that agents who are oppressed or subjugated are still capable of
autonomous actions.
22

The concept of relational autonomy was initially proposed in an effort to

preserve the emancipatory promise of autonomy while simultaneously recognizing and
integrating the concerns voiced by feminist scholars regarding the patriarchal origins of
autonomy. Feminist theorists have treated autonomy with critical suspicion for a number
of reasons. For one, some have argued that autonomy presupposes a self-sufficient, presocial, atomistic and independent self, a paradigm that overlooks the contribution of
social forces to the production of selfhood (Baier, 1985). Some feminists have argued
that autonomy is a particularly “masculine” ideal that privileges activities and traits
historically associated with, or limited to, the lives of upper class, heterosexual, white
men (Code, 1991; Code, 2000). Other feminists have insightfully argued that identifying
autonomy as the ethical ideal par excellence, overlooks other equally important ethical
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ideals, such as care, interconnection, trust, and compassion (Chodorow, 1978; Held,
1993; Nedelsky, 1989).
23

Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000, p.26) credit Jennifer Nedelsky with being the first

scholar to explicitly articulate a feminist conception of relational autonomy (Nedelsky,
1989; Nedelsky, 1990; Nedelsky, 1993; Nedelsky, 1995). Subsequent to Nedelsky’s
articulation, other scholars have explored and developed the idea of relational autonomy.
For some good examples see Donchin (2001), Freeman (2011), Mackenzie and Stoljar
(2000), and Sherwin (1998).
24

Theorists, for example, disagree whether autonomy is a pre-social capacity that

is nurtured in social contexts, or one that is activated by social relations. Likewise, there
is a tension between procedural and substantial accounts of autonomy. Procedural
accounts argue autonomy occurs so long as the agent has subjected her ideas to certain
procedures of reflection and evaluation, no matter the content or conclusion of her
thoughts. Substantive accounts worry that procedural accounts fail to recognize the
import of oppressive socialization, and they add additional requirements in terms of
content and process. For a concise discussion of this distinction see Mackenzie and
Stoljar (2000, pp.12-15).
25

McLeod (2002) recognizes that the relationship between autonomy and self-

trust is reciprocal: one must have self-trust to act autonomously, and one must have some
autonomy to have self-trust.
26

McLeod (2002) has insightfully suggested that if patient autonomy is truly the

goal, then the provider will need to encourage the patient’s general capacity for self-trust,
as lack of self-trust may foreclose autonomy completely (p.147).
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27

In the blog My Ecdysis (2008, April 26), kyriarchy is defined as a “neologism

coined by Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza and derived from the Greek words for ‘lord’ or
‘master (kyrios) and ‘to rule or dominate’ (archein) . . . . Kyriarchy is best theorized as a
complex pyramidal system of intersecting multiplicative social structures of
superordination and subordination, of ruling and oppression.”
28

It is important to note, however, that shared decision making is valued for its

emphasis on provider participation, as well. In many ways, shared decision making
marks a middle ground between paternalistic models which overlook patient input and
“independent choice” models which deemphasize physician input and potentially place
too much responsibility on patients, thus leading to concerns of patient abandonment.
For a discussion of concerns raised by these competing paradigms see Quill and Brody
(1996).
29

Smith (1996) defines the information transfer model as:

On what I call an information-transfer model, a source of information transfers it
to a receiver. As the model applies to medicine, one source, usually the
physician, obtains relevant information on patient symptoms, status, and history,
by medical interviews and tests. Subsequently, after objective analysis, the
physician transfers diagnostic and treatment information back to the patientreceiver or his or her family. (p.187)
For another critique of the treatment of “information” by bioethicists see Manson and
O’Neill (2007).
30

Alternatively, abortion was permitted for any reason in Alaska, the District of

Columbia, Hawaii, New York, and Washington (Craig & O’Brien, 1993, p.75).
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31

The Due Process Clause reads, “No state shall . . . deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law” (U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 3). In prior
decisions, the Court ruled that the notion of liberty encompasses an individual’s right to
privacy. The Court recognizes a right of personal privacy as far back as the 1891
decision Union Pacific River Company v. Botsford, but the Court’s articulation of privacy
in the reproductive context originates in the 1965 decision Griswold v. Connecticut and in
the 1972 decision Eisenstadt v. Baird. For a discussion of privacy within judicial
discourse see Shapiro (2007, p.xxix) and Garrow (1998). Although the Court turned to
these past cases to defend abortion on the basis of privacy, it is important to note that the
Court recognized that the privacy defended in Roe differed from the privacy articulated in
Griswold and Eisenstadt. For example, Justice Blackmun argued, “The pregnant woman
cannot be isolated in her privacy. She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus, if one accepts
the medical definitions of the developing young in the human uterus.” The Court
reasoned, “The situation therefore is inherently different from marital intimacy, or
bedroom possession of obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or education . . . .”
(as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.40).
32

In Roe, the Court explained,

Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are requirements as to the
qualifications of the person who is to perform the abortion; as to the licensure of
that person; as to the facility in which the procedure is to be performed, that is
whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or some other place of less-thanhospital status; as to the licensing of the facility, and the like.
(as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.42)
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In other words, states were permitted to place prohibitions on the abortion decision to
protect the woman’s health and medical safety.
33

For insightful legal criticisms of Roe’s excessive focus on physician rights, see

Tribe (1985) and Asaro (1983).
34

I do not mean to imply that the respective members of the Court are insensitive

to the varied conditions that inform the abortion decisions of individual women, and the
Court does recognize the existence of nonmedical factors that influence the abortion
decision, like stigma or family size. However, Roe ultimately insists on the medical
nature of abortion. This insistence reflects Justice Blackmun’s unswerving belief that
abortion ultimately requires medical oversight and that “the physician’s guidance was
essential” (Hunter, 2006, p.185). Years after Roe, Blackmun argued, “I think to this day
there ought to be the physician’s advice in there. I don’t believe in abortion on demand”
(Blackmun, July 6, 1994-December 13, 1995).
35

As an example of this type of strategic thinking see Wood and Durham (1978).

36

Laws that prohibited abortion in public hospitals were, in many cases, simply

maintaining the status quo, as many public hospitals had never provided abortions
(Henshaw, 1986, p.253).
37

The Missouri law defined viability as “that stage of fetal development when the

life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or
artificial life-supportive systems” (as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.58). Opponents argued
this definition conflicted with the definition provided by Roe because it failed to
reference gestational time periods and the trimester framework as established in Roe.
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38

Before choosing a career in law, Justice Blackmun considered going to medical

school, and he later served as general counsel for the Mayo Clinic, a medical and
research center in Rochester, Minnesota. It is likely that this experience deepened his
reverence for the medical world. See, for example, Hunter (2006), Koh (1987), and
Greenhouse (2004).
39

It should also be noted, however, that Justice Blackmun had demonstrated a

profound awareness of the moral complexity of abortion in the past, and there is reason to
argue that his phrase “full knowledge” did not reflect his belief that the informed consent
process could comprehensively cover all of the moral dimensions of abortion.
Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun’s ruling enshrines the idea of “full knowledge” within
judicial articulations of informed consent vis-à-vis the abortion decision.
40

For a full list and discussion of these laws see Wood and Durham (1978,

pp.817-818).
41

For legal discussions of the Casey decision see Borgmann (2004), Blumenthal

(2008), Dresser (2008), Goldstein (1996), Manian (2009), Tholen & Baird (1995),
Wharton, Frietsche, & Kolbert (2006), and Whitman (2002). For a concise discussion of
the political context that impacted the Casey decision see Craig and O’Brien (1993,
pp.325-359) and Friedman, L. (1993, pp.3-18).
42

There was further reason to believe the judicial winds had shifted to favor

antiabortionists. The personnel of the Court had changed significantly since Roe, when
the Court defended abortion rights by a majority of seven to two. By the time of Casey,
only Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens openly defended abortion rights, giving
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abortion opponents reasons to believe the new coalition of conservative judges would
support enhanced abortion regulations (Friedman, L., 1993, pp.10-12).
43

Like all laws that potentially interfere with a fundamental constitutional right,

the Court had to assess the provisions instituted by the Pennsylvania Control Act using a
standard of judicial review. Traditionally, this standard is chosen from a three-tiered
system of review that includes rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. In
effect, these standards prohibit the federal government or state governments from passing
laws that could have discriminatory effects. Each tier dictates a different set of necessary
requirements to measure the constitutionality of a law. Strict scrutiny is the most
demanding standard. If a right is protected by strict scrutiny, it receives the highest level
of protection and little can be done to regulate or restrict that right. For a cogent
summary of the requirements necessary for a law to pass strict scrutiny see Oshana
(2011, pp.51-52).
44

The undue burden standard is vague and imprecise, a problem recognized by

dissenting members of the Court. The potential arbitrariness of the undue burden
standard is evident if we contrast the provisions overturned by the Court with those it
upheld. For example, the Court determined that the spousal notification provision of the
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act was unconstitutional because of the prevalence of
physical and psychological abuse inflicted by husbands against their wives (as cited in
Shapiro, 2007, p.207). At the same time, however, the Court ruled that Pennsylvania’s
mandatory waiting period did not pose an undue burden on a woman’s decision to
terminate her pregnancy, despite recognizing that waiting periods may pose “increased
costs and potential delays” (as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.202). In a brief filed by twenty!

192

!
four organizations supporting the right to an abortion, petitioners enumerated problematic
consequences of mandated waiting periods, including “duplicate journeys,” missing
work, and lost pay (as cited in Friedman, L., 1993, p.121). Surely, increased costs, lost
work, and time delays constitute a legitimate obstacle. Must there be an extant threat of
physical abuse to qualify regulations as unduly burdensome, as the Court’s ruling seems
to suggest?
45

Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, O’Connor, Stevens and Souter upheld Roe’s

central ruling that a woman has a constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy. Justice
Blackmun disagreed with the Court in upholding Pennsylvania’s regulations; Justice
Rehnquist, Justice White, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas maintained that Roe was
wrongly decided and that the spousal notification provision “rationally furthers legitimate
state interests” (as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.223).
46

In her dissenting opinion in Akron, Justice O’Connor argued in favor of

adopting the “unduly burdensome standard” (as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.134) to assess
abortion regulations. In deploying the undue burden standard, Justice O’Connor explains
that the concept of undue burden has a history in Supreme Court Rulings. For example,
in Maher v. Roe (1977), the Court argued that a woman’s constitutional right to abortion
protected her only from “unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide
whether to terminate her pregnancy” (as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.81). When the Court
ruled in Bellotti v. Baird (1979) that a Massachusetts law requiring minors to obtain
parental consent before procuring an abortion without exception was unconstitutional, it
argued that “the constitutional right to seek an abortion may not be unduly burdened by
state-imposed conditions . . .” (as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.103). In Casey, the majority
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opinion includes a list of past uses of “undue burden” by the Court (as cited in Shapiro,
2007, p.197).
47

Notably, the Court’s contention that abortion is psychologically damaging sets

a dangerous precedent that influences later Court decisions regarding abortion regulation.
In Gonzales v. Carhart (2007), for example, the Court upheld a ban on a specific type of
abortion procedure on the unfounded basis that abortion is psychologically traumatic for
women. In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy argued that it is “self-evident that a
mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must suffer grief more anguished and
sorrow more profound when she learns, only after the event, what she once did not
know” (as cited in Legal Information Institute, n.d.d, Justice Kennedy delivered the
opinion of the court, IV, A, para 9). Notably, the only evidence supporting Justice
Kennedy’s argument that abortion is psychologically damaging came from an amicus
brief submitted by the antiabortion organization The Justice Foundation (Siegel, April
2008, p.102).
48

In Roe the Court argued, “. . . the word “person,” as used in the Fourteenth

Amendment, does not include the unborn” (as cited in Shapiro, 2007, p.39).
49

The strategies I discuss in this chapter are not exhaustive; there are other

equally problematic topics couched within “informed consent” materials that I do not
attend to. As way of example, six states—Arizona, Kansas, North Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, and West Virginia—suggest a correlation between abortion and future
infertility within their “informed consent” materials (Guttmacher Institute, February,
2015b), despite widespread consensus within the medical community that other than in
very rare cases of infection, abortions performed during the first trimester using vacuum
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aspiration present no long-term risk of infertility or ectopic pregnancy (Atrash & Hogue,
1990; Boonstra, Gold, Richards & Finer, 2006; Frank, McNamee, Hannaford, Kay &
Hirsch, 1991; Hogue, 1986; Hogue, Boardman, Stotland, & Peipert, 1999, p.217; Hogue,
Cates, & Tietze, 1982; Kalish, Chasen, Rosenzweig, Rashbaum, & Chervenak, 2002).
50

To be clear, the National Cancer Institute does claim that some pregnancy-

related factors may lower a woman’s risk of breast cancer later in life. For example,
studies suggest that women who carry full-term pregnancies before the age of 30 face a
decreased risk of breast cancer when they are older (NCI, n.d.a, Are there any pregnancyrelated factors associated with a lower risk of breast cancer?, para 2), and the likelihood
of breast cancer decreases in relation to the number of births (NCI, n.d.a, Are there any
pregnancy-related factors associated with a lower risk of breast cancer?, para 3; Lambe et
al., 1996). However, some evidence shows that multiple births only protect women from
hormone receptor-positive breast cancer (NCI, n.d.a, Are there any pregnancy-related
factors associated with a lower risk of breast cancer?, para 2, para 3). Additionally, the
National Cancer Institute (n.d.a) claims that “women who are older than 30 when they
give birth to their first child have a higher risk of breast cancer than women who have
never given birth” (Are any pregnancy-related factors associated with an increase in
breast cancer risk?, para 2), and that women face a short-term increased risk of breast
cancer immediately following birth (Are any pregnancy-related factors associated with an
increase in breast cancer risk?, para 3; Dickson, Pestell, & Lippman, 2004). Moreover,
many women who have abortions early in life will later carry a pregnancy to term and
may thus still benefit from the protective benefits of pregnancy. In summation, there is
an incredibly important difference between the claim that some pregnancies appear to
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protect some women from some types of breast cancer and the claim that abortion causes
breast cancer.
51

Antiabortion arguments purporting the psychological “dangers” of abortion also

make use of discredited research studies. For example, antiabortion politicians in South
Dakota have referenced a disputed study published in The Journal of Psychiatric
Research titled, “Induced abortion and anxiety, mood, and substance use disorders:
Isolating the effects of abortion in the national co-morbidity survey” (Coleman, Coyle,
Shuping, & Rue, 2009). For arguments disputing or refuting the Coleman, Coyle,
Shuping and Rue study, see Steinberg and Finer (2011) and Kessler and Schatzberg
(2012, p.410).
52

For examples of medical organizations driven by antiabortion ideology see The

Coalition on Abortion/Breast Cancer (n.d.) and The American Association of Pro-Life
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (2013).
53

The booklet can be downloaded from a state-sponsored website (Kansas

Department of Health and Environment, n.d.a) where one can also watch size-enhanced
videos of developing embryos. The Kansas booklet includes information on the
psychological “risks” of abortion (Kansas Department of Health and Environment, n.d.a,
p.30), paternal responsibility, alternatives to abortion, medical risks of abortion and
pregnancy, and illustrated accounts of fetal development.
54

Operation Outcry’s strategy exemplifies what Reva Siegel terms the “woman-

protective antiabortion argument” (Siegel, April 2008, p.1648; Siegel, June, 2008; Siegel
& Blustain, October 2006). According to Siegel, the woman-protective antiabortion
argument is a rhetorical strategy that expands antiabortion discourse beyond the fetal!
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centric arguments favored by antiabortion groups in the past, and argues that abortion
psychologically damages women as well.
55

Here, I do not mean to suggest that the women who share their stories on the

forums provided by Operation Outcry are disingenuous or fabricating their abortion
experiences. Many of these women appear genuinely regretful. However, it does not
follow from their stories that post-abortion regret is an authentic psychological disorder
that will afflict all women.
56

Similar tactics are found within the “informed consent” materials of Michigan,

Nebraska, North Carolina, and Utah. In North Carolina, false claims regarding the
psychological consequences of abortion are not extensively developed, yet they exist.
For example, under a section detailing medical risks, North Carolina’s abortion booklet
simply states “possible increased risk of mental health problems” (North Carolina
Department of Health and Human Services, December, 2011, p.23). In other state
“informed consent” materials, however, the psychological “risks” of abortion are
discussed in more detail. In Michigan, women are only given information detailing the
negative emotional consequences of abortion (Michigan Department of Community
Health, 2001-2014, Medication-Induced Abortion, Risks and Complications, para. 5).
Nebraska’s “informed consent” booklet warns women that, “[s]ome reports suggest that
some women experience reactions such as sadness, grief, regret, anxiety and guilt”
(Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services, 2012, p.28). Likewise, the Utah
Department of Health Division of Family Health and Preparedness (2012) publishes a
booklet that claims:
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Right after the abortion, some women report a sense of relief. This relief may be
the short-term result of ending what was viewed as a problem. Possible negative
emotional responses to having an abortion include: depression, grief, anxiety,
lowered self-esteem, hostility toward self and others, regret, difficulty sleeping,
suicidal thoughts and behavior, sexual dysfunction, relationship disruption,
flashbacks, and a sense of loss and emptiness.
(Utah Department of Health, 2012, p.28)
57

Any assessment of women’s negative emotional responses to abortion must

also recognize the hostile environment that circumscribes many abortion facilities.
Antiabortion harassment is common, and it can take multiple forms including picketing,
vandalism, bomb threats, and Internet harassment. Eighty-eight percent of abortion
clinics report at least one type of harassment, with increased levels of harassment
reported by clinics in the Midwest and the South (Jones & Kooistra, 2011, p.48). More
specifically, 85% of clinics in the Midwest, 75% of clinics in the South, 48% of clinics in
the Northeast, and 44% of clinics in the West report harassment (Jones & Kooistra, 2011,
p.48). In a research study carried out between 2008 and 2010 at thirty abortion facilities,
researchers determined that most facilities experience “regular” protestor presence, and
one third of these facilities described the protestors as “aggressive” toward women. Of
the 956 women interviewed, 46% reported seeing protestors, 25% reported feeling “a
little upset” and 16% reported being “quite a lot or extremely upset.” Researchers
determined that, “women who had difficulty deciding to abort had higher odds of
reporting being upset by protesters” (Foster, Barar, Gould, & Weitz, 2011, p.303). See
also Foster, Kimport, Gould, Roberts and Weitz (2013).
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58

It also bears mention that women are provided information detailing fetal

development throughout the full course of pregnancy in twenty-seven states,
notwithstanding the fact that third-trimester abortions have always been prohibited,
unless the woman’s life is in danger (Guttmacher Institute, February, 2015b). Many
“informed consent” booklets carry detailed photos or depictions of fetal development
through all stages of pregnancy, including the third trimester. For women considering
abortion, extensive information on third-term fetal growth is superfluous and
unnecessary. Although it is possible that some women may find such information helpful
or interesting, there is no medically sound reason that justifies subjecting all women to
this information.
59

North Dakota also requires physicians to tell women that, “the abortion will

terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being” (North Dakota
Abortion Control Act, 2009, 14-02.1-11(a)(2)).
60

Although the informed consent materials of Indiana and Missouri do not

extensively discuss the claim that human life begins at conception, this claim still
occupies an aggressively rhetorical spot within each state’s informed consent booklet.
Indiana’s Abortion Informed Consent Brochure (Indiana State Department of Health, July
1, 2013) opens its section on fetal development with the following claim, “Human
physical life begins when a human ovum is fertilized by a human sperm” (p.3). In
Missouri, the first page of the “informed consent” booklet declares in bold print, “The life
of each human being begins at conception. Abortion will terminate the life of a separate,
unique, living human being” (Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services, n.d.,
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p.1). Though laconic, the underlying moral message of each statement is reductively
clear: abortion kills a person.
61

My analysis of ultrasounds owes a debt to feminist work that precedes me. See

Boucher (2004), Casper (1998), Dubow (2010), Duden (1993), Franklin (1991), Hartouni
(1992), Hartouni (1999), Mitchell (2001), Morgan (2009), Morgan and Michaels (1999),
Oaks (2000), Petchesky (1987), Taylor (2004), and Taylor (2008).
62

Recently, antiabortion politicians have proposed legislation that articulates how

a woman may comport herself during a mandatory ultrasound. For example, Republican
Michelle Bachmann introduced a bill to the 112th U.S. Congress titled The Heartbeat
Informed Consent Act (Heartbeat Informed Consent, 2011, §3402). Regarding
mandatory ultrasounds, the bill states:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent a pregnant woman from
closing or averting her eyes from the ultrasound images required to be displayed,
or not listening to the description of the images required to be given, by the
provider or the provider's agent pursuant to paragraph.
(Heartbeat Informed Consent, 2011)
Regarding the fetal heartbeat, the bill also grants the woman the “Ability to not listen—
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the pregnant woman from not
listening to the sounds detected by the hand-held Doppler fetal monitor, . . . ” (Heartbeat
Informed Consent, 2011, §3402). The very fact that politicians are trying to legislate
where a woman can and cannot look and what a woman can and cannot listen to is
alarming. By arguing that women are permitted to “not listen,” the legislation implies
that such permission can be withdrawn. Moreover, this proposed law raises pragmatic
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issues about how women might exercise their decision not to look or listen. Referencing
the Heartbeat Informed Consent Act, James Rocha (2012) notes, “while a woman could
avert her eyes to avoid seeing the image, it is hard to believe that she could avoid hearing
a heartbeat merely by ‘not listening to the sounds’ (p.46). The bill did not pass.
63

For additional examples of this type of thinking see Focus on the Family (2011)

and National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (2014). I am grateful to the work of
Wiebe and Adams (2009) for directing me to these websites.
64

In Texas, a woman is required to hear an explanation of the sonogram unless

her pregnancy is a result of sexual assault or incest, she is a minor with a judicial bypass,
or the fetus has an irreversible medical condition or abnormality (Texas A Woman’s
Right to Know Act, § 171.012 (5)). In addition, Texas’ ultrasound law carries punitive
consequences for abortion providers who resist or ignore its requirements. According to
section 171.008 of the Texas law, physicians and abortion providers who do not comply
with such requirements commit a misdemeanor and are punishable with fines not
exceeding $10,000.
65

Historically, the physiological differences between a fetus and a postnatal

human being have long held moral significance in abortion practice, and the legality of
abortion has always varied in relation to stages of pregnancy. Prior to criminalization,
abortion was legal until “quickening,” or the point where the woman can feel fetal
movements. Prior to 1869, Catholic doctrine did not view early abortions as murder
because the embryo had not yet been ensouled or “animated” (Luker, 1984, p.13). It was
not until Pope Pius IX’s 1869 declaration that all abortions entailed excommunication,
that Catholic doctrine categorically prohibited abortions. Likewise, Roe’s trimester
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framework, which forbids states from proscribing abortion prior to viability, links the
legal permissibility of abortion to fetal development. A 2012 Gallup poll demonstrates
that American support for abortion changes in response to the stages of pregnancy, with
61% supporting legal abortion in the first trimester, 27% supporting legal abortion in the
second trimester, and 14% supporting legal abortion in the third trimester (Saad, January
22, 2013).
66

For additional discussions of the rich and diverse moral reasoning that informs

women’s abortion decisions see Baumgardner (2008) and Jacob (2004).
67

Notably, available data on abortion rates is not current enough to adequately

reflect the recent surge of “informed consent” regulations. The most recent and
comprehensive study of abortion incidence and service availability was published in 2014
(Jones & Jerman). However, the Jones and Jerman study only reflects abortion rates
during 2010 and 2011. Consequently, the data do not reflect abortion incidence in the
wake of heightened regulations passed during the last three years.
68

It is important to note that the data generated by ANSIRH (June, 2014) only

reflect situations where women were offered the choice to view an ultrasound image, not
situations where women are required to view the image.
69

Other limited studies also report that many women find viewing the image

helpful, although not for the reasons advanced by antiabortionists. See Graham, Ankrett,
and Killick (2010), Bamigboye, Nikodem, Santana, and Hofmeyr (2000), and Wiebe and
Adams (2009).
70

There are a number of limitations that shape Cockrill and Weitz’s (2010) study.

They caution that, “one of the main limitations to our research is that we only interviewed
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women who successfully negotiated access issues like cost and distance” (p.18).
Likewise, their study is limited by small sample size: only 20 participants were
interviewed (p.12). In addition, the mandated information provided by the state in which
Cockrill and Weitz (2010) conducted their research did not contain overtly misleading
information. Instead, the information provided to the women at the clinic they surveyed
was designed to encourage “motherhood or adoption by fostering a bond between the
pregnant woman and her fetus . . . or to encourage her to consider alternatives like
adoption or motherhood . . . .” (p.14). Consequently, their study does not reflect
women’s ability to recognize gross misinformation, like the false claim that abortion
causes breast cancer or psychological disorder.
71

The exception is one participant named Lyndsay who discussed an abortion she

had when she was 17. She writes, “I was being careless, you know just like ‘oh well,
there’s abortion out there’” (as cited in Cockrill & Weitz, 2010, p.17). Lyndsay’s
comments occurred in the context of a discussion addressing parental notification and
minors seeking an abortion.
72

It is also important to note that the belief that “other women” need information

could be coming from a place of genuine concern for other women. Many women lack
the proper venues, opportunities, and discursive arenas for fruitful, insightful, and
beneficial conversations about unwanted pregnancy. In a society that stigmatizes
abortion and routinely collapses the complex moral elements of the abortion decision into
reductive clichés and hackneyed rhetoric, many women may require additional
conversations and information about abortion, a need that other women facing the
abortion decision may be sensitive to.
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In 1962, Sheri Finkbine, a married mother of four, attempted to terminate a

wanted pregnancy after learning she had taken an anti-nausea drug that contained
thalidomide, a compound that causes severe fetal defects. Although her doctor advised
her to have an abortion, the hospital later rescinded the doctor’s recommendation, forcing
Finkbine to travel overseas for an abortion.
74

It is important to note that Jones was halfway through her pregnancy at the time

of her sonogram. According to the Guttmacher Instituted, 88.8 % of U.S. abortions occur
in the first twelve weeks of pregnancy, and 63.1% occur in the first nine weeks of
pregnancy (Guttmacher Institute, July, 2014). Given that first-trimester fetuses are less
developed than Jones’ fetus, it follows that Jones’ ultrasound description may have
included morphological details that would not be included in other readings.
75

For a sympathetic response to Jones’ story see Turits (March 26, 2012),

although many of the article’s online commenters do not share Turits’ sympathy.
76

Importantly, Meaghan Winter, the author of the story, later explained that

whereas it was easy to find white urban women in their 20s and 30s who were willing to
discuss their abortion experiences, it was difficult to find women of color, or women who
were living in rural or conservative pockets of the country to share their abortion stories
(Herold, 2013, para 5).
77

I do not mean to suggest that the American Medical Association represents the

opinion of all physicians. Notably, the majority of physicians and medical students do
not belong to the AMA, and membership in the AMA has been declining over time. As
of 2011, approximately 15% of practicing United States doctors belong to the AMA, as
opposed to a 75% membership rate in the early 1950s (Collier, 2011).
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78

To be fair, AMA publications have provided important forums for discussing

onerous abortion laws. In April of 2014, for example, the AMA’s online ethics journal
Virtual Mentor focused on the impact of third parties and outside influences upon
medical decision-making, and it featured a short report on mandated ultrasound viewing.
In one essay, Jen Russo (April, 2014) concludes that mandated ultrasound legislation
violates the core principles of medical ethics, and Steinauer and Sufrin (April, 2014)
argue that “micromanagement” of abortion-care “exists to no comparable degree
anywhere else in medicine” (p.267). Importantly, such articles testify to a growing
awareness amongst AMA community members of the injustice occasioned by invasive
abortion legislation. It is important to note, however, that the AMA includes a disclaimer
at the bottom of each article that states, “The viewpoints expressed on this site are those
of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the AMA.” Thus,
although the AMA provides a platform for critical discussion of abortion laws, one
cannot extrapolate the AMA’s official position from individual critiques.
79

In one study, 17% of medical educators surveyed reported no training in

abortion in clinical or preclinical years; almost a quarter of educators surveyed reported
no training during third year OBGYN rotation; and only 32% of educators surveyed
offered a third year OBGYN lecture on abortion specifically. Roughly half of all medical
schools surveyed offered a fourth year reproductive health elective, but participation rate
amongst students was low (Espey et al., 2005). For further discussion regarding the
diminution of abortion provision see Joffe, Anderson, and Steinauer (1998).
80
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For an example, see American Academy of Family Physicians (2012).
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For an interesting discussion of the history of abortion counseling practices in

the clinic settings see Carol Joffe (January, 2013).
82

In general, both standards dictate that patients be given information regarding

the following elements: “The nature and purpose of the proposed treatment, its risks and
benefits, and any available alternatives” (Berg et al., 2001, p.53). The standards differ in
the criteria they use for identifying the content and scope of each element.
83

It is important to note that although leading psychological organizations have

rejected the notion of Post-abortion Syndrome and feminists have correctly identified
abortion stigma as the source of much abortion-related emotional distress, some women
may experienced genuine emotional distress. In such cases, it may be necessary to meet
women’s psychological distress with professional mental health services.
84

Of course, the model of patient-provider interaction that I advocate here would

also require fundamental institutional changes to our healthcare system. The healthcare
financing system, for example, would have to recognize and value the added time
necessitated by robust medical dialogue. The difficulty of any overhaul to the healthcare
system should not be underestimated, as demonstrated by the prolonged and acrimonious
debates surrounding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (2010).
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